How the FCHR Corrupts Itself
| Background: | The FCHR - a state agency responsible for investigating discrimination (in Florida) - has a corrupt background (eg, ⚠ Bribery, ⚠ Discrimination, ⚠ Obstruction) |
| Problem: | You’re unsure of how the FCHR corrupts itself |
| Solution: | You inform yourself by reading through this [well-cited] explanation |
I | Definitions
II | The FCHR's Legislated Purpose
III | The FCHR's Ulterior Motive
Quite simply, the FCHR aims to save civil rights defendants 'millions of dollars'. The agency has said so [itself] on many occasions...
2019 Annual Report | $16,774,230 in Savings (to Defendants)
...the Commission has helped Florida stakeholders avoid over $16 million in litigation expenses. For FY 2018-19, the Return on Investment (ROI) is 214%.2018 Annual Report | $19,106,044 in Savings (to Defendants)
...the Commission has helped Florida stakeholders avoid over $19 million in litigation expenses. For FY 2017-18, the Return on Investment (ROI) is 304%.2017 Annual Report | $11,983,530 in Savings (to Defendants)
...the Commission has helped Florida stakeholders avoid over $12 million in litigation expenses. For FY 2016-17, the Return on Investment (ROI) is 145%....so forth & so on.
These savings, importantly, come at the expense of civil rights plaintiffs. A reality which the FCHR reveals with its own calculations:
| T | = | Total Costs Avoided |
| N | = | Number of mediated resolutions |
| µc | = | Average court-awarded damage |
| µm | = | Average FCHR mediated settlement |
- defendants (eg, Florida Blue, Pichard Holdings - Remedy Inteligence Staffing); and – pertinently –
- FCHR Commissioners (eg, Mr. Jay Pichard).
IV | The FCHR's Corruption (in Action)
Summary
The FCHR corrupts itself by aiming to cover for defendants (ie, the very same entities whom the FCHR’s [statutorily] required to investigate/reprimand). In order to cover up the defendants’ [alleged] discrimination, the FCHR commands its staff to obstruct/defeat cases. Obstructions/obliterations that feature:- pressuring FCHR staff to break the law (§760 FS – to be specific);
- pressuring FCHR staff to make complaints/charges disappear;
- installing an executive director who will subvert statutory/constitutional law;
- commanding the FCHR to cover up the commissioners’ own illegalities (see Art. II. Pol. 6 Section 1 of the FCHR Governance Policy);
- allowing the agency to adjudicate itself; and
- more
Case Parameters
| State/Territory: | Florida United States of America |
| Plaintiff: | Michelle Wilson (Former Executive Director of the FCHR) |
| Defendant #1: | Cheyanne Costilla (Current Executive Director of the FCHR) |
| Defendant #2: | Florida Commission on Human Relations, The (a Statewide Agency of Florida) |
| Defendant #3: | Division of Risk Management, The (a Statewide Agency of Florida) |
| Case Type: | Whistleblower Complaint |
| Authorities: |
• Florida’s Whistleblower Act | §112.3187-§112.31895 FS; • Florida Constitution (Art. I §9, Art. I §21, Art. I §22, Art. II §3) • United States Constitution (1st + 14th Amendments) |
| Tribunals: |
• Florida Office of the Inspector General, The • Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Leon County Court (ie, Florida’s 2nd Judicial Circuit Court) • Florida’ First District Court of Appeal |
| Case Numbers: | 1FCHR2021-28179 21DCA1D21-3417 3Leon County2023-CA-1569 41DCA1D24-0476 |
| Charges: | Retaliation |
| Adverse Events: | Termination Hostile Work Environment |
Pertinent Background
2. The FCHR – in its statutory form – is comprised of [a maximum of] 12 commissioners. These commissioners are actual people; who’ve been appointed by the governor. These people, however, don’t actually perform the investigations. Instead, they oversee the agency.
3. The FCHR – in its practical form – is comprised of dozens of employees. Employees, notably, who are neither: (i) elected; nor (ii) appointed. Of course, these employees work under the direction of their agency head. Their agency head (ie, the Executive Director) is [the only person] hired by the commissioners
4. So – as a quick recap – Florida’s governor appoints FCHR commissioners, and these FCHR commissioners hire the FCHR Executive Director.
Operation
b. makes determinations (among other things)
7. In turn, the Commissioners:
b. evaluate the executive director (among other things).
Operators
9. The statewide agency has also had numerous commissioners. The most notorious of whom (at least for this block of corruption) is Mr. Jay Pichard. Mr. Pichard, notably, has:
b. made a number of decisions/votes (ie, 236+ votes); and
c. engaged with the executive directors in a number of ways.
Details
11. On July 3, 2020, Commissioner Pichard tried to corrupt Director Wilson. Thereby asking her to cover-up illegalities [of civil rights defendants] for the sake of ‘saving businesses’:
“On 07/03/20, Jay Pichard specifically asked Ms. Wilson for “flexibility” to “save businesses.” By this he meant dismissing employment discrimination charges at intake, without investigation, issuing a “no cause” finding so charging parties could not go to court.”Director Wilson, however, refused Commissioner Pichard’s unlawful inducements:
“Ms. Wilson declined [Commissioner Pichard’s corruptions], reiterating to Pichard and the board that the commission’s job, by law, was to investigate claims as a neutral fact finding agency and not to favor either party to a complaint.”Yet, Commissioner Pichard persisted [with his corruptions]:
“Pichard repeatedly asked the same question hoping to get a different response from the General Counsel. To our knowledge, he never did.”12. On August 18, 2020, Commissioner Pichard continued his quest to corrupt FCHR investigations. He did so, importantly, by commanding jurisdictional impediments (via “no cause” determinations):
“Mr. Pichard steered the discussion [towards] meeting the 180-day compliance deadline for completing investigations of employment discrimination claims. As he had made clear throughout his tenure, he wanted the 180-day deadline met consistently by issuing “no-cause” determinations on charges at intake, rather than after investigation.”Once again, Director Wilson refused Commissioner Pichard’s corruptions:
“She pointed out that FCHR is bound by the Florida Statutes and the rules of the Florida Administrative Code to perform a fair and neutral investigation, not just go through the motions or dismiss cases at the very outset. She made it clear to the panel that she would not direct the staff to close an investigation prematurely just for the sake of meeting a 180-day standard.Commissioner Pichard, however, persisted with his unlawful inducements. Thereby upping the ante; by seeking Director Wilson’s termination:...
She also asserted that demanding an employee to close a case prematurely was unfair to both parties and that it could be detrimental to the agency's core value of providing fair and impartial investigations as well as exposing FCHR to consequences for unlawful conduct. She said the answer is to provide the resources FCHR needs to meet the 180-day deadline or change the law. Otherwise, FCHR will have to go on taking longer in some cases. It is not an option to just break the law.”
“Mr. Pichard, as was his custom, demanded that FCHR finish the investigations in 180 days and dismiss some without investigation. Derrick McGhee supported that view. A “no-confidence” vote immediately followed:”13. On October 15, 2020, the FCHR fired Director Wilson:
“[Director] Wilson was fired as Executive Director of the Florida Commission on Human Relations on October 15, 2020, after 17 years’ tenure with the agency.”
“The vote that fired Ms. Wilson on October 15, 2020, was over [the 180-day obstruction].”14. By October 23, 2020 (ie, 8 days later), the FCHR had already hired Cheyanne Costilla (“Director Costilla”) to be its new [interim]1 agency head (ie, Executive Director)2
“I believe that I have been discriminated against in violation of the Public Whistle-blower’s Act, §§1123187-112.31895, Florida Statutes for the following reasons:16. One such violative defendant was Commissioner Pichard [himself]:
The public whistleblower statute has three elements:(1) protected conduct,
(2) adverse action; and
(3) a connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action....
As stated above, the main adverse action was being fired in retaliation for refusal to violate the law on case investigations.”
“Mr. Pichard was antagonistic because his business had been the target of charges of discrimination to FCHR that he thought should have been processed differently...
Mr. Pichard, smarting from the charges against his small company, felt aggrieved that Ms. Wilson would not violate the statute to the extent of dismissing certain “frivolous” charges without the appropriate administrative review. Ms. Wilson explained that procedural changes would require the legislature amending the statute and, following that, the agency amending the pertinent sections of the Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Pichard was unforgiving on this point and continued thereafter to seek replacement of Ms. Wilson.”
“9. There came a point at which members of the Commission itself, which was, collectively, Plaintiffs boss, began demanding that Plaintiff perform illegal acts.
10. For example, and without limitation, members of the Commission, including one who had more than a score of discrimination charges against his business, began demanding that Plaintiff issue “no-cause” determinations against employment discrimination claims that had not yet been investigated."
“Commission members, including one, Jay Pichard, who was himself the Respondent in a number of discrimination charges involving a company he owned, directed Ms. Wilson to dismiss such charges at the outset without investigation.”17. One such ‘abandoned investigation’ was [indeed] Director Wilson’s [own] Whistleblower Complaint. A complaint which the FCHR:
b. refused to relinquish (ie, refused to disengage from its conflict-of-interest); and
c. closed without an investigation (¶18 infra)
“The Commission previously notified you that the information contained within your complaint was insufficient for the Commission to begin its investigation. Pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.001(7), Florida Administrative Code, you were provided an opportunity to address the insufficiencies within 60 days, Considering all information received, the Commission does not have authority to investigate, and the complaint will be dismissed.”That dismissal, importantly, eliminated Director Wilson’s ability/right to litigate her whistleblower complaint in court (compare with the 1st Amendment; compare with the 14th Amendment).
19. Of course, that dismissal was issued by [replacement/installed] Director Costilla. Thereby fulfilling the dogmatic prophesy that Commissioner Pichard set in motion (¶10 supra).
Conclusion
The FCHR corrupts itself by commanding its staff to [immediately] obstruct/defeat charges of discrimination (the very same charges that it’s legally required to investigate). When its staff refuses to break the law, then the FCHR retaliates against them (the staff). The agency will even go so-far-as-to terminate its own agency head (ie, Director Wilson) [to effectuate its corruptions/subversions].Plus, as an added twist – when confronted with its [own] illegalities – the FCHR acts as its own judge & jury.
Main Takeaway
Warning: Reader Discretion Advised
b) to the detriment of plaintiffs (ie, the injured/afflicted).
Recommendations
- Stay Vigilant
- Understand How the FCHR Legal Process Works
- Aim to have a Dual-Filed Complaint (ie, one that is filed within 300-days of the last discrete act of discrimination)
- this will help you retain access to the courts (albeit, after an arduous process).
Disclosure
So, if/when the agency responds, TBD will update this page accordingly.
Footnotes
† although TBD has attributed these quotes to Director Wilson, they are actually direct quotes from Attorney Rick Johnson. A board-certified attorney whom Director Wilson hired to represent her (throughout this legal dispute). He issued those quotes in front of the government (ie, under the threat of penalty/perjury/etc.).
...POINTS & THINGS...
Please keep this in mind when you're navigating through your legal action.
Also, keep in mind:
- the FCHR's self-discrimination;
- the FCHR's statutory ability to accept bribes; and
- the FCHR's method of obstruction.
As always: please get the justice that you deserve.
Sincerely,
www.TextBookDiscrimination.com
