Comparison: Individual Capacity vs Official Capacity

"an individual capacity claim is one where "the real party in interest is the individual, not the sovereign." Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1291. Individual capacity suits seek to impose only personal liability upon a government official, meaning the remedy in a successful individual capacity claim does not extend to the official's office. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). This "means an individual capacity suit targets the individual behavior of an official . . . as he carries out his state duties." Clemons, 818 F. App'x at 872 (Grant, J., concurring)."

"Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 416 U. S. 237-238 (1974)..."

"Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself."

"With this distinction in mind, it is clear that a suit against a government officer in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the governmental entity."

“In a §1983 action, punitive damages are only available from government officials when they are sued in their individual capacities"

“mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983"

“Because the complaint targets Clemons not as a proxy for the sovereign, but for personal conduct that will not be repeated by his successor-in-office, the suit involves only an individual capacity claim — and it is for that reason that Clemons may not invoke sovereign immunity."

"... Besides, neither a State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases, the law of agency has no application -- the wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury."

“Under Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 . . . (1980), a municipality is not entitled to claim the qualified immunity that the city's agents can assert."

"Defendants Kirby and Johnson were each sued in their individual capacity. The individual defendants, however, do not enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. First, with regard to plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against the individual defendants, they are not immune because plaintiff sued them in their individual capacities. In Hafer v. Melo, the Supreme Court emphasized that a plaintiff may sue a state official in his individual capacity, even though his actions were undertaken in his official capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26, 31 (1991) (holding in context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit that officials sued in their individual capacities are "persons" under that statute). In contrast to suits against officials in their official capacity, for which any liability would issue from the state treasury, a suit against an official in his individual capacity seeks the personal liability of the official. Because liability would issue from the individual, not the state, the state is not the real party in interest, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. Id. at 25-26; accord, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("Even a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally."); see also Erwin Chermirinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 429 (4th ed. 2003) ("[I]f the suit is against an officer for money damages when the relief would come from the officer's own pocket, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar even though the conduct was part of the officer's official duties."); cf. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The [states'] immunity also applies to actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for money damages." (emphasis added)). Because the individual defendants are only sued in their individual capacities, the court finds that they are not immune with regard to plaintiff's federal law claims for money damages."

"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office... [a]s such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself."

"In at least three recent cases arising under § 1983, we have plainly implied that a judgment against a public servant "in his official capacity" imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided, of course, the public entity received notice and an opportunity to respond. We now make that point explicit."

"official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent."

"An official capacity claim may proceed only if "[t]he real party in interest is the government entity, not the named official." Lewis v. Clark, --- U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291, 197 L. Ed. 2d 631 (2017) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1974))"

“In such cases, two other circuit courts have held that § 1983 plaintiffs may recover substantial general money damages as compensation for the wrong. See Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897-98 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1982); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1227-31 (8th Cir. 1981)"

“Absent waiver by a State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court, a bar that remains in effect when state officials are sued for damages in their official capacity."

“mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983"

“Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against official-capacity defendants. See Rosie D. v. Swift, 310 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 2002); Fred v. Roque, 916 F.2d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1990)"

“In an injunctive or declaratory action grounded on federal law, the State's immunity can be overcome by naming state officials as defendants. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89 (1984); see also Ex parte Young, supra. Monetary relief that is "ancillary" to injunctive relief also is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 415 U. S. 667-668"

“an official capacity suit targets not the personal behavior of an official like Clemons, but his enforcement of, or action carrying out, a government policy. And the result of such a suit, if successful, is that both the current officeholder and any future officeholder will be barred from carrying out whatever policy is at issue."

“We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."

"plead and prove three elements: (1) an official custom or policy that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right"

“The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit in federal court unless the state either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity."