E | CROOKED COURT | PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE'S REPORT & RECOMMENDATION | #2

INTRODUCTION
I.     Background

A. Underlying Federal Action (Makere v Allstate)

1. On August 12, 2020, Plaintiff sued Allstate Insurance Company for employment discrimination (3:20-cv-00905; USFLMD). The action was/is on the bases of race/sex/color/retaliation; and brought under many state & federal statutes. His case evidenced disparate/discriminatory/hostile treatment that included – but was not limited to:

a. unwanted date requests; racist dolls; racist characterizations;

b. sabotaged work;

c. disparate pay; denied raises; denied work-from-home privileges;

d. forcing Plaintiff to pay for a $1,025 actuarial exam fee while never doing the same to other employees; and

e. much more.

2. The case continues to this day; albeit hampered by unconstitutional conduct of state actors.

B. Preceding Federal Action (Makere v Early)

3. On-or-around January 31, 2021, Plaintiff sued Edward Gary Early (a state hearing officer) for constitutional deprivations (4:21-cv-00096; USFLND) (“That Case”). The action was brought under federal law. It – like the underlying lawsuit which Mr. Early impeded – continues to this day; albeit hampered by unconstitutional conduct of the above-charged public officials.

C. Immediate Federal Action (Makere v Fitzpatrick, et al)

4. On-or-around April 26, 2022, Plaintiff sued the above-captioned Defendants for constitutional violations. Therein, Plaintiff levied one Bivens count against each of the following six defendants (hereinafter “Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc”): Defendant Fitzpatrick (1); Defendant Walker (1); Defendant USFLND (1); Defendant Frank (1); Defendant Winsor (1); and Defendant Cannon (1). Plaintiff also filed two counts against Defendant Schreiber (2); doing so under 42 USC §1983 (‘Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871’) and 42 USC §1985.

a. Importantly, Plaintiff initiated this action in state court (Florida; Duval County; 2022-CA-2333).^1/

b. Notably, the final three federal defendants were added via complaint amendment.

c. Lastly, all defendants – save for Defendant USFLND – were sued in both their individual capacities as well as their official capacities.^2/

5. On August 10, 2022, Defendant Schreiber filed his Motion to Dismiss. Sixteen days later, Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc filed theirs.

a. In between those two dates, Plaintiff filed a partially unopposed motion for leave to utilize electronic filing (“eFiling Motion”).

6. On-or-around August 29, 2022, USFLMD transferred this case into this Court.

7. Roughly two months later – on November 8, 2022 – this Court’s magistrate recommended dismissal.

a. A document that did not land in Plaintiff’s mailbox until November 16, 2022.
b. A document that also denied Plaintiff’s eFiling Motion.

8. On-or-around November 21, 2022, Plaintiff objected. Two days later, though, the Court overruled his objections; and adopted the Magistrate’s first recommendation. He would make another.

D. Recent Docket Entries

9. On January 30, 2023, this Court docketed two documents that it attributed to Plaintiff. The first was supposedly a Case Management Report (“CMR”), while the second was supposedly a Certificate of Interested Persons (“CIP”).

10. Plaintiff had nothing to do with those two supposed documents getting docketed in January 2023.

a. On October 4, 2022, Plaintiff drafted a CMR; as well as a CIP. He mailed it the same day – via USPS. Any explanation for why it took this Court 114 days to docket Plaintiff’s two legal papers is unknown to Plaintiff.

b. Importantly, though, this Court’s 114-day delay [in docketing Plaintiff’s papers] is further evidence of the unconstitutionality of Local Rule 5.4(A)(3).

11. Nevertheless, the Court’s self-produced delay sparked its subsequent actions. Because ten (10) days later – on February 9, 2023 – the magistrate entered an order {#67} disregarding those two documents. He simultaneously entered That Order {#68}.

E. Ultimate Facts

12. Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights [C088]. Their plan was pockmarked by invidious discrimination on the bases of race & sex. Plus, they were motivated by unlawful contributions.

13. Among other things, Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc committed the following acts:

a. lying [C058] [C082];
b. ratifying lies [C062];
c. altering the federal docket [C058d];
d. entering orders without authority [C058] [C062];
e. shunning their duties to disqualify themselves [C058];
f. drafting unconstitutional local rules [C058] [C062] [C078]; and
g. enforcing unconstitutional local rules [C058] [C062] [C078]

14. Doing so, importantly, “under the guise of federal authority” in order to “deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights”. [C107]-[C108] [C117]-[C118] [C122] [C125]-[C126] [C129]-[C130] [C133]-[C134].

15. As such, Plaintiff sought nominal, compensatory, punitive, injunctive, and declaratory relief against Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc [C145][C147-152]. Declaratory relief, importantly, that was aimed at ‘Declaring that’ Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (under Bivens and 28 USC §1343) in the Makere v Early case^5/. Injunctive relief, importantly, that was aimed at “Enjoining” Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc from committing further constitutional violations (under Bivens and 28 USC §1343). An injunction that was also geared towards “enjoining” Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc “from ever participating” in “a case involving Plaintiff”.

16. Similarly, Defendant Schreiber entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights [C088]. His plan was also pockmarked by invidious discrimination on the bases of race & sex. Plus, he was motivated by unlawful contributions.

17. Defendant Schreiber performed his role in the conspiracy by (among other things):

a. lying [C050]-[C054];
b. altering electronic records;
c. appearing in That Case without authority [C053]; and
d. interfering with That Case [C048]-[C054].


18. To be more specific, Defendant Schreiber’s unauthorized lie was captured in public record.

a. On March 11, 2022, he admitted (to USFLND) that Plaintiff had sued Mr. Early in Mr. Early’s individual capacity only.

This was true.

b. However, on that same day (ie, 3/11/22) – and in that same court document – Defendant Schreiber said the opposite.

19. Simply put, Defendant Schreiber lied, and he used that lie as the basis for his appearance/interference in That Case.

20. As such, Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Schreiber [C146]-[C147]. Injunctive relief, importantly, that was aimed at “Enjoining Defendant Schreiber from committing further violations of §1983/§1985” and “ever participating in a case in which his client is being sued solely in an individual capacity”. Such relief cannot come soon enough.

F. Subsequent Federal Action (Makere v Gorsica, et al)

21. On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff sued Stanley G. Gorsica for similar constitutional deprivations (16-2022-CA-3804-XXXX-MA; Duval County; FL).

22. On August 19, 2022, Mr. Gorsica defaulted on the lawsuit.

23. However, five days later (and seven days late), Defendant Schreiber hopped onto the case to thwart Plaintiff’s recovery of damages (from Mr. Gorsica). Defendant Schreiber – once again – couched his interference on two crucial lies.

a. One of which was the same lie he told in That Case (¶12).

24. The Makere v Gorsica case continues to this day; albeit, obstructed by Defendant Schreiber’s lie-filled interference.

II.    Factual Analysis & Summary

25. Briefly put, Plaintiff charged Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc for committing constitutionally-violative acts. Acts which were non-judicial in nature (ie, administrative records mutilation - ¶7c; legislative rulemaking – ¶7f). He sought both prospective and retrospective relief (individually and officially - ¶2c).

26. Likewise, Plaintiff charged Defendant Schreiber with impeding Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (trial by jury, due process, etc.). Acts which Defendant Schreiber was unauthorized to perform. Plaintiff sought prospective and retrospective relief (individually and officially - ¶2c). Importantly, Defendant Schreiber – during this case – repeated his lies & obstructions; thereby further highlighting Plaintiff’s need for relief.

27. It must also be noted that this Court is adjudicating itself. USFLND (ie, ‘this Court’) is a defendant in this case. Its officers are named defendants. So, the presiding judges (ie, the magistrate and district judge) are judging their peers, and their employer.

OBJECTIONS
III.   Objection #1: False Statement A (Reasonable Factual Basis)

28. Page 4 of That Order claimed that this action has no reasonable factual basis:
“...far-fetched government conspiracy that had no reasonable factual basis” - [O004]

29. This is false.

30. The discriminatory/unconstitutional nature of Local Rule 5.4 is clear. In fact, Plaintiff outlined its illegitimacy in his complaint (highlights added):
“63. As specified before (¶58), USFLND discriminates against different classes of litigants. Local Rule 5.4(A)(3) states that pro se parties must send hard copies of their court papers. That same rule, though, alleviates represented parties from this hardship.”

64. Not only does the disparity affect time & money, it also affects the efficacy of litigation.

a. Pro se litigants lose multiple days due to the transit times (mailing documents to & from USFLND). Days which they could use for research, evidence collection, writing, and self-representation. 65. Moreover, there is no legitimate reason for the disparity. Neither USFLND’s rules nor USFLND’s website state a compelling government interest in the discrimination.” - [C064]-[C065]

31. Importantly, Plaintiff performed an in-depth analysis of the discriminatory ventures of Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc. In fact, he placed the results of that analysis in a short & plain statement in his complaint (highlights added):
“67. Importantly, the pro se distinction is just a cover for targeting black people (especially black men who litigate civil rights cases).”

a. Records show that pro se litigants are disproportionately black. Records also show that civil rights litigants are disproportionately black.
i. To be precise, statistics show that 84% of Florida’s pro se civil rights litigants are black. This value is dramatically high, because government census shows that only 17% of Floridians are black.” - [C067]

32. The aforementioned in-depth analysis took Plaintiff a significant amount of time to perform.

a. April 19, 2022 marked the first day of Plaintiff’s analysis into Defendants’ discriminatory local rule. Over the next five days, he spent a total of 55.75 hours analyzing demographics & pro se status (in civil rights disputes).

b. He completed his six-day effort on April 24, 2022. Two days later (ie, 4/26/22) he filed his lawsuit (¶4 supra).

33. In fact, Plaintiff presented these results directly to Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc; he even disclosed that presentation in his complaint (highlights added):
“b. USFLND has always known that its rule would have (and has had) a disparate impact on black people.

i. On June 10, 2022, Plaintiff asked Defendants (via email) whether they disputed these statistics. Defendants laid silent.
ii. The following month - on July 13, 2022 – asked again. Defendants – again – did not dispute the facts/statistics related to its discriminatory rule.” - [C064]-[C065]

34. Plus, Plaintiff published this analysis (and underlying data) on his website. A process that took him 392.50 hours to complete.

a. The first piece was the demographics analysis.

i. Which – between 5/16/22 and 5/29/22 – took Plaintiff 214.50 hours to finish. It can be found here:

TextBookDiscrimination.com/Analysis/Demographics/DOAH/

b. The second half was the pro se status analysis.

i. Which – between 5/30/22 and 6/12/22 – took plaintiff 178.00 hours to finish. It can be found here:

TextBookDiscrimination.com/Analysis/ProSe/

35. Put simply, evidence of Defendants Fitzpatrick/etc’s discrimination & unconstitutionality has a deep basis in fact.

36. This factual basis is important because it refutes That Order’s contention. For a long time now, Courts have held that sanctions are inapplicable when a factual basis [for a complaint] exists (highlights added):

“[Appellant] also argues that Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate because [Appellee] failed to provide the district court with evidence that [Appellant]'s case or pleadings (1) had no reasonable factual basis... ...We therefore VACATE the order imposing sanctions and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” - Massengale v Ray, 267 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2001)

37. So, since That Order based its recommendation on a materially false statement this Court is well-positioned to reject it. And Plaintiff hereby asks this Court to do just that.

IV.    Objection #2: False Statement B (History)

38. This Court is also well-positioned to reject That Order’s contention that Plaintiff has a “history of filing frivolous complaints” [O005].

39. This – once again – is false.

40. No Court has ever entered a ‘with prejudice’ dismissal against any of Plaintiff’s complaints that has been deemed “frivolous”.

41. In fact, That Order failed to cite any case that fit that description.

42. Moreover, prior to this lawsuit, no Court (or opponent) has ever threatened Plaintiff with the label “frivolous”.

43. Thus, due to this verifiably false statement, this Court is in prime position to deny That Order’s recommendation. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.

V.    Objection #3: False Statement C (5 Complaints vs 2 Complaints)

44. Page 8 of That Order put forth another false statement. It claimed that “Plaintiff has filed five state administrative claims “seeking redress for his termination”” [O008].

45. Once again, this is false.

Verifiably false.

46. Plaintiff has not filed five state administrative claims “seeking redress for his termination”.

47. Plaintiff has filed two (2).

a. The first was on June 30, 2017 (FCHR 2017-01432).

b. The second was on April 10, 2019 (FCHR 2019-19238).

48. In fact – and like before (¶41 supra) – That Order failed to cite any of the supposed “five state administrative claims” that it was using in its false statement.

49. Moreover, both of those administrative complaints graduated & congealed into Plaintiff’s ongoing federal lawsuit against Allstate (¶1 supra).

50. So, since That Order based its rationale on verifiable falsehoods, this Court is well-positioned to reject the recommendation. And Plaintiff hereby asks that it does.

VI.    Objection #4: False Statement D (Subjective Allegation)

51. Next, Plaintiff hereby asks this Court to reject That Order’s false statement that “Plaintiff became vindictive and began acting out of spite and anger” [O009].

52. This statement is false.

53. Plaintiff has never acted out of spite/vindictiveness/anger/ in this proceeding. Nor has he acted with those motivations in any of his [ongoing] legal actions (Makere v Allstate; Makere v Early).

54. Instead, Plaintiff has been proceeding on truth, facts, and logic. The facts – in this case and in others – have been produced; and they have gone undisputed.

All of them

55. Plus – and as this document has outlined (¶32-34 supra) – Plaintiff has spent hundreds of hours procuring the facts, analyses, and legal vehicles needed to “petition the government for a redress of grievances”.

56. Additionally, Plaintiff has spent thousands of hours developing & updating a free, comprehensive, self-help website for pro se litigants. As of February 19, 2023, Plaintiff has spent 6,370.50 hours building TextBookDiscrimination.com. It has well-over 10,000 pages; which are:

a. Free;

b. Fast;

c. Available for all;

d. Devoid of ads;

e. Devoid of contracts;

f. Devoid of sign-ups; and

g. Devoted to civil rights litigants.

Thus, Plaintiff has had no time (nor interest) to engage in personal exploits with any of the above-named defendants. In fact, Plaintiff has never wanted anything to do with any of them; and has been working diligently to repair the damages that they have caused. Damages to Plaintiff directly; damages to civilians nationwide; and damages to the United States of America.

57. Moreover, That Order failed to produce any evidence to support its false statement. The record shows that the magistrate has never observed Plaintiff [do anything – of any kind] (neither via phone nor via in-person hearing). Nor has the magistrate ever attempted to commandeer Plaintiff into his presence for the purpose of questions/observations.

58. Of course, as the Courts have held, erroneous statements equate to abuses of discretion (highlights added):
“We conclude that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Wang and Anderson's opinions, erred in her characterization of General's opinion, and failed to offer specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting part of Garrison's testimony. We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion” - Garrison v Colvin, 759 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2014)

As the Garrison Court held, an abuse of discretion is reversible upon appeal (highlights added):
“We reverse the judgment of the district court” - Garrison v Colvin, 759 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2014)

59. Thus, this Court is well-positioned to reject That Order’s bald, subjective allegations which bore zero follicles of underpinning facts. And Plaintiff hereby asks this Court to perform that rejection.

VII.    Objection #5: Essential Requirements of Law (Equal Protection)

60. This Court can also reject That Order because this proceeding has departed from the essential requirements of law.

61. According to Haines v Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995), the “essential requirements of law” are defined as follows (highlights added):

“...in determining whether there was a ‘departure from the essential requirements of law’ reviewing courts have inquired: (1) whether the lower court proceeded ‘according to justice’ or deprived the petitioner of fundamental rights, resulting in serious and material injury or gross injustice...” - Haines v Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995)

62. The record shows that this Court has deprived Plaintiff of ‘fundamental rights’. Specifically, the 14th Amendment right to equal protection.

63. This Court did that, most notably, by denying Plaintiff access to electronic filing (despite granting each defendant that access) (¶3a supra). Access that has been material.

64. For starters, the disparity in treatment has expressed itself financially. Plaintiff – to this date – has spent approximately $___ printing & shipping papers to this Court. Defendant has spent $0.

65. The disparity in treatment has also expressed itself timewise. Plaintiff – to this date – has spent about 4 hours printing & shipping papers to this Court. Defendant has spent 0 hours doing the same.

66. Most importantly, however, is the legal disadvantage that the disparity has caused Plaintiff. Who has had to wait multiple days to receive Court orders (5-days on average). Defendant has waited 0 days (per order).

a. For instance, That Order took eight (8) days to arrive at Plaintiff’s mailbox. It took zero (0) days to arrive at Defendants’ inboxes.

i. Moreover, Rule 6(d) Fed. R. Civ. P. only recoups three (3) of those days. Meaning that Plaintiff lost five (5) days of response time – simply because the documents were mailed to him. An unequal and harmful mechanic.


67. All three of these injuries (financial, temporal, efficacy) have violated Plaintiff’s ‘fundamental right’ to equal protection. According to the US Supreme Court, such a violation is cause for reversal (highlights added):

“Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protection where the procedures implementing a neutral statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds... decisions of this Court have been concerned largely with discrimination. Since the Fourteenth Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 (1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other stages in the selection process,"
...
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner's conviction be reversed.” - Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986)

68. This Supreme Court holding fits the instant case with near-perfection. Plaintiff – like Batson – has provided clear evidence of racial discrimination (¶31). Discrimination that has impaired this proceeding (¶58). And discrimination that none of the transgressors have rebutted.

69. Therefore, this Court has Supreme reason to reject That Order.

VIII.    Objection #6: Essential Requirements of Law (Due Process)

70. This Court also has Supreme reason to reject That Order on the grounds that this proceeding has failed to respect Plaintiff’s right to due process. Committing that failure with its partiality and inequity.

71. Partiality that crystalized when this Court decided to adjudicate itself (¶27). An action that has violated 28 USC §455(a) (“shall disqualify [when] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”).

72. Partiality that the US Supreme Court deems to be a reversible violation of due process (highlights added):
“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.
...
“The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” - Marshall v Jerrico, Inc., 446 US 238 (1980)

73. Also, this Court exhibited its inequities by sparking sanctions on a pretended offense of its own volition. As explained, Plaintiff was not responsible for the 114-day delay (between the day he filed his legal papers and the day this Court docketed them). Legal papers, importantly, that sparked That Order – which was entered ten (10) days later.

74. By dictated local rule, this Court was culpable for docketing Plaintiff’s papers 114 days after Plaintiff mailed them. Yet, this Court is now attempting to punish Plaintiff for the Court’s own transgressions.

a. Transgressions which Plaintiff foresaw, and attempted to cure/prevent with injunctive/declaratory action.

75. Fortunately, the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel prohibits the government from punishing someone for something that the government did (see Machules v Dept. of Administration, 523 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1988)).

a. In the instant case, punishing Plaintiff for something that the government did is what That Order is aiming to do.

76. So, since this proceeding has violated fundamental fairness (and has failed to uphold the tenets of due process), this Court has Supreme authority to reject That Order.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to reject That Order’s recommendation, because it was based on: (a) clear errors; (b) an abuse of discretion; and (c) a departure from the essential requirements of law.

Dated this 23^rd day of February 2023.
Respectfully submitted,

	/s/ Elias Makere
	ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA, Plaintiff PO Box 324 Hobart, IN 46342 P: (904) 294-0026 E: justice.actuarial@gmail.com W: TextBookDiscrimination.com    Get Booked Up on Justice!

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the size and style of type used in this document is Times New Roman 14-point Font (contents); thus complying with the font requirements of Local Rule 5.1(C) USFLND. Also, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(F), this document has less than 8,000 words (3,896).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ____ day of February 2023, I mailed the foregoing to the Clerk of Courts (via ____). I also emailed an electronic copy to the people on the attached service list.

/s/ Elias Makere

Endnotes