FCHR CORRUPTION
Michelle Wilson v. The Florida Commission on Human Relations
Chapter 4: Second Appeal

All Pertinent Documents

ITEM 401 | INITIAL BRIEF

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Case No.: 1D2024-0476
L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
FIRST DISTRICT

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MICHELLE WILSON
Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually,
Appellee.

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Appeal of a Final Order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Honorable John C. Cooper presiding

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APPELLANT’S INITIAL BRIEF

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Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 425-1997
rick@rej-law.com

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla.,Inc., 678 So.2d 1239 (Fla.1996)		13
Barrington v. Florida Dept. of Health,112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2000)		8
Beverly Beach Properties,Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1953)		9
Caldwell v. Florida Dept. Of Elder Affairs,121 So.3d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)		14 and passim
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M.,656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995)		7
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. LaPlante,470 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)		7
Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse,411 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982)		9
Gordon v. Gordon,59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952)		7
Garnac Grain Co.,Inc. v. Mejia, 962 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)		9,10
Hemphill v. Kimberly–Clark Corp.,605 F.Supp.2d 183, 186 (D.D.C.2009)		10
Kimbrell v. Paige,448 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984)		13
Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron,U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)		12
Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,308 So.3d 953 (Fla. 2020)		12
Palm Beach County School Board v. Doe,210 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017)		6
Palmer v. McCallion,645 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)		32
Point Conversions,LLC v. Omkar Hotels, Inc., 321 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)		6
Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel,610 So.2d 419, 424 (Fla.1992)		13
R.D.J. Enters.,Inc. v. Mega Bank, 600 So.2d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)		7
Robinson v. Department of Health,89 So.3d 1079, 1082–83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)		2
Stanton v. Florida Department of Health,129 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)		14 and passim
State v. McBride,848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003)		9
Strazzulla v. Hendrick,177 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1965)		9
Tillery v. Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice,104 So.3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)		13 and passim
United States v. Cotton,535 U.S. 625 (2002)		12
Wilson v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)		1
Youngin's Auto Body v. District of Columbia,775 F.Supp.2d 1,6 (D.D.C. 2011)		10

Constitution and Statutes (2000 unless otherwise indicated)
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution		12-14
§ 112.31895(3)(d), Florida Statutes		1
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1)		10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)		10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)		10
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d)		9
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1)		9,10,11
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(6)		11,12

Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, West 1979		14

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

The Complaint in this case, R-004-018, states that the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) violated several of Appellant’s state and federal constitutional rights by refusing to issue a determination on a whistleblower charge Appellant had filed against FCHR itself upon being dismissed by that agency.

FCHR moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R-019-024. Wilson opposed the motion. R-025-033. The circuit court dismissed the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Order at R-034-037 and Judgment at 038.

Appellant had brought the issue of FCHR’s failure to issue a determination before this Court in a prior appeal of an agency decision, Wilson v. Florida Commission on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), (rehearing denied, December 5, 2022). The main point of that case was that the public whistleblower statute, at § 112.31895(3)(d), Florida Statutes, requires FCHR to investigate and make a determination on every whistleblower complaint. The FCHR determination, regardless of outcome, amounts to a ticket for the charging party to bring a case in circuit court. In this regard, a whistleblower charge differs from a charge of discrimination in that, for the latter, a timely negative finding by FCHR can block access to court. By contrast, a whistleblower charge goes to court regardless of FCHR’s determination.

For years, FCHR sought a means to escape the statutory mandate to investigate and make a determination in every case. The agency hit upon an “inherent power” to dismiss cases without investigation or determination if those cases appeared to be untimely, appear to fail to state a prima facie case, or to fall short in whatever other way FCHR determined to be fatal. Charging parties challenged these dismissals in a quartet of cases. Robinson v. Department of Health, 89 So.3d 1079, 1082–83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Tillery v. Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 104 So.3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Stanton v. Florida Department of Health, 129 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); and Caldwell v. Florida Dept. Of Elder Affairs, 121 So.3d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

These cases seemed legally erroneous to the team bringing the present action. But the losses also seemed to be at least in part the fault of the previous appellants, who had never raised any of the salient constitutional violations that marred FCHR’s dismissals of cases without determination. Accordingly, the present Appellant did not stop at showing that her whistleblower charge met all statutory standards of acceptability for investigation and determination on the merits of the charge. She went on to show that the FCHR dismissal without determination violated the numerous constitutional rights set forth in the Complaint in the instant case. Under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida, every charging party under the whistleblower statute is entitled to a day in court.

However, this Court declined to reach any of the constitutional issues in its opinion disposing the case. Indeed, this Court declined even to mention the constitutional issues, let alone decide them. The opinion stuck strictly to interpretation of the whistleblower statute, as decided in this Court’s old cases. This spurred Appellant to file a motion for rehearing, which, among other things, pointed out that the DCA’s silence on the constitutional issues deprived Appellant of her jurisdiction to have the Florida Supreme Court consider the constitutional issues. The Supreme Court could not take up those issues because the DCA did not decide them. This Court denied rehearing without comment.

Thus, Plaintiff brought the instant case to litigate the constitutional issues for the first time. Accordingly, no collateral estoppel is even theoretically possible. That form of preclusion requires that a point be actually decided by the prior court. It is not enough that one or more parties mentioned it.

The gravamen of the Judgment now appealed is that Appellant seeks an improper second bite at the apple in violation of collateral estoppel. That holding is in error because Appellant, even now, has still not had her first bite at the apple. No court has ruled on the issues raised in the instant suit. That is the dispositive factor of this appeal. It is of no consequence that the issues were raised in a prior proceeding in which the tribunal declined to reach them.

The court below signed FCHR’s proposed order of dismissal, R-034-037, and then entered judgment, R-038. This timely appeal follows.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court below misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel by holding that a non-decision on an issue by a prior court bars consideration of that issue by a later court. But collateral estoppel applies only to decisions, not non-decisions. For the bar to apply, the issue must have been actually litigated and resulted in a clearcut adjudication on the merits. It is never enough that an issue was presented and not decided.

The motion to dismiss that ended this case in the court below was not properly cognizable. This is so because the stated basis of the motion was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on collateral estoppel. But there is no such thing. It is not even a theoretical possibility. Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and is not capable of waiver. By contrast, collateral estoppel is waived if not timely asserted and must be raised in a pleading as an affirmative defense, not in a motion. There is an exception when a complaint puts the prior ruling in the record, but the exception does not apply here because the complaint did not say there was an affirmative decision on the contested issues, but only a non-decision.

The decision below violates the access-to-courts provision of the Florida Constitution. That right is a right to have one’s case heard on the merits. The right is not one that can be circumvented by procedural sophistry. A trial court has the duty to decide the cases before it on the merits. An appeals court may pick and choose what to address and what to ignore when presented with multiple issues. A trial court does not have that luxury.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An order determining subject matter jurisdiction resolves an issue of law and is therefore reviewed de novo. Point Conversions, LLC v. Omkar Hotels, Inc., 321 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). The Order and Judgment on appeal grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the stated basis for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is collateral estoppel, which can never implicate subject matter jurisdiction because collateral estoppel can be waived while subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. This is discussed below. Nevertheless, even if a “tipsy coachman” analysis finds that the better vehicle for dismissal would have been failure to state a cause of action, the standard of review is still de novo. Palm Beach County School Board v. Doe, 210 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017).

ARGUMENT
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRES AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

In Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952), the Florida Supreme Court held that the test in determining whether judgment by estoppel applies to a case is “whether the evidence in both cases is in essence the same” and whether “every point and question” presented in the second action was actually litigated and decided in the first. Id., 59 So.2d at 45. For collateral estoppel to apply, there must also exist in the prior litigation a “clearcut former adjudication” on the merits. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. LaPlante, 470 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also R.D.J. Enters., Inc. v. Mega Bank, 600 So.2d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation of issues that have been fully litigated and which resulted in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction).

No issue in this case was previously litigated to conclusion. Thus there is no preclusion under Florida law. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (noting that Florida courts have emphasized that judgment by estoppel “precludes re-litigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding”) (court’s emphasis). It is never enough that an issue was presented and not decided. The court below misapprehended that point in finding it is enough that Appellant (Plaintiff below), in her Complaint, mentioned that she raised constitutional issues and that this Court made a ruling. That sweep of misapprehension omits the fact that the ruling made by this Court had nothing to do with the constitutional issues. This is a dispositive fact that makes irrelevant the dismissal order’s reliance on Barrington v. Florida Dept. of Health, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2000). Barrington is a case in which an employee who litigated and lost her discrimination claim at the Public Employee Relations Commission (PERC) was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the same race discrimination in federal court. Though the statutory regimen was different and the employee was on the offense in federal court but on the defense at PERC, there was still a determination of the exact same issue – whether her termination was because of race discrimination. Moreover, the employee in Barrington had a full due process hearing, whereas in the instant case Plaintiff has had no opportunity to present documents or witnesses nor to cross examine anyone, nor even to be informed of the grounds for her termination. That, in itself, would be enough to prevail on this motion because it is well-settled that preclusion will not apply where it would result in a manifest injustice. See, e.g., Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1953); Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1965); Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse, 411 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982); see also State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003).

Though it may be fair enough that a plaintiff who litigated and lost the merits of a race discrimination claim in one forum does not get to relitigate it in another, it does not follow that a claimant who had her constitutional claims ignored in one forum must also have them ignored in every subsequent forum. It is not as though she lost those issues in the prior proceeding.

II. DISPOSITIVE MOTION WAS NOT COGNIZABLE

Defendants moved to dismiss under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on collateral estoppel. R-019-024.

Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). This defense may not be used in a motion to dismiss. Garnac Grain Co., Inc. v. Mejia, 962 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). It must be pled first in an answer. Palmer v. McCallion, 645 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The court below erred in even taking cognizance of the issue.

Although the defense of collateral estoppel can look jurisdictional in character, it is an affirmative defense, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1), and therefore is not a per se jurisdictional bar to court review as contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (and thus the Florida rule which is based on that federal rule, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1)). Youngin's Auto Body v. District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 1,6 (D.D.C. 2011); and see, Hemphill v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 605 F.Supp.2d 183, 186 (D.D.C.2009) (observing that “res judicata is an affirmative defense that is generally pleaded in a defendant's answer, but is also properly brought in a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).¹

Though it is true that there is an exception that permits collateral estoppel to support a motion to dismiss where the facts that establish such defenses are stated on the face of the Complaint, this is not such a case. Indeed, the refutation of collateral estoppel is set forth in the Complaint, which stated at Paragraph 26, “The appeals court failed to acknowledge or address any of the constitutional issues, even on rehearing, and found FCHR to have an “inherent” power to decline jurisdiction over a whistleblower charge.” Thus, according to the Complaint, this Court did not decide anything that is advanced in this case, so its decision can have no preclusive impact. If the Complaint had said the DCA considered and expressly rejected the constitutional claims, that would have opened the door to the defense gambit of arguing that assertion of collateral estoppel need not be held back until the answer.

The Defendants compounded the error by purporting to rest the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, Rule 1.140(b)(1), instead of the more common “failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action” basis, Rule 1.40(b)(6). There are two apparent reasons Defendants chose that erroneous path. First, there is a body of law, already referenced, barring collateral estoppel from serving as bases for the sort of motion to dismiss that was used in this case. Second, a motion under Rule 1.40(b)(6) must stay within the confines of the four corners of the Complaint, while a motion under Rule 1.140(b)(1), to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, may bring in extraneous evidence. But the very idea of affirmative defenses defeating subject matter jurisdiction is fatally flawed both legally and logically. Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, 308 So.3d 953 (Fla. 2020). By contrast, “res judicata is an affirmative defense which must be pled, and may be waived, by the defendant.” Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Thus the motion was not cognizable under the procedural vehicle on which it rode in because it in no way implicated the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

III. DISMISSAL VIOLATES RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.” The right to go to court to resolve our disputes is one of our fundamental rights. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 424 (Fla.1992), receded from on other grounds in Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.2d 1239 (Fla.1996) "While article I, section 21 may not give a litigant a particular remedy, the right of access does guarantee the litigant a forum in which to be heard.")

Under Defendants’ calculus, Appellant’s constitutional claims can never be heard. One court’s refusal to hear them must be copied by all later courts. But the Constitution demands a decision on the merits, at least where a plaintiff has committed no fatal error in pleading, such as missing a statute of limitation, splitting actions, or suing immune entities. This is not a case in which Plaintiff held back claims from the DCA to be presented later in another court, thus running afoul of the doctrine that the ruling would be preclusive “not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that action.” Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984). Plaintiff had no control over the DCA decision not to address the constitutional claims.

The proposed order wrongly assumes that Plaintiff is seeking a second bite at the apple. In fact, Plaintiff is seeking her first substantive decision.

One should recoil instinctively from the notion that, because a DCA decided nothing about an issue, a later circuit court must also decide nothing. Billy Preston sang, “Nothing from nothing leaves nothing.” Those are words of wisdom, but they do not compel the conclusion that a DCA saying nothing on a subject requires a circuit court to say nothing on the same subject. We get similar sagacity from the ancient legal maxim “ex nihilo nihil fit,” translated as “from nothing nothing comes,” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, West 1979. That tells us that nothing comes from the absence of a ruling from this Court in a prior case, let alone a bar on consideration of the same issues by a different court in a later case.

The decision on appeal makes “nothingness” into an absurd rule holding that the first court presented with the constitutional claims in this case refused to reach them, therefore collateral estoppel dictates that no court can ever reach them. Collateral estoppel would become not just issue preclusion on claims already decided affirmatively, but also a bar on hearing claims a prior court refused.

In a nobler time, that would have been called frivolous.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the decision below and remand for discovery and trial. The decision is substantively incorrect in that it purports to find preclusion in a prior proceeding that did not address the constitutional issues that form the basis of the instant case. The decision also suffers from fatal procedural infirmities in that it seeks to conscript collateral estoppel into service as a basis for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it is an affirmative defense that is subject to waiver and thus can never support a finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The decision below also violates the right of access to courts under the Florida Constitution.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Richard E. Johnson
Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Office of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
850/ 425-1997
rick@rej-law.com

Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief was served to all counsel of record this 2d day of May, 2024, through the Court’s e-service system.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(a)(2), I hereby certify that this brief was prepared using proportionately spaced Bookman Old Style, 14-point font.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

¹ In the motion and response in the court below, collateral estoppel and res judicata were used interchangeably. By the time of the order, all concerned realized that res judicata was out of the question because there were two different suits. But there is no place in this case where the law differs on the two concepts.

ITEM 402 | ANSWER BRIEF

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Case No.: 1D2024-0476
L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
FIRST DISTRICT

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ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

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APPELLEE’S ANSWER BRIEF

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JAMIE ITO
Florida Bar No. 13553
Ito Law, PLLC
411 Wilson Ave.
Tallahassee, FL 32303
Jamie@itolaw.net

Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Brown v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation,Bd. of Psychological Examiners, 602 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)		8
Cromartie v. Shealy,941 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2019)		12
Felder v. State,Dept. of Mgmt. Services, Div. of Ret., 993 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)		7
Johnson v. State,311 So. 3d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)		8
Jones v. Grace Healthcare,320 So. 3d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)		11
Stanton v. Florida Department of Health,129 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)		3
Washington v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue,337 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)		3,8
Wilson v. Florida Comm’n on Human Relations,351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)		2

Statutes & Rules
§ 112.3187, Fla. Stat.		2
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(6), F. R. Civ. P.		11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
I. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

This is an appeal of the dismissal of a complaint brought by Appellant, Michelle Wilson (“Wilson”) against the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) and its Executive Director, Cheyanne Costilla (“Costilla”), in both her official and individual capacity. [R4—R18].

Wilson filed a seven-count Complaint on May 25, 2023, alleging her state and federal constitutional rights were violated when the FCHR failed to issue a determination on a Whistle-blower Charge she filed on December 14, 2020. [R4—R18].

Costilla and FCHR moved to dismiss Wilson’s complaint on June 26, 2023. [R19—R24]. Wilson filed her response in opposition on July 12, 2023. [R25—R33]. A hearing was held on December 6, 2023, and on December 29, 2023, the court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding that Wilson’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel. [R34—R37].

This appeal followed.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wilson was employed as Executive Director of the FCHR until October 15, 2020, when her employment was terminated. [R64]. On December 14, 2020, she submitted a Whistle-blower’s Act (WBA) Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) to the FCHR, which she contends “easily met all the requirements of a whistleblower charge under Florida Law.” [R7]. The FCHR disagreed, notified Wilson that the Charge was inadequate, and gave her an opportunity to amend. [R7]. The FCHR ultimately dismissed Wilson’s Charge without an investigation, meaning that Wilson did not receive a right to sue FCHR under section 112.3187, Florida Statutes. [R8].

Wilson sought judicial review with this Court under section 120.68, Florida Statutes. On appeal, Wilson disputed “the authority of FCHR to withhold a determination under the operative statute [and raised] state and federal issues of separation of powers, conflict of interest, due process, access to courts, and right to trial by jury.” [R8].

This Court affirmed FCHR’s dismissal of Wilson’s Charge and denied her motion for rehearing. [R8]. Wilson v. Florida Comm'n on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), reh'g denied (Dec. 5, 2022).

In its decision, this Court cited to its opinion in Stanton v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 129 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which reaffirmed “that when a whistle-blower complaint does not meet the prima facie elements necessary to initiate operation of the Whistle-blower’s Act, the Florida Commission on Human Relations has no authority to proceed with a fact-finding investigation,” and Washington v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 337 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), which held that in order to receive WBA protection, “a protected disclosure must be a written and signed complaint ... when a complainant has not claimed to have participated in an investigation or to have made a complaint through a hot-line.”

After her unsuccessful appeal of FCHR’s dismissal of her Charge, Wilson filed the subject Complaint, asserting that by “refusing to honor Plaintiff’s right to a determination on her whistleblower charge,” Costilla violated her First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances” (Count I) [R8-9]; that by “review[ing] and passing[ing] upon the propriety of its own decision to fire Plaintiff,” Costilla violated her due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II) [R10]; that by “sweeping away Plaintiff’s valuable right to proceed in court on her whistleblower claim,” Costilla and FCHR violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution (Counts III and IV) [R11—R13]; that by “placing illegitimate and insuperable obstacles in her path to vindication of her rights to litigate her whistleblower claims in circuit court,” FCHR violated her right of access to court and trial by jury under the Florida Constitution (Counts V and VI) [R13—R15]; and that by “amending the public whistleblower statute to grant itself an unlimited and undefined exception to the mandate to issue a determination in every case to allow each case to go to court,” FCHR violated the Florida Constitution’s mandate of separation of powers. (Count VII) [R16—R17].

FCHR and Costilla moved to dismiss Wilson’s complaint based on collateral estoppel because this Court had already ruled on the issue dispositive to all of her claims: whether FCHR was required to investigate Wilson’s Charge and issue a determination giving her a point of entry to court. [R23].

The trial court concluded that because this Court previously found that FCHR’s dismissal of Wilson’s Charge was appropriate, and because each of her claims depended on that one issue, her claims were barred by collateral estoppel.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Wilson raises claims here that all stem from her belief that FCHR is required to investigate and issue a determination on every Whistle-blower Charge that it receives. This Court has repeatedly explained that FCHR has inherent authority to dismiss a Charge that does not meet the prima facie elements necessary to trigger the protections of the Whistle-blower’s Act. Applying that precedent, this Court affirmed FCHR’s dismissal of Wilson’s Charge. With the question of the correctness of the dismissal already answered, Wilson’s constitutional claims cannot succeed, and the trial court’s order dismissing Wilson’s Complaint should be affirmed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review when a court reviews an order granting a motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel is de novo. Felder v. State, Dept. of Mgmt. Services, Div. of Ret., 993 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

ARGUMENT
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL APPLIES BECAUSE THIS COURT PREVIOUSLY RENDERED A DECISION ON THE ISSUE DISPOSITIVE TO ALL OF WILSON’S CLAIMS

Wilson argues that collateral estoppel does not preclude her claims because “[n]o issue in this case was previously litigated to conclusion.” [Initial Brief, p. 7].

This Court has explained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “prevents identical parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been decided.” Johnson v. State, 311 So. 3d 203, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). See also Brown v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Psychological Examiners, 602 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(explaining that the doctrine applies when the parties are identical or privies.).

The issue that is central to and necessary for all Wilson’s claims — whether FCHR had the authority to and properly dismissed her Whistle-blower Charge — was the issue on appeal in Wilson v. Florida Comm'n on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). Wilson’s claim that Costilla violated her First Amendment right is based on Costilla “refusing to honor Plaintiff’s right to a determination on her whistleblower charge.” [R8-9]. Her claim that that Costilla violated her due process rights under the United States Constitution is based on Costilla “passing[ing] upon the propriety of its own decision to fire Plaintiff.” [R10]. Her claim that Costilla and FCHR violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution is based on their “sweeping away Plaintiff’s valuable right to proceed in court on her whistleblower claim.” [R11—R13]. Her Claim that FCHR violated her right of access to court and trial by jury under the Florida Constitution is based on FCHR “placing illegitimate and insuperable obstacles in her path to vindication of her rights to litigate her whistleblower claims in circuit court.” [R13—R15]. And her claim that FCHR violated the Florida Constitution’s mandate of separation of powers is based on FCHR “amending the public whistleblower statute to grant itself an unlimited and undefined exception to the mandate to issue a determination in every case to allow each case to go to court.” [R16—R17].

To find in Wilson’s favor on any of these issues would contradict this Court’s prior decision affirming FCHR’s dismissal of her Charge.

Because this Court has already decided that FCHR had the authority to and appropriately dismissed Wilson’s Charge, and because to succeed on the constitutional claims she now raises would require a contradictory decision on that issue, the trial court correctly dismissed Wilson’s complaint based on collateral estoppel.

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS COGNIZABLLE

Wilson next argues that because collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense, it was not appropriately raised by a motion to dismiss. [Initial Brief, p. 10].

Wilson concedes in her brief, however, that collateral estoppel may support a motion to dismiss “where the facts that establish such defenses are stated on the face of the Complaint.” [Initial Brief, p. 11]. The facts establishing the defense of collateral estoppel are indeed stated on the face of Wilson’s Complaint. As noted above, Wilson’s Complaint alleged that the action giving rise to each of her claims is FCHR’s alleged improper dismissal of her Charge. Likewise, she alleged on the face of her Complaint that this Court affirmed FCHR’s dismissal of her Charge.

This single issue that underlies each of Wilson’s claims — whether FCHR appropriately and lawfully dismissed her Charge foreclosing her right to sue — was decided and concluded, and this is all apparent on the face of Wilson’s Complaint. The trial court was not required to look outside of the four corners of Wilson’s Complaint to determine that collateral estoppel applied and therefore the defense was properly raised by motion to dismiss.

Wilson then argues that the motion erroneously rested on jurisdictional grounds, rather than on the grounds of failure to state a claim. The trial court did not address whether its order was based on subject matter jurisdiction or the failure to state a claim. Regardless, if this Court finds that the motion to dismiss should have been brought under Rule 1.40(b)(6), it should affirm based on the tipsy coachman doctrine because Wilson’s Complaint, on its face, did not state a claim for which she could recover in light of her allegations of this Court’s prior decision on the central issue. See Jones v. Grace Healthcare, 320 So. 3d 191, 192–93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)(affirming decision below but “via a slightly different analytical route.”).

III. DISMISSAL DOES NOT VIOLATE WILSON’S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

Finally, Wilson argues that the trial court’s dismissal of her Complaint violated her fundamental right to go to court and contends that this Court “decided nothing” about her constitutional claims in the prior appeal. [Initial Brief, p. 14].

A party asserting that her right to access courts must be able to show “an underlying cause of action the vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.” Cromartie v. Shealy, 941 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2019).

Contrary to Wilson’s argument, this Court did “decide something” in the prior appeal. Namely, that FCHR was not required to issue a determination on her Charge — the issue that is dispositive for all of Wilson’s claims.

Moreover, Wilson was not barred from the courts. She could have asserted other claims related to the termination of her employment that did not depend on the lawfulness of FCHR’s dismissal of her Charge. For example, she could have filed a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation, a claim which has no administrative prerequisite. But she chose only to go the Whistle-blower Act route.

FCHR dismissed Wilson’s Charge because she failed to sufficiently describe activity that would trigger the protections of the Whistle-blower’s Act, and this Court agreed. The trial court’s dismissal of Wilson’s claims, all of which depended on an issue that has already been decided, did not infringe upon her right to access the courts. The decision below should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The Trial court properly found that Wilson’s claims all relied on a dispositive issue that was previously decided by this Court, and that her claims were therefore barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal and judgment for FCHR and Costilla.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jamie Ito
Jamie Ito
Florida Bar No. 13553
Ito Law, PLLC
411 Wilson Ave.
Tallahassee, FL 32303
Jamie@itolaw.net

Counsel for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief is prepared in Bookman Old Style 14-point font and contains 2,319 words.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this brief was filed with the Florida Courts E-Portal which furnished a copy to all parties of record on May 18, 2024.

	/s/ Jamie Ito
	Jamie Ito

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 403 | REPLY BRIEF

********************************
Case No.: 1D2024-0476
L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569
********************************

********************************
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
FIRST DISTRICT

********************************

Appeal of a Final Order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Honorable John C. Cooper presiding

********************************

APPELLANT’S INITIAL BRIEF

********************************

Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 425-1997
rick@rej-law.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS		i
TABLE OF CITATIONS		ii
ARGUMENT		1
I. Collateral Estoppel Requires An Actual Decision, Not A Bare Mention		2
II. Dispositive Motion Was Not Cognizable		3
III. Dismissal Violates Right of Access to Courts		4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		6
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE		6

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES
Garcetti v. Ceballos,547 U.S. 410 (2006)		2
Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)		3
Wilson v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)		2

Constitution, Statutes, Rules
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution		5
First Amendment		4-5
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1)		3
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(6)		3,4

Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, West 1979		14

ARGUMENT
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRES AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

FCHR casts its argument at such a high and abstract level of generality that it misses everything important in this case. FCHR’s argument is that this court ruled that Michelle Wilson is not entitled to a determination on her public whistleblower charge in a prior case, so that precludes forever any relief on Wilson’s whistleblower on any theory or authority.

But down here on the ground, other things matter.

The prior opinion addressed only the whistleblower statute. It carefully avoided ruling on the constitutional issue. It is quite possible that FCHR’s dismissal of Wilson’s charge is legal under the whistleblower statute, but illegal under the various constitutional doctrines asserted in this case. Since the whistleblower statute is not reasserted here, the prior decision on that statute has no preclusive impact on this case. It is not enough to say that Michelle Wilson lost in a prior case, so she must lose in this case. That is too high a level of generality.

In that prior case, FCHR had been both a party and judge in the events leading up to the appeal. FCHR fired Wilson on October 15, 2020. After that date, FCHR, acted as a quasi-judicial agency processing Wilson’s whistleblower claim and sitting in judgment of its own actions, despite Wilson’s protest of conflict of interest. Thus, for the events up to October 15, 2024, FCHR acted as Wilson’s employer; for events after that date, FCHR was an adjudicative agency.

In the prior case before this Court, Wilson appealed FCHR’s dismissal of her whistleblower charge. To do so, she made statutory arguments and constitutional arguments. The statutory arguments were mostly about FCHR’s violations as an employer. None of the constitutional arguments were about the merits of the whistleblower claim – only about Wilson’s rights to receive the determination of “cause” or “no cause,” that serves as a ticket to court. This Court’s opinion made no reference to the constitutional arguments. The opinion, Wilson v. Florida Commission on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), stuck strictly to what FCHR could do under the whistleblower statute.

FCHR now (Answer Brief at 9) gets to the bare essence of its argument: “To find in Wilson’s favor on any of these [constitutional] issues would contradict this Court’s prior decision affirming FCHR’s dismissal of her Charge.” But when a statute contradicts a constitutional provision, the statute must fall. That is the most fundamental doctrine in constitutional law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

It is only by operating at such a high level of generality that FCHR can make so bold an assertion. It should go without saying that an interpretation of a statute, no matter how correct an interpretation, says nothing about that law’s constitutionality. And that a prior court’s silence on whether a law is constitutional can never serve as an outcome that works collateral estoppel on a future claim.

II. DISPOSITIVE MOTION WAS NOT COGNIZABLE

FCHR chose to frame its motion to dismiss around jurisdiction, using Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(1) as its vehicle, instead of the more common “failure to state a cause of action” under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(6). This allows wandering outside the four corners of the Complaint to reference other documents that are mentioned in the Complaint. Here, that reference is a statement from Paragraph 26, “The appeals court failed to acknowledge or address any of the constitutional issues, even on rehearing, and found FCHR to have an “inherent” power to decline jurisdiction over a whistleblower charge.” With no small audacity, FCHR claims that this recites a holding of this Court in the prior case on the constitutional issues that works collateral estoppel on everything in this case. That is self-refuting. An absence of a holding cannot be a holding.

In the Answer Brief, FCHR suggests that the Court use the “tipsy coachman” doctrine to convert the motion below into one under Rule 1.140(b)(6). That does not help FCHR’s case. Such a conversion would merely put a claim of collateral estoppel in its proper place – an affirmative defense that cannot serve as a basis for a motion to dismiss. So it hardly helps a motion to dismiss.

III. DISMISSAL VIOLATES RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

FCHR now claims that Wilson was derelict in not filing a First Amendment claim when FCHR foreclosed her whistleblower claim. This assertion ignores the main authority in recent First Amendment employee law, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), which stripped First Amendment protection from public employees for speech that is made in the course and scope of their jobs. Indeed, Garcetti, id., at 425, points out that taking First Amendment protection away from public employees will not be so bad because those employees have state whistleblower laws that they can still use.

The result in this case is a total strangulation of a right because there is no avenue for redress. FCHR refused to investigate Wilson’s claim or issue a determination on it. This Court, in the prior case, refused to consider the constitutional challenge. So now, FCHR holds out that refusal as a preclusion on any other court’s consideration of those claims. That leaves Wilson no point of entry. That is a textbook case of a right without a remedy, as prohibited by Article 1, section 21, of the Florida Constitution.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief was served to all counsel of record this 19th day of June, 2024, through the Court’s e-service system.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(a)(2), I hereby certify that this brief was prepared using proportionately spaced Bookman Old Style, 14-point font.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 404 | OPINION #2 (PCA)

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually, Appellees.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	1D2024-0476

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

John C. Cooper, Judge.

February 6, 2025

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

Richard Errol Johnson, Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Jamie Marie Ito, Ito Law, PLLC, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 405 | MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
FIRST DISTRICT
MICHELLE WILSON Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually, Appellees.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case 1D2024-0476 L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569

MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 425-1997
rick@rej-law.com

MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

Appellant respectfully moves, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.330(a), for a written opinion to provide a basis for seeking Supreme Court review. Such an opinion on these unaddressed issues would provide a basis for such review on several questions including the following:

• Separation of powers violations arise from the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) arrogating to itself the legislative power to change the words of a statute to excuse itself from the legislative mandate to investigate and issue a determination in every whistleblower case and arrogating to itself the judicial power to make final disposition of a case involving a right to a jury trial and a possibility of unliquidated damages;

• Federal and state due process violations arise from FCHR’s breach of the long-standing constitutional principle that, “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009), when FCHR undertook review of its own conduct in a firing it had performed, despite Appellant’s objection to that conflict of interest.

• Further due process violations arise from the fact that FCHR’s refusal to obey its statutory mandate to investigate and make a determination on every case is capricious and without any rules, policies, or standards at all. Whatever moves the agency at the moment or reduces its workload is the practice.

• Right-to-trial-by-jury violations arise from FCHR’s final and dispositive determination administratively of a cause of action on which Appellant has a right to trial by jury.

• Federal and state access-to-court violations arise from FCHR imposing insuperable burdens on a person seeking to work through the statutory pre-requisites to litigation, such that access to any remedy is extinguished with no grant of an alternate remedy.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was served to all counsel of record, this 18th day of February, 2025, through the Court’s e-service system.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 406 | ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A WRITTEN OPINION

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
2000 Drayton Drive,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Telephone No. (850) 488-6151
February 20, 2025
MICHELLE WILSON Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually, Appellees.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case 1D2024-0476 L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The Court denies the motion for written opinion docketed February 18, 2025.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

Served:

Juan Ricardo Collins
Hon. John C. Cooper
Jamie Marie Ito
Richard Errol Johnson

1D2024-0476 February 20, 2025
Kristina Samuels, Clerk
1D2024-0476 February 20, 2025

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 407 | MOTION FOR REHEARING (#2)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
FIRST DISTRICT
MICHELLE WILSON Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually, Appellees.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case 1D2024-0476 L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569

MOTION FOR REHEARING

Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 425-1997
rick@rej-law.com

MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellant respectfully moves, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.330(a), for rehearing because, this morning, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that, in the view of the undersigned, makes impossible this Court’s determination in this case. Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. __ (2025); 2025 WL 567335 (Feb. 21, 2025).

In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state court regimen that made it impossible for a plaintiff to secure a merits-based ruling on her constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That outcome does not appear to be reasonably distinguishable from the one this Court would now be compelled to follow in this case.

Appellant herein moved heaven and earth to secure a merits decision on her federal constitutional claims. She briefed those claims extensively in her first appeal, only to get an opinion that carefully avoided mentioning those claims. So she filed a new action in circuit court seeking resolution of those as yet undisposed claims. The circuit court found that this Court’s failure to address the constitutional claims previously worked a preclusion in the nature of collateral estoppel that required an imitative refusal to rule on the constitutional claims. Now this Court has affirmed that holding without opinion.

There has thus been no point of entry for Appellant to obtain either a hearing or a determination of her constitutional claims. And now the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion binding on these facts, has forbidden the outcome reached in this case.

Today is the deadline for such motions in this Court. However, Appellant filed a motion for written opinion a few days early, not knowing the Supreme Court opinion would come out today. This poses a technical conflict with the part of Rule 9.330 that requires all motions to be in a single document. But that should be waived because seriatim holdings were not sought and the Supreme Court opinion could not have been anticipated.

Accordingly, Appellant respectfully moves for rehearing and for the Court to receive additional briefing from the parties on whether Williams v. Reed alters the outcome of this case.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was served to all counsel of record, this 21st day of February, 2025, through the Court’s e-service system.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 408 | ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REHEARING

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
2000 Drayton Drive,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Telephone No. (850) 488-6151
February 20, 2025
MICHELLE WILSON Appellant, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, in her official capacity, and individually, Appellees.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case 1D2024-0476 L.T. No.: 2023-CA-1569

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The Court denies the motion for rehearing, docketed February 21, 2025.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

Served:

Juan Ricardo Collins
Jamie Marie Ito
Richard Errol Johnson

1D2024-0476 March 7, 2025
Kristina Samuels, Clerk
1D2024-0476 March 7, 2025

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

Congratulations! You're now booked up on this chapter's court filings which reveal the FCHR's corruptions (by (i) pressuring staff for predetermined outcomes; (ii) adjudicating itself; (iii) obtructing cases; and much more)!

Keep this in mind while you litigate your civil rights case in Florida. Also, keep in mind the FCHR's statutory ability to accept bribes.

Plus - at all times - keep the 7th Amendment of the US Constitution (your right to a trial-by-jury) in mind.

As always, please get the justice you deserve.

Sincerely,

www.TextBookDiscrimination.com

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FCHR CORRUPTIONMichelle Wilson v. The Florida Commission on Human RelationsChapter 4: Second Appeal

All Pertinent Documents

ITEM 401 | INITIAL BRIEF

Appeal of a Final Order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Honorable John C. Cooper presiding

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

ARGUMENTI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRES AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

II. DISPOSITIVE MOTION WAS NOT COGNIZABLE

III. DISMISSAL VIOLATES RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

ITEM 402 | ANSWER BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTSI. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

ARGUMENTI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL APPLIES BECAUSE THIS COURT PREVIOUSLY RENDERED A DECISION ON THE ISSUE DISPOSITIVE TO ALL OF WILSON’S CLAIMS

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS COGNIZABLLE

III. DISMISSAL DOES NOT VIOLATE WILSON’S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITEM 403 | REPLY BRIEF

Appeal of a Final Order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Honorable John C. Cooper presiding

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS

ARGUMENTI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRES AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

II. DISPOSITIVE MOTION WAS NOT COGNIZABLE

III. DISMISSAL VIOLATES RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

ITEM 404 | OPINION #2 (PCA)

February 6, 2025

ITEM 405 | MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITEM 406 | ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A WRITTEN OPINION

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

ITEM 407 | MOTION FOR REHEARING (#2)

MOTION FOR REHEARING

MOTION FOR REHEARING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITEM 408 | ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REHEARING

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

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