How Sovereign Immunity Works

"Here, as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.

This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform."

"A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend."

1. whether the state waives its sovereign immunity;
2. whether Congress abrogates that immunity under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment; or
3. whether injunctive relief is being pursued;
   • whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law;
   • whether the complaint seeks relief properly characterized as prospective; and
   • whether a declaratory decree was violated;

• see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1890)
• see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56
• see Montero v Travis, 171 F. 3d 757

• Important Exception:State Officials are NOT immune from constitutional violations
  

  "The Court has recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State. This was the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void," and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 209 U. S. 160. Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative character and [was] subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." Ibid."

1. whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds;
2. whether the entity performs central governmental functions;
3. whether the entity may sue or be sued;
4. whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the name of the state; and
5. whether the entity has the corporate status of a state agency

• see Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cnty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988)
• see Ray v. City of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 703, 709-10 (9th Cir. 2019)

"Defendants Kirby and Johnson were each sued in their individual capacity. The individual defendants, however, do not enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. First, with regard to plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against the individual defendants, they are not immune because plaintiff sued them in their individual capacities. In Hafer v. Melo, the Supreme Court emphasized that a plaintiff may sue a state official in his individual capacity, even though his actions were undertaken in his official capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26, 31 (1991) (holding in context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit that officials sued in their individual capacities are "persons" under that statute). In contrast to suits against officials in their official capacity, for which any liability would issue from the state treasury, a suit against an official in his individual capacity seeks the personal liability of the official. Because liability would issue from the individual, not the state, the state is not the real party in interest, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. Id. at 25-26; accord, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("Even a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally."); see also Erwin Chermirinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 429 (4th ed. 2003) ("[I]f the suit is against an officer for money damages when the relief would come from the officer's own pocket, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar even though the conduct was part of the officer's official duties."); cf. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The [states'] immunity also applies to actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for money damages." (emphasis added)). Because the individual defendants are only sued in their individual capacities, the court finds that they are not immune with regard to plaintiff's federal law claims for money damages."