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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

the doctrine recognizing that the determination of facts litigated between two parties in a proceeding is binding on those parties in all future proceedings against each other; also known as issue preclusion. In a subsequent action between the parties on a different claim, the judgment is conclusive as to the issues raised in the subsequent action, if these issues were actually litigated and determined in the prior action. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy includes within it the right of the defendant (but not the state) to plead "collateral estoppel" and thereby preclude proof of some essential element of the state's case found in the defendant's favor at an earlier trial.
See estoppel. See also bar; merger; res judicata.
EXAMPLE: Damien is charged with robbing six persons at a poker game and his defense in the first trial involving the alleged robbery of only one of the victims is that he wasn't there [ALIBI], and if he is acquitted at that trial due to the jury's specific acceptance of his alibi, the state will be estopped to relitigate the alibi question with respect to the other related robberies.
Source: Barron's Dictionary of Legal Terms, Steven H. Gifis, 5th Edition; ©
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action, and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action."
"To support collateral estoppel, the issue must have been “actually ... litigated” in the previous litigation. Karan, 629 S.E.2d at 262–63 (quoting Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d at 7). An issue is considered “actually litigated” when the “issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.” Restatement of Judgments § 27, cmt. d. Requiring that issues be “actually litigated” ensures that collateral estoppel precludes only those issues that were contested by the parties. See Cleland v. Gwinnett Cnty., 226 Ga.App. 636, 487 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1997) (holding that where one party's interpretation was accepted without contest by both the other party and the court, “it was not ‘actually litigated’ ” and thus could not support collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation)"

"The essential role of this “necessarily decided” requirement is that it prevents judgments that rest on ambiguous grounds from having issue preclusive effect. Thus, where two or more possible grounds would theoretically support a judgment, and both were actually litigated, and the court does not clearly state on which ground its judgment rests, the judgment cannot have issue preclusive effect as to either issue, for neither is definitively the ground of the judgment. See Restatement of Judgments § 27, cmt. i (“If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.”); see also Callaway v. Irvin, 123 Ga. 344, 51 S.E. 477, 480 (1905) (“Thus, where several defenses are pleaded, and the judgment does not show upon which issue the decision was rendered, there is no estoppel.”)."
"Our application of collateral estoppel principles does not end the analysis, either. We must still decide whether a manifest injustice exception exists in the context of collateral estoppel, and if it does, whether manifest injustice would prohibit application of that doctrine."

...

Federal courts and other state courts, however, have held that the collateral estoppel doctrine does contain such a manifest injustice exception. See, e.g., Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 1982); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Dowling v. Finley Assocs., Inc., 727 A.2d 1245, 1249 n. 5 (Conn. 1999); Kansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer Koger Assocs., Inc., 941 P.2d 1321, 1333 (Kan. 1997); State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 61 P.3d 1104, 1109 (Wash. 2003). We agree. We hold that collateral estoppel will not be invoked to bar relief where its application would result in a manifest injustice.
Although the defense of collateral estoppel can look jurisdictional in character, it is an affirmative defense, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1), and therefore is not a per se jurisdictional bar to court review as contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (and thus the Florida rule which is based on that federal rule, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1)). Youngin's Auto Body v. District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 1,6 (D.D.C. 2011); and see, Hemphill v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 605 F.Supp.2d 183, 186 (D.D.C.2009) (observing that “res judicata is an affirmative defense that is generally pleaded in a defendant's answer, but is also properly brought in a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).
While the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be resolved through a motion for summary judgment, the trial court erred when it ventured outside the four corners of the complaint, took judicial notice of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. See Kest v. Nathanson, 216 So.2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
Differences in the burden of proof or persuasion between the initial proceeding and the subsequent proceeding may also affect whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel will be applied. Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 28(4) thus recognizes that a determination of an issue will not be given preclusive effect where "[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action." The classic example of the application of this exception occurs in the context of an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, which is not sufficient to protect the defendant from liability in a subsequent civil action by the government related to the same misconduct. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938); State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So.2d 477 (1943).

Florida also recognizes a "manifest injustice exception" to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. McBride, 848 So.2d at 291. This exception comes into play when application of the doctrine "would defeat the ends of justice." Id.; cf. Universal Const. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 68 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1953) (discussing "the salutary principle that the doctrine of res judicata should not be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice"). The manifest injustice exception recognized in Florida law parallels the exception in Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 28(5)(a) for circumstances where "[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue . . . because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest." See State v. Freund, 626 So.2d 1043, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(a) in support of holding that "denial of a petition for dependency does not preclude a criminal charge based on the same misconduct involved in the dependency proceeding").
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