Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978)
In a suit brought against an Indiana circuit court judge, Linda Kay Sparkman sought damages alleging that the judge deprived her of her fundamental rights. Judge Stump had approved1 a petition2 submitted by appellant's mother to have her then fifteen-year-old daughter sterilized. After Judge Stump signed the sterilization petition,3 Linda went to a hospital ostensibly to have her appendix removed; in fact, a tubal ligation was performed.4 Four years later, Linda learned of the consequences of the operation.5 She then sought damages under 42 U.S.C. §19836 alleging that the actions of defendants7 in sterilizing her or causing her to be sterilized violated her constitutional rights.8 The district court dismissed the action on the ground that Judge Stump was "clothed with absolute judicial immunity."9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the judge had acted extrajudicially, the doctrine of judicial immunity was inapplicable.10 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, because Indiana law gave a circuit judge jurisdiction to consider and act upon a petition for sterilization, the judge was immune from damages liability even though approval of the petition may have been erroneous.11In 1868, the Supreme Court in Randall v. Brigham12 first recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity.13 The Court held that judicial officers were not liable in a civil action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction. However, the Court limited the scope of the doctrine of immunity by indicating that judges might be held liable for malicious or corrupt acts done in excess of their jurisdiction.14
In the leading immunity decision of Bradley v. Fisher,15 the Supreme Court reexamined the Randall opinion and held that judges were not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, regardless of motive.16 Recognizing that judges need to exercise judicial discretion within their vested authority, the Court used the doctrine of immunity to encourage independent judicial thinking.17 The Bradley Court, reasoning that amenability of judges to suit would inhibit the exercise of discretion in controversial cases,18 established an absolute immunity19 applicable even when a judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The Court further justified the immunity doctrine by recognizing that a judge's errors could be corrected on appeal.20
In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the judicial immunity doctrine to actions brought under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. §1983.21 In light of an earlier holding22 that Congress did not intend to abolish other common law immunities by enacting section 1983, the Court held in Pierson v. Ray23 that the judicial immunity doctrine had not been abrogated. Thus ended the period between enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the Pierson decision during which the Act could have been enforced against a judge.24
While the scope of judicial immunity was expanding, it was not limitless. The Court in Bradley, emphasizing the distinction25 between acts done in excess of jurisdiction and those done in "clear absence of all jurisdiction,"26 limited immunity to acts done in excess of jurisdiction. Additionally, immunity from liability applied only to judicial acts.27
In cases dealing with sterilization, the weight of authority was that judges had no jurisdiction to order or approve sterilization absent a specific statutory grant of authority.28 Accordingly, a district court held in Wade v. Bethesda Hospital29 that a judge acted in clear absence of jurisdiction by ordering plaintiff's sterilization. In the context of sterilization, which deprived the plaintiff of the fundamental right to procreate,30 authority for the judge's action could not be inferred from a grant of general jurisdiction.31 Therefore, his act done in the absence rather than in mere excess of jurisdiction deprived him of immunity.
Assuming that a judge had jurisdiction, he could still be liable for his challenged act if it were non-judicial. Although the Supreme Court has not defined a judicial act for immunity purposes, the lower courts have maintained that not every act by a judge is a judicial act.32 In Gregory v. Thompson,33 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a court must look beyond the status of a party seeking immunity to consider the nature of the conduct for which immunity was sought.34 Further justifying its grant of immunity, the court stated that a judicial act, within the meaning of the doctrine, may normally be corrected on appeal.35 Therefore, according to the court, judges were subject to liability for acts which could not properly be characterized as judicial.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a judicial officer should be free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of personal liability.36 The Court noted, however, that the doctrine of immunity protected a judge from civil liability only when he was performing a judicial act within his jurisdiction. To determine whether Judge Stump was immune to suit, the Court examined the judge's order in light of his authority to act.37
As an Indiana circuit court judge, Judge Stump was vested by statute with general jurisdiction over all cases and other causes where exclusive jurisdiction was not conferred by law upon some other court.38 The Court construed this provision as a broad jurisdictional grant which could include the authority to approve a petition for tubal ligation.39 Absent a specific statute or common law doctrine denying a court of general jurisdiction the authority to entertain a petition like that presented to Judge Stump, the Court found that the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 Thus, because neither statute41 nor common law42 prohibited a circuit judge from authorizing a minor's sterilization, the Court held that Judge Stump had acted within his jurisdiction.43
Although the Court found that Judge Stump had acted within his jurisdiction, it recognized that he would not be entitled to judicial immunity if approval of the petition were not a judicial act.44 In considering for the first time for immunity purposes the necessary attributes of a judicial act, the Court discussed several controlling factors. The Court noted that the informality45 with which Judge Stump proceeded could not render his act non-judicial46 Rather, the critical determinative factors were the nature of the act47 and the expectations of the parties.48 In the instant case the Court concluded that Judge Stump performed a judicial act when he signed the sterilization petition, because signing petitions was a normal judicial function49 and because appellant's mother believed that he was acting in his official capacity.50
The Court emphasized the purpose and necessity of judicial immunity in protecting judges from vexatious litigation.51 Thus, despite the tragic consequences of his act and the fact that approval of the petition may have been in error, Judge Stump was held immune from liability for damages because his act was judicial and within his jurisdiction.52
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall and Justice Powell joined, stated that "what Judge Stump did... was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act."53 Justice Stewart rejected the majority's enunciated determinants of judicial action, deeming that such a test would render meaningless the inherent limitations on immunity.54 He stated that the test of whether an act is judicial should instead be based on the factors supporting immunity from liability,55 including the judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction, the possibility of an appeal to correct his errors, and protection of the judge from suit by unsatisfied litigants.56 Finding in the instant situation no case, no possibility of appeal,57 and no litigants, Justice Stewart concluded that Judge Stump's approval of the petition was not a judicial act.58
In analyzing the authority vested in a court of general jurisdiction, the Court did not consider the weight of lower court decisional law. With only one exception,59 the earlier lower court decisions had held that a specific statute was needed to confer jurisdiction over sterilization matters.60 The Supreme Court looked only at Indiana common law and concluded that there was no specific limitation upon a court of general jurisdiction precluding Judge Stump's consideration of a sterilization petition.61 In light of the common law of other states,62 the Court could have inferred that a judge vested with general jurisdiction could not approve a person's sterilization without a specific statutory grant of authority.63 The majority of the Court, however, disregarded the weight of the common law proscription of authority,64 and refused to require such a specific grant of power.
In examining the statutory law of Indiana, the Court found that the statute providing that parents of a minor have the authority to consent to the medical or surgical care of their child65 supported jurisdiction over the sterilization petition. Yet that statute implied that a parent could consent only to necessary medical treatment of his child.66 Because the sterilization of appellant was not necessary,67 it should not have come within the ambit of the Indiana statute.68 Thus, no statutory law supported the Court's conclusion that a court of general jurisdiction had authority over the sterilization petition.
The Court then analyzed the factors determining whether a judge's act is a judicial one for immunity purposes. Focusing first on the nature of the act of signing the petition, the Court failed to consider the petition's substance and effect.69 Stating that judges with general jurisdiction have the authority to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, the Court implied that a petition which would deprive a minor of a fundamental right70 was no different from a petition to settle a minor's claim. That the two types of petitions should not be equated is apparent. Deprivation of fundamental human rights is not a "function normally performed by judges"71 even though accomplished through the mechanics of signing a petition. The Court's second determinant of the judicial nature of a judge's act was whether the parties believed that they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. But, as the dissenters pointed out: "False illusions as to a judge's power can hardly convert a judge's response to those illusions into a judicial act."72 Only rarely would parties seeking judicial action expect a judge not to be acting in his official capacity. Clearly, the factors established by the Court for determining the judicial nature of an act are not viable.
The Court's analysis of the purpose of judicial immunity focused solely on the need to protect judges from vexatious or malicious law suits, without considering the extent to which an individual's rights were circumscribed or whether an appeal was effectively foreclosed. If the Court had instead balanced individual constitutional rights against the inimical effects of judicial liability,73 the result need not have been in favor of judicial immunity. Extension of liability to outrageous judicial behavior would not open the floodgates to vexatious litigation and would not unduly interfere with judicial independence. Only judges who act with disregard for the constitutional rights of individuals would have to fear civil liability.74
The instant decision creates an unqualified judicial immunity. The Court's broad test for determining the judicial nature of an act rendered meaningless that qualification to the general rule of immunity. As a result, judges are isolated by an unqualified protection from accountability for their injudicious actions.75 Vindication of the deprivation of individual rights has been subordinated to the Court's interest in insulating judges from civil liability. Consequently, the independence of the judiciary has been strengthened at the expense of the rights of individuals.
