PENDENT JURISDICTION

"In this case, once the amended complaint was accepted by the district court, the original complaint was superceded and there was no longer a federal claim on which the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the remaining state law claims."

"The Supreme Court concluded that the withdrawal of allegations in an amended complaint which had formed the basis of federal jurisdiction defeats jurisdiction."

"When Pintando amended his complaint and failed to include a Title VII claim or any other federal claim, the basis for the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ceased to exist, and the district court should have dismissed Pintando's state claims without prejudice. See Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir.1999)"

"Federal court decisions on issues of state law are not binding on and have limited precedential effect in state courts. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).""

Absent a special consideration, a determination arising solely under one statute should not automatically be binding when a similar question arises under another statute. See Title v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 322 F.2d 21, 25 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1963); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.04, at 577-78 (1958); cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601-602, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948). This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary. This case provides an excellent example of the differences in two statutes. Racial discrimination in employment is an unfair labor practice that violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act if the discrimination is unjustified and interferes with the affected employees' right to act concertedly for their own aid or protection. United Packinghouse, Food Allied Workers International Union v. National Labor Relations Board, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 216, 24 L.Ed.2d 179 (1969). In contrast, racial discrimination in employment is prohibited by Title VII without reference to the effect on the employees' right to unite. Hence, certain discriminatory practices that are valid under the National Labor Relations Act may be invalid under Title VII. See Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally, Fuchs Ellis, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on the National Labor Relations Board, 7 B.C.Ind. Com.L.Rev. 575, 597-600 (1966).

Similarly, the United States Senate rejected a proposed amendment which would have made Title VII the exclusive means of relief for most discriminatory employment practices. 110 Cong.Rec. 13650-52 (1964). This action is some evidence at least that Congress, realizing the differences between Title VII and other statutes directly or indirectly proscribing racial discrimination in employment, did not intend for a decision under one such provision to bar automatically a suit under another statutory scheme.