LEGAL FICTION

Nevertheless, when a choice must be made we apprehend that the State, as well as the courts, is more interested in the fair and proper administration of justice than in rigidly applying a fiction of the law designed to terminate litigation.

...

Although we are constrained to adhere to our former opinion that all the requisites of res judicata appear to exist, we are now convinced that this doctrine should not necessarily be controlling under the facts and circumstances attendant upon this litigation. Indeed, this very Court, among others, has announced the salutary principle that the doctrine of res judicata should not be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice.

In Wallace v. Luxmoore, 156 Fla. 725, 24 So.2d 302, 304, speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell, we said:

"Stare decisis and res adjudicata are perfectly sound doctrines, approved by this court, but they are governed by well-settled principles and when factual situations arise that to apply them would defeat justice we will apply a different rule. Social and economic complexes must compel the extension of legal formulas and the approval of new precedents when shown to be necessary to administer justice. In a democracy the administration of justice is the primary concern of the State and when this cannot be done effectively by adhering to old precedents they should be modified or discarded. Blind adherence to them gets us nowhere."

"With this observation, the die was cast, and the opinion declared: "[N]o technical fiction should stand in the way of fair play and common justice." 165 Kan. at 447."