AMENDMENT 11 | JUDICIAL LIMITS

"The eleventh amendment continues to be an obstacle to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (reaffirming Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), which held that Congress did not intend section 1983 to create a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity). The eleventh amendment does not, however, bar suits for equitable relief against state officers in their official capacity, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), nor does the amendment preclude a damages award against state officials in their individual capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Appellants' complaint distinguished between the appellees' individual and official capacities, and the district court should have construed the appellants' prayer for relief to conform to this long accepted practice. The district court erred in dismissing appellants' claims on the basis of sovereign immunity."

"However, the eleventh amendment is necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Section five of the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). Therefore, Congress had power to authorize suits against state employers by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). Unlike Title VII, Section 1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state's eleventh amendment immunity. This indicates that Congress did not intend by the general language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to invoke its fourteenth amendment power. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 342, 99 S.Ct. at 1146, 59 L.Ed.2d at 367 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 675-77, 94 S.Ct. at 1362, 39 L.Ed.2d at 679 (1974).""