B | CROOKED COURT | RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT SCHREIBER'S MOTION TO DISMISS

RESPONSE
I.     Background

A. First Federal Action (Makere v Allstate)

1. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff sued Allstate Insurance Company for employment discrimination {3:20-cv-00905; USFLMD} [Exhibit A]. The action was/is on the bases of race/sex/color/retaliation; and brought under many state & federal statutes. The case continues to this day; albeit hampered by unconstitutional conduct of state actors.

B. Second Federal Action (Makere v Early)

2. On-or-around January 31, 2021, Plaintiff sued Edward Gary Early (a state hearing officer) for constitutional deprivations {4:21-cv-00096; USFLND} [Exhibit B] (hereinafter “That Case”). The action was brought under federal law. It – like the first action – continues to this day; albeit hampered by unconstitutional conduct of other public officers.

C. Current Federal Action (Makere v Fitzpatrick, et al)

3. On-or-around April 26, 2022, Plaintiff sued the above-captioned Defendants for constitutional violations. Doing so under federal law only. Therein, Plaintiff levied two counts against Defendant Schreiber. The first was through 42 USC §1983 (‘Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871’), while the second was through 42 USC §1985.

D. Ultimate Facts

4. Defendant Schreiber entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights [C088]. His plan was pockmarked by invidious discrimination on the bases of race & sex. Plus, he was motivated by unlawful contributions (bribes).

5. Defendant Schreiber performed his role in the conspiracy by:

a. accepting bribes [C047];
b. lying [C050-C054];
c. altering electronic records;
d. appearing in That Case without authority [C053]; and
e. interfering in That Case [C048-C054].

6. To be more specific, Defendant Schreiber’s unauthorized lie was captured in public record.

a. On March 11, 2022, he admitted (to USFLND) that Plaintiff had sued Mr. Early in Mr. Early’s individual capacity only [Exhibit C]. This was true.

b. However, on that same day (ie, 3/11/22) – and in that same court document – Defendant Schreiber said the opposite [Exhibit D].

7. Defendant Schreiber lied, and he used that lie as the basis for his appearance/interference in That Case. As an Assistant Attorney General (FL), Defendant Schreiber was/is prohibited from representing public officials sued solely in their individual capacities (ie, Mr. Early) [C053].

8. As such, Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Schreiber [C146-C147]. Injunctive relief, importantly, that was aimed at ‘Enjoining Defendant Schreiber from committing further violations of §1983/§1985’ and ‘ever participating in a case in which his client is being sued solely in an individual capacity’. Such relief cannot come soon enough.

E. Simultaneous State Action (Makere v Gorsica)

9. On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff sued Stanley G. Gorsica for similar constitutional deprivations {2022-CA-3804; Duval County; FL}.

10. On August 19, 2022, Mr. Gorsica defaulted on the lawsuit [Exhibit F].

11. However, five days later (and seven days late), Defendant Schreiber hopped onto the case to thwart Plaintiff’s recovery of damages (from Mr. Gorsica). Defendant Schreiber – once again – couched his interference on two crucial lies.

a. One of which was the same lie he told in That Case (¶6).

12. The Makere v. Gorsica case continues to this day; albeit obstructed by Defendant Schreiber’s lie-filled interference.



II.    Factual Analysis & Summary

13. In the complaint, Plaintiff identified Defendant Schreiber as a state official (¶7) [C048].

14. Also – in the complaint – Plaintiff sued Defendant Schreiber under federal law only (¶3).

15. Moreover, the complaint never claimed that Defendant Schreiber engaged in “improper” representation of Mr. Early. In fact, the word “improper” never even appears in the complaint.

16. Plaintiff identified two ongoing federal cases that have been affected by Defendant Schreiber’s conduct (¶1, ¶2).

17. As the record shows, the complaint had 152 numbered paragraphs, 9 exhibits, and 9 direct quotes ([C012] [C028] [C038] [C039] [C044] [C050] [C051] [C053] [C083]). All nine (9) quotes are verifiable from public sources (ie, court records).

18. Plaintiff indicated that he was suing Defendant Schreiber in Defendant Schreiber’s individual and official capacities [Exhibit E].

19. Plaintiff’s complaint reserved his right to “amend his pleadings to assert a claim for punitive damages” upon “an evidentiary showing and hearing” [C142].

20. Plaintiff charged Defendant Schreiber with malice, “disdain” and “invidious discrimination” (on the bases of race & sex) [C088] [C142].

Now, with these facts firmly affixed/
This Court will be surely equipped/
To deny defendant’s lies to dismiss/
Because they just aren’t legit//

21. These truths rebut That Motion’s request in its entirety; as follows.


III.   Direct Rebuttal: Schreiber’s Unauthorized Interference

22. Defendant Schreiber began his dismissal argument with a lie. He claimed that Plaintiff complained of “improper representation” [M003].

This is not true.

23. Plaintiff complained of Defendant Schreiber’s unauthorized/unlawful interference in That Case (¶5). In fact, the word “improper” never even appeared in Plaintiff’s complaint (nor in any amendment) (¶15).

24. Defendant Schreiber based That Motion on this falsehood; especially since he repeated the lie multiple times throughout the document.

25. In Limone v Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2004), the First Circuit explained that trial courts must guard against defendants who twist words for self-preservation:
“Courts must be equally careful, however, not to permit a defendant to hijack the plaintiff’s complaint and recharacterize its allegations so as to minimize his or her liability.” - Limone v Condon, 372 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2004)

26. Given appellate precedent holding such mischaracterizations as intolerable, this Court is well-positioned to reject Defendant Schreiber’s argument. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.



IV.    Direct Rebuttal: Mischaracterization of Public Record

27. Yet, Defendant Schreiber’s fistful of mischaracterizations did not stop there. On the following page [M004], Defendant Schreiber claimed “two (2) unsuccessful attempts by Plaintiff to sue Judge Early” would be grounds for dismissal.

28. Defendant Schreiber’s statement is false.

29. Plaintiff’s case against Edward Gary Early (ie, the state hearing officer who perjured himself to infringe Plaintiff’s constitutional rights) continues to this day (¶2). This reality is public record.

30. Thus, this Court is well-equipped (with verifiable fact) to reject That Motion’s misguided arguments.



V.     Direct Rebuttal: Standing

31. Next, Defendant Schreiber argued that Plaintiff lacked standing to continue his suit (highlights added):
“Plaintiff fails to meet the test for standing because his allegations are limited to SCHREIBER’s alleged past conduct in prior case(s) that Plaintiff litigated against Early... Plaintiff’s allegations thus do not involve any imminent or future threat” - [M006]

32. This statement, of course, is false.

33. Public record shows that That Case continues to this day (¶2, ¶29). And – importantly – Defendant Schreiber’s interference with That Case continues to this day.

34. In fact, Defendant Schreiber has spread his same misconduct to another case involving Plaintiff (¶9-12). A case with operative facts that were admitted prior to Defendant Schreiber’s interference.

35. Thus, not only were Defendant Schreiber’s violations ongoing/imminent, but they were actually realized (in repeat form). So, the principle of standing fits Plaintiff’s charge against Defendant Schreiber like a glove:
“Standing is, in the final analysis, that sufficient interest in the outcome of litigation which will warrant the court's entertaining it.” - General Dev v. Kirk, 251 So.2d 284 (2DCA 1971)

36. Plaintiff demonstrated this “sufficient interest” by pleading the impact Defendant Schreiber’s conduct has had on That Case (as well as the preceding Makere v Allstate case (¶1)).

37. So, upon unfolding That Motion’s fistful of lies this Court will be well-armed to give it the cold hand of denial. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.

VI.    Direct Rebuttal: Case or Controversy

38. May this Court’s hand stay frigid towards That Motion’s coldblooded swipe at a boilerplate “case or controversy” argument. Therein, Defendant Schreiber claimed that Plaintiff did not have any active case/controversy to warrant suit (highlights added):
“In the case sub judice, Plaintiff fails to identify any ongoing case or controversy inherent to his claims because, as noted above, all of his claims are predicated on past acts or conduct in a case, or cases, that have concluded.” - [M007]

39. This statement, of course, is false.

40. The cold hard truth is that all of Plaintiff’s causes of action continue to this day. The Makere v Allstate case is still running (¶1), the Makere v Early case is still running (ie, ‘That Case’) (¶2), and the Makere v Gorsica case is still running (¶9).

a. Since this matter has been fully briefed before {IV, V, supra}, Plaintiff will move onto the next topic from That Motion.

41. Yet, as soon as Plaintiff gets away from one of Defendant Schreiber’s lies he runs into another.



VII.   Direct Rebuttal: Capacity of Suit

42. Page 8 of That Motion shows Defendant Schreiber’s run-on sentences about how capacity affects relief (highlights added):
“However, Plaintiff has failed to specify the capacity in which he is suing SCHREIBER, i.e., individually or in his official capacity... Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to pursue an award of monetary damages.” - [M008]

43. Defendant Schreiber – again – is wrong. Plaintiff did specify the capacity in which he was suing Defendant Schreiber (both) (¶18) [Exhibit E].

44. Defendant Schreiber ran on lies before, and he is running on lies now. As the facts show, his lies have been aimed at impeding Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (1st, 7th, 14th Amendments). So, although this rendition of this run-on sentence is educational, may this Court in this condition sentence its argument to academic death.



VIII.  Direct Rebuttal: Traceable Injury

45. That Motion moved onto an academic argument about traceable injury:
“In order for subject matter jurisdiction to exist, a plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” - [M009]

46. On its face, the argument is redundant. Upon further inspection, such redundancy is cemented. The Lewis v. Continental Bank case (which That Motion cited) focused on an ongoing case or controversy:
“Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies... To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision” - Lewis v. Continental Bank, 494 US 477 (1990)

47. This is the same argument that Defendant Schreiber proffered earlier (VI). An argument that was based on a lie. A lie that – now – is accumulating; yet dissolving itself in its own petri dish of acid.

48. Thus, That Motion’s “traceable injury” argument was just an experiment on this Court’s sensibilities. An act that this Court is well-positioned to deny a passing grade to. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.



IX.    Direct Rebuttal: Absence of Ultimate Facts

49. That Motion also tested the resolve of this Court when it claimed that Plaintiff’s complaint lacked ultimate facts:
“The Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any ultimate facts in support of any of the allegations that have been made.” - [M010]

50. This statement, like many others from Defendant Schreiber, is just false.

51. Plaintiff’s complaint had an entire section dedicated to ultimate facts. In fact, the section was titled “Ultimate Facts”.

a. It had 21 paragraphs; three of which were only about Defendant Schreiber (¶4-8) [C088-C090].

b. It was even listed in the table of contents.

52. Defendant Schreiber’s continued falsehoods give this Court continued rationale to deny That Motion.



X.     Direct Rebuttal: Capacity

53. This Court can continue that denial rationale when evaluating Defendant Schreiber’s next argument. The one he titled “Failure to Specify SCHREIBER’s Capacity” [M012].

54. That Motion already argued this point. Plaintiff already debunked it (¶42). It is false. It is contradicted by the docket. And it is ripe for this Court’s rejection.



XI.    Direct Rebuttal: Color of Law

55. The same can be said about That Motion’s re-surfaced argument titled “Failure to Sufficiently Allege Any Acts Under Color of State Law” [M012].

56. Importantly, That Motion contradicted itself.

a. On Page 13, Defendant Schreiber wrote that Plaintiff failed to indicate whether Defendant Schreiber was a state actor:
“Herein, Plaintiff has failed to properly plead the required elements as to SCHREIBER having acted under color of state law or that SCHREIBER was a “state actor” - [M013]

b. Then, on Page 22, he admitted that he was a state official:
“public officials like SCHREIBER properly perform their duties in accordance with” - [M013]



57. That Motion’s lies, redundancies, and contradictions are ripe for denial. And Plaintiff asks this Court to deny Defendant Schreiber’s entire argument on “color of state law”, because it is predicated on a falsehood.



XII.   Direct Rebuttal: Sovereign Immunity

58. In the next section of That Motion, Defendant Schreiber claims that he is immune to any damages (highlights added):
“sovereign immunity immunizes SCHREIBER from any damages award.” - [M017]

59. Defendant Schreiber is wrong. Sovereign immunity will not protect him in any way.

60. First, it must be reiterated that Defendant Schreiber is being sued in both his individual capacity and his official capacity (¶18). This fact is important because it will negate his multi-page argument on monetary damages.

61. Second, Sovereign Immunity is not in play in this case because Defendant Schreiber is being charged with constitutional violations. In the 1984 Pennhurst case, the US Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity does not extend to constitutional misconduct:
“The Court has recognized an important exception to [sovereign immunity]: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State. This was the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void," and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 209 U. S. 160. Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative character and [was] subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.” - Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 US 89 (1984)

62. Third, injunctive relief is not protected by Sovereign Immunity (ie, the 11th Amendment, US Constitution):
“The rates fixed are confiscatory and the legislation is therefore unconstitutional and void under the Fourteenth Amendment...Neither the suit itself, nor the injunction against petitioner is within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment.” - Ex Parte Young, 209 US 155

63. In sum, this Court is well-positioned to reject That Motion’s argument on Sovereign Immunity, because it was false and inapplicable.



XIII.  Direct Rebuttal: Equitable Relief

64. Next, this Court is also well-positioned to reject That Motion’s argument on equitable relief. Because it – like many others – was based on false information:
“For Plaintiff to state a claim for declaratory relief, there must be a substantial, continuing controversy between the parties... In the instant case, Second Amended Complaint fails to establish the foregoing requirements for declaratory relief... Having failed to allege any irreparable injury that is actual, imminent, and involves future conduct that is not speculative, Plaintiff has failed to meet his pleading burden for injunctive relief” - [M017]-[M019]

65. That Motion is once again repeating itself. And the redundancy is – once again – based on a falsehood. Plaintiff does have “an actual case or controversy”; he has three, in fact (¶1, ¶2, ¶4, ¶16).

66. Defendant Schreiber argued this point before, and Plaintiff dispelled this point before (¶38). Thus, Plaintiff will not re-brief the matter here.

67. What Plaintiff will do, however, is state in the affirmative that he is entitled to declaratory relief (contrary to what That Motion averred [M018]). This is so because Plaintiff’s ongoing causes – which have been impeded by Defendant Schreiber’s conduct – serve as the ‘immediate’ and ‘real-life’ case/controversy entitling Plaintiff to declaratory relief:
“To meet the requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act there must be a "case of actual controversy", as the Constitution requires for any invocation of federal judicial authority... The case must be "of sufficient immediacy and reality" to warrant declaratory relief.” - Genentech v. Eli Lilly, 998 F.2d 9321 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

68. Once these conditions have been met, dismissal is no longer available:
“When there is an actual controversy and a declaratory judgment would settle the legal relations in dispute and afford relief from uncertainty or insecurity, in the usual circumstance the declaratory action is not subject to dismissal.” - Genentech v. Eli Lilly, 998 F.2d 9321 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

69. Therefore, this Court is well-positioned to reject Defendant Schreiber’s argument against equitable relief. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.



XIV.   Direct Rebuttal: Litigation Privilege

70. This Court is also well-positioned to reject That Motion’s argument for Litigation Privilege [M019]-[M023]. Because – like usual – That Motion’s own submissions debunk its argument.

71. On page 22 of That Motion, Defendant Schreiber cites a federal case captioned Moskovits v. Mercedes-Benz (1:21-cv-20122; USFLMD). The Moskovits court held that Florida’s Litigation Privilege is inapplicable to federal causes of action (highlights added):
“However, an absolute privilege under state law cannot defeat a federal cause of action... Here, the Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action against Defendants Russo, Gregoire, and Ivers. See ECF No. [5]2. The Florida litigation privilege does not apply to Count II for deprivation of rights under §1983, Count III for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under §1985, and Count V under the Alien Tort Statute because they are federal claims that are not subject to the state privilege.” - Moskovits v. Mercedes-Benz, 1:21-cv-20122 (USFLMD 1/10/22)

72. The Moskovits decision, usefully, was supported by federal appellate case law (ie, Huls v. Llabona, 437 Fed. Appx. 830 (11th Cir. 2011); and Steffes v. Stepan, 144 F. 3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998)).

73. Moreover, out of the dozen-or-so decisions that Defendant Schreiber referenced in his litigation privilege argument, only the Moskovits case dealt with a lawyer sued under §1983/§1985. In other words, the Moskovits case was the only case similar to the instant case. And it – in clear terms – debunked That Motion’s litigation privilege argument (in its entirety).

74. So, as Defendant Schreiber’s fist pointed this Court to his purported invincibility, the rest of the fingers on his unclean hands pointed back towards his guilt. And back towards his guilt is where a jury should be positioned to look.

75. With this operation in tow, this Court is well-positioned to reject That Motion’s litigation privilege argument. Thereby allowing a jury to do just so.



XV.    Direct Rebuttal: Striking Allegations

76. And just so the Court can fully know, there is no reason to strike any of the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint.

77. That Motion asked this Court to strike paragraphs 9-48, and paragraphs 140-143.

78. Paragraphs 9-48 of the complaint detail the events that led up to this lawsuit. They are important for (a) contextualization; (b) factual substance; and (c) showing the basis for Defendant Schreiber’s “invidious discrimination” towards Plaintiff on account of Plaintiff’s race & sex. Plus, at minimum, they supply the verifiable facts to prove that there are multiple ongoing cases/controversies that Defendant Schreiber’s conduct is impeding (¶1, ¶2, ¶16).

79. Paragraphs 140-143 of Plaintiff’s complaint summarize the damages Plaintiff seeks in this action, as well as his reservation of various rights (eg, evidentiary hearing on punitive damage). The words speak for themselves. And – when placed in front of the backdrop of That Motion – they say that That Motion’s argument against punitive/monetary damages are bunk.

80. So, may this Court deny That Motion’s prayers for multiple strikes, because each one has been debunked.



XVI.   Direct Rebuttal: More Definite Statement

81. Finally, at the end of That Motion’s bunkbed of collapsed arguments is the oft-assembled averment for a “more definite statement”.

“The Amended Complaint is vague and ambiguous and fails to provide any factual support for the conclusory statements that SCHREIBER engaged in” - [M025]

82. This statement is rebutted by the record it sleeps on. Plaintiff’s complaint supplied Defendant Schreiber with 152 numbered paragraphs, 9 exhibits, and 9 direct quotes. They detail the dates, times, and places in which the confirmed conduct occurred.

83. Plus, Defendant Schreiber’s own litigious lie was captured in public record (¶6) [Exhibit C, Exhibit D]

84. Therefore, this Court is well-positioned to hit the snooze button on That Motion’s last leg of a debunked bed of lies, mischaracterizations, and falsehoods. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does; with a denial of its “more definite statement” argument.



XVII.  Legal Standard | Plaintiff’s Argument Against Dismissal

85. Now, may this Court rise for the proper adjudication of That Motion. Importantly, it was filed under Rule 12(b) Fed. R. Civ. P. [M001].

86. History shows that this Court has a well-established method for resolving 12(b) motions to dismiss.

87. To start out, the Court’s review is limited to the “four corners” of the complaint (highlights added):
“The scope of review must be limited to the four corners of the complaint” and attached exhibits. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)."” - Braun v TD Bank | 8:20-cv-02951 | 3/23/21

“In considering the motion, courts should limit their “consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)." - Parkhurst v Hiring 4 U, Inc. | 2:19-cv-00863 | 9/29/20

88. Then, the Court looks to see if a complaint satisfies the requirements set out in Rule 8(a)(2) Fed. R. Civ. P. (highlights added):
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The rules also require plaintiffs to set out their claims in separate, numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)."” - Parkhurst v Hiring 4 U, Inc. | 2:19-cv-00863 | 9/29/20

89. Third, USFLMD judges look to see if a complaint contains sufficient facts (highlights added):
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff need not recite “detailed factual allegations,” but must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). - CRM Suite Corp v GM Company | 8:20-cv-00762 | 3/10/21

90. In performing this examination, the judges lend all deference to the non-movant (highlights added):
“Likewise, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). But the Court “need not accept factual claims that are internally inconsistent; facts which run counter to facts of which the court can take judicial notice;" - Parkhurst v Hiring 4 U, Inc. | 2:19-cv-00863 | 9/29/20

91. Importantly, the factual allegations must be “plausible”; which is defined as follows:
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id."” - CRM Suite Corp v GM Company | 8:20-cv-00762 | 3/10/21

92. Plus, the Court must afford leeway to layperson litigants:
“The pleadings of pro se litigants are "liberally construed" and held to a less exacting standard as those complaints drafted by attorneys. Tannenbaum v Untied States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). "However, a pro se litigant must still meet minimal pleading standards." Pugh v Farmers Home Admin., 846 F. Supp. 60, 61 (MD Fla. 1994) (citation omitted). And the courts are not tasked with drafting or rewriting a complaint to locate a claim. Peterson v Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F. 2d 904 (11th Cir. 1993)” - Daley v Florida Blue | 2:20-cv-00156 | 12/8/20

93. Similarly, this Court stresses that motions to dismiss must be confined to the legal sufficiency of the complaint (highlights added):
“[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the complaint’s legal sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions or addressing the merits of the case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-cv-1264-T-26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2009) (Lazzara, J.)." - Johnson v Nocco, et al | 8:20-cv-01370 | 2/18/21





XVIII. Analysis

94. Altogether, a methodical review of a 12(b) motion to dismiss encompasses:

a. Looking only at the “four corners of the complaint”;
b. Checking the complaint against Rule 8(a) Fed. R. Civ. P.;
c. Determining whether it has sufficient facts;
d. Construing all facts as true;
e. Concluding that the claims are plausible; and
f. Double-checking for propriety.

a. Four Corners of the Complaint

95. In the instant matter, the ‘four corners of the complaint’ include (i) The Complaint (with all 9 exhibits); (ii) That Motion (with 0 exhibits); and (iii) this filing (with all 6 exhibits).

b. Short & Plain Statements

96. The Complaint – although detailed – still contained short & plain statements describing Defendant Schrieber’s culpability:
“Defendant Schreiber also entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Schreiber’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination on the bases of race & sex." - [C088]

“Defendant Schreiber performed his role in the conspiracy by:

a. accepting bribes (¶47);
b. lying (¶50-54);
c. altering electronic records;
d. appearing in That Case without authority (¶53); and
e. interfering with That Case (¶48-54)." - [C089]

“Defendant Schreiber will continue his misconduct by:

a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating public records (¶58d); and
d. committing perjury (¶25-35)." - [C090]

As such, Plaintiff has satisfied element “b” for denial of That Motion.

c. Sufficient Facts

97. Notably, The Complaint had 152 numbered paragraphs. Many of which had subparts. None of which were redundant.

a. This assertion of non-redundancy is buoyed by Plaintiff’s active statement that The Complaint was neither “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” in any respects (see Rule 12(f) Fed. R. Civ. P.).

98. Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint had 9 exhibits and 9 direct quotes.

a. All of which, importantly, are public record (ie, not subject to dispute because they are readily verifiable from sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned – Rule 201(b)(2) Fed. R. Evid.)

99. Put together, the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint had details that were significantly in-depth.

100. According to the Eleventh Circuit, dismissal would be improper:
“Dismissal is not appropriate unless it is plain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support the claims in the complaint." - Next Century v Ellis, 318 F. 3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2003)

101. Thus, Plaintiff has objectively satisfied element “c” in the multi-step analysis for denying That Motion.

d. Construing All Facts as True

102. For the purposes of evaluating That Motion’s attempt to dismiss Plaintiff’s civil rights Counts, this Court must accept The Complaint’s 95 factual allegations as true ([C009-C105]).

103. Pertinently, the following facts operate:
a. Defendant Schreiber accepted bribes – and will continue to do so – in order to interfere with That Case (ie, Makere v Early)
b. Defendant Schreiber lied – and will continue to do so – in order to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional/statutory rights.
c. Defendant Schreiber altered electronic records – and will continue to do so – in order to defeat That Case.
d. Defendant Schreiber appeared in That Case without authority – and will continue to do so – in order to prevent Plaintiff’s access to justice.
e. Defendant Schreiber interfered in That Case – and will continue to do so – in order to injure Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
f. Defendant Schreiber, importantly, committed these acts – and will continue to commit these acts – in collaboration with other people (of both the public and private variety).

e. Plausibility

104. Now, this analysis turns to the plausibility of these facts.

105. Generally, “A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.”

106. This Court, in Strange-Gaines v Jacksonville, 3:20-cv-00056, further set out the method for determining plausibility (highlights added):
“When applying the plausibility standard, a court should undertake a “two-pronged approach.” [Iqbal]. First, the court should identify and disregard legal conclusions not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. Second, the court should identify and assume the truth of well-pleaded factual allegations and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. An example of a legal conclusion is, “the defendant was negligent.” An example of a factual allegation is, “the defendant was driving 90 m.p.h. on a road with a speed limit of 45 m.p.h.”” - Strange-Gaines v Jacksonville | 3:20-cv-00056 | 1/26/21

107. First, this Court must discard any legal conclusions masquerading as facts. Plaintiff hereby states that the fundamental fact (ie, ‘Defendant Schreiber lied to the Court in order to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights’) is a stone-cold, verifiable fact.

108. Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong in the two-pronged plausibility test.

109. Next, this Court should determine whether Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts rise to an entitlement of relief. Breaking the law (ie, perjury, bribery), of course, entitles a plaintiff to relief:
“If the act which the [state officer] seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” - Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908

110. Thus, Plaintiff has passed the second prong in the plausibility test. And as such, he has satisfied element “e” in the overarching analysis for denying That Motion.

f. Double-Check for Propriety

111. Lastly, the analysis must safeguard against injecting impropriety into the review (highlights added):
“The pleading standard should not be confused with the evidentiary standard; detailing all evidence in a pleading or attaching evidence to a pleading could run afoul of the “short and plain statement” requirement. Presenting arguments and all evidence in a complaint generally is improper.” - Strange-Gaines v Jacksonville | 3:20-cv-00056 | 1/26/21

112. This Court has deemed it improper for a motion to dismiss to apply an evidentiary standard. Which, unfortunately, is what That Motion tried to do:
“SCHREIBER enjoys absolute immunity based upon the litigation privilege... The litigation privilege is well settled in Florida law. Essentially, absolute immunity is afforded to those participating in a judicial proceeding for any act occurring during the course thereof so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding... AGM Inv’rs, LLc v. Bus. Law Grp., P.A., 219 So.3d 920, 924 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2017);” - [M019]-[M021]

113. This quote from That Motion came from an appellate court decision on a motion for summary judgment (highlights added).
“AGM Investors, LLC, appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of Business Law Group, P.A. and its associated lawyers Bruce M. Rodgers, Michael H. Casanover, and Brandon R. Burg (collectively, Business Law Group)” - AGM v. Business Law Group, 219 So.3d 920 (2DCA 2017

114. Summary judgment, of course, is governed by Rule 56 Fed. R. Civ. P. (not Rule 12(b)). Such requests are based on unconquerable fact. And – importantly – they occur after discovery. Doubly important: Pursuant to Donaldson v Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987), any conversion of a Rule 12 motion into a Rule 56 motion must be formally noticed (which has not happened in the instant case).

115. Thus, Defendant is wrong: Plaintiff does not need to meet an evidentiary burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Evidentiary determinations are the exclusive province of the fact finder (ie, the jury – in this case).

116. Instead, as the controlling law in Twombly holds, the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint need only raise the inference that discovery will reveal evidence:

“While the facts need not be detailed, they must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” for the plaintiff’s claim. Twombly, 550 US at 556” - Cooper v Murphy, et al | 2:18-cv-00675 | 11/6/20

117. Thus, upon double-checking for impropriety, Plaintiff has placed the final piece of the 12(b) review standard onto the palm for motion denials.

118. In all, That Motion’s full-fisted attack-on-black points back to Defendant Schreiber’s lies, mischaracterizations, and falsehoods. Asking to be upheld amid the verifiable facts & records that render its hands brittle.

That Motion swung, yet it missed on this; it missed on that/
and this Court is positioned to referee it into a hands-down defeat...
a defeat handed down from facts//





CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to deny “Defendant Charles Schreiber’s Amended Motion to Dismiss...”, because Plaintiff has submitted a well-pled set of factual elements pointing to Defendant Schreiber’s unlawful and unauthorized infringements on Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Dated this 31^st day of August 2022.
Respectfully submitted,

	/s/ Elias Makere
	ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA, Plaintiff 3709 San Pablo Rd. S # 701 Jacksonville, FL 32224 P: (904) 294-0026 E: justice.actuarial@gmail.com W: TextBookDiscrimination.com    Get Booked Up on Justice!

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the size and style of type used in this document is Times New Roman 14-point Font (caption) and Courier New (contents); thus complying with the font requirements of Local Rule 1.08 (USFLMD) and Local Rule 5.1(C) USFLND. Also, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(F), this document has less than 8,000 words (5,811).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7^th day of September 2022, I mailed the foregoing (via USPS) to the Clerk of Courts. I also sent an electronic copy to the people on the attached service list.

/s/ Elias Makere

Endnotes

AFFIDAVITS

EXHIBIT A
Full Verified Civil Complaint
(Amended)

Employment Discrimination, Civil Rights Infringement
(§760 FS, EPA, Title VII, 42 USC §1981, 42 USC §1981a, 42 USC §1985)

Makere v Allstate

US District Court, Florida, Middle District
3:20-cv-00905-MW-MAF

11/5/2021


Still Active Case





[1^st Page, 62^nd Page]

EXHIBIT B
Verified Complaint (Amended)
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
(42 USC §1983)

Makere v Early

US District Court, Florida, Northern District
4:21-cv-00096-MW-MAF


12/31/21


Still Active Case





[1^st Page, 25^th Page]

EXHIBIT C
‘That Motion’
Showing Defendant Schreiber Acknowledging the Truth


Makere v Early
(42 USC §1983)

US District Court, Florida, Northern District
4:21-cv-00096-MW-MAF


3/11/22






Excerpt Only
[Page 7]

marked

EXHIBIT D
‘That Motion’
Showing Defendant Schreiber Telling a Crucial Lie


Makere v Early
(42 USC §1983)

US District Court, Florida, Northern District
4:21-cv-00096-MW-MAF


3/11/22






Excerpt Only
[Page 25]

marked

EXHIBIT E
Complaint
Showing the Truth Regarding the Capacity in Which Defendant Schreiber Has Been Sued


Makere v Fitzpatrick, et al
(42 USC §1983, 42 USC §1985, Bivens)

Florida, Duval County, 4th Judicial Circuit Court
16-2022-CA-002333-XXXX-MA

US District Court, Florida, Middle District
3:22-cv-00734



4/26/22






Excerpt Only
[Page 2]

marked

EXHIBIT F
Default
Establishing Admitted Facts Which Defendant Schreiber Has Tried to Impede


Makere v Gorsica, et al
(42 USC §1983, 42 USC §1985)

Florida, Duval County, 4th Judicial Circuit Court
16-2022-CA-003804-XXXX-MA




8/19/22