CONSTRUCTION

"We believe it fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, "we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." We should not assume that Congress intended to set the courts completely adrift from state law with regard to questions for which it has not provided a specific and definite answer in an act such as the one before us which, as we have indicated, is so intimately related to state law. Thus, we conclude that a reading of the statute as a whole, with due regard to its purpose, requires application of the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred."

""A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975)). When construing the meaning of a statute, "the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.""

"It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute are to be read together "to facilitate the achievement of their goals in accordance with reason and common sense." Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So.2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). "Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control District, 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992). Construing all these subsections of the Act together, Appellee argued that, as a matter of law, 1) once the Commission failed to make a "reasonable cause" determination within 180 days of the filing of Appellant's complaint, Appellant had the option, under subsection (8) of the Act, of proceeding under subsection (4) as if the Commission had made a determination; 2) under subsection (4), Appellant the option to bring a civil action or request an administrative hearing; and 3) Appellant was time-bound by the one-year deadline set forth in subsection (5) for commencing a civil action. "

Accordingly, because of the similarity in the provisions of the two acts, we follow the instruction of numerous state decisions, recognizing that if a Florida statute is modeled after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same construction as placed on its federal prototype, insofar as such interpretation is harmonious with the spirit and policy of the Florida legislation. See, e.g., Kidd v. City of Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 297, 304, 120 So. 556, 559 (1929); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. SCM Glidco Organics Corp., 606 So.2d 722, 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Department of Professional Reg., Div. of Real Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So.2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Pasco County Sch. Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 108, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). For the above reasons, we look to section 504, pertinent regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act and federal case law interpreting the statute for guidance in ascertaining the merits of appellant's handicap discrimination claim.