A | CROOKED COURT | VERIFIED CIVIL COMPLAINT (AMENDED)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA Plaintiff vs. MARTIN FITZPATRICK; CHARLES SCHREIBER; MARK WALKER; USFLND; MICHAEL FRANK; ALLEN WINSOR; HOPE CANNON; Defendants

) ) ) ) ) ) )

Case No (LT): 3:22-cv-00734 Jury Trial Demanded ☒ Yes | ☐ No

AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Elias Makere on this 29th day of July 2022 and hereby sues Defendants (public officials residing in Florida), and states the following:

I.    NATURE OF THE CLAIM

1. This action is brought under 42 USC §1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (“§1983”)), 42 USC §1985 (“§1985”), and Bivens. An action to redress Defendants’ injurious conduct towards Plaintiff (also see 28 USC §1331, §1343, and §1367). Unlawful conduct that has infringed on Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (1st, 7th, and 14th amendments, etc.).

II.   JURISDICTION: AMOUNT

2. Pursuant to 28 USC §2201 and §2202, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages in excess of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) - exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees (also see 42 USC §1988, Rule 54 Fed. R. Civ. P.).

III.  JURISDICTION: PARTIES

3. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was a resident of Jacksonville, FL (Duval County).
4. Upon information & belief, MARTIN FITZPATRICK (“Defendant Fitzpatrick”) - at all times material hereto – worked and lived in-or-around Tallahassee, FL (Leon County).
a. The same can be said about CHARLES SCHREIBER (“Defendant Schreiber”), MARK WALKER (“Defendant Walker”), and USFLND.
5. Upon information & belief, MICHAEL FRANK (“Defendant Frank”) – at all times material hereto – worked and lived in-or-around Pensacola, FL (Leon County).
a. The same can be said about ALLEN WINSOR (“Defendant Winsor”), and HOPE CANNON (“Defendant Cannon”).

IV.   RELATED CASES

6. Since August 2020, Plaintiff and Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) have been litigating a related federal case at this Court. Plus, dating back to February 2021, Plaintiff and Edward Gary Early (“Judge Early”) have been litigating a different related federal case at USFLND.

V.   JURISDICTION: VENUE

7. Some of Defendants’ unlawful conduct was committed within the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, pursuant to 28 USC §1331 FS (and §1391), this venue is correct.

V.    STATUTORY PREREQUISITES

8. It appears that no administrative remedies need to be exhausted before initiating this lawsuit. Thus, the matter before this Court is ripe for adjudication.

VII.   STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

9. Plaintiff fell into Defendants’ grasp by virtue of a lawsuit that he filed against Judge Early. A case about demonstrable perjury and evidence destruction. A quick review of that case is in order.
10. But first, Plaintiff must brief this Court on the underlying discrimination that spawned Judge’s Early’s unlawful conduct. Conduct, which the clothed Defendants in the instant action have been covering up. Originating Lawsuit (State Agency, Makere v Allstate)
11. On June 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR. Pursuant to §760.11(1), he alleged that his former employer (Allstate Insurance Company) had violated his civil rights on the bases of race and sex (see Exhibit A).
a. In federal court, Allstate has been sued more than 900 times for employment discrimination. In fact, at USFLMD alone, Allstate has been charged by more than 15 different employees since 1990.^9/
12. On September 8, 2017, Allstate denied both allegations (see Exhibit B). Stating that it fired Plaintiff for a legitimate reason. Specifically, because he had failed an actuarial exam (see Exhibit C):
“Complainant was terminated solely because he failed his [FSA] exam.”
- Allstate Insurance Company, 9/8/17

13. On December 15, 2017, the FCHR concluded its investigation. Notably affirming that race and sex were the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint (see Exhibit D).
14. On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Petition for Relief with the FCHR. Just as in his original charge, he listed only race and sex as the protected characteristics for his complaint (see Exhibit E). Thus, pursuant to §760.11(7) FS and §120.569 FS, the FCHR transmitted it to DOAH.
15. After a series of irregularities (authority breaches, deposition sit-ins, recusals, etc.), Judge Early became the administrative hearing officer over Plaintiff’s case (circa November 13, 2018).
a. A hearing officer, however, with corrupted hearing.
16. Despite the procedural incongruities, the facts continued to develop in Plaintiff’s favor; heavily. Facts which included – but were not limited to:
a. Unwanted date requests; racist dolls, racist characterizations;
b. Cursing at Plaintiff for buying a condolence card;
c. Death threats; smear campaigns; lethal attacks.
17. Allstate made it known that many of its other employees had also failed exams. Yet, Allstate never fired any of them. This was the ‘smoking gun’ for proving that Allstate’s reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment was a pretext.
18. Moreover, at the hearing, three other revelations were cementing:
a. Allstate granted the work-from-home privilege to its other employees. An accommodation it denied to Plaintiff on countless occasions.
b. Allstate made Plaintiff pay $1,025 for an actuarial exam fee; a payment it never required any of its other employees to make.
c. Allstate paid Plaintiff an annual salary that was significantly lower than his similarly situated comparators.

19. These core facts rendered Plaintiff’s lawsuit (against Allstate) a textbook case of employment discrimination. One which – unfortunately – ran counter to widespread propaganda (as foretold by the Ku Klux Klan itself; and its progenies).
20. Faced with these probative facts, Judge Early went on the attack.
Judge Early’s Illegalities: (A) Evidence Suppression
21. On November 30, 2018, during the moments in which the payment disparity was being revealed (see ¶18b, supra), Judge Early ordered Plaintiff to cease questioning.
22. After the hearing – around January 9, 2019 - Plaintiff asked Judge Early for a redress of the cessation order (citing due process). He further detailed the importance of the requested testimony/revelation.
23. Two days later (January 11, 2019), Plaintiff received a copy of the hearing transcript. It was missing one page (and one page only). That crucial page was the one that contained testimony on the payment disparity (¶18b) - and Judge Early’s cessation order.
a. It must be noted that DOAH’s clerk told Plaintiff (over the phone) that Judge Early was the person who scanned/photocopied the transcript.
b. It is important to note that prior to this date, Plaintiff had never requested a hearing transcript on his case.
i. Plaintiff suspects that Judge Early knew this, and was preying on Plaintiff’s novice (Plaintiff was pro se).


24. Given these circumstances – and upon Plaintiff’s information/belief - Judge Early willfully and knowingly hid evidence.
Judge Early’s Unlawful Conduct: (B) Perjury
25. Judge Early took it one step further, though, by making a wholesale removal of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination charge.
26. On April 19, 2019, Judge Early entered its Recommended Order (“RO”).
27. The first page of the document had a section titled “Statement of the Issue”. Where Judge Early excluded Plaintiff’s sex discrimination charge (see Exhibit F).
28. The second page had a section titled “Preliminary Statement”. Where Judge Early continued to exclude Plaintiff’s sex discrimination charge. This time, however, Judge Early made the fateful declaration that Judge Early never complained of sex discrimination prior to the DOAH proceedings (see ¶14, supra) (see Exhibit G).
“[Plaintiff], also for the first identifiable time, alleged that Allstate, and in particular [Plaintiff’s manager], engaged in sexually provocative and inappropriate behaviors, which [Plaintiff] alleged to be “sexual harassment and discrimination””
- The Honorable E. Gary Early, ALJ | 4/18/19 | Florida

29. Judge Early repeated that highlighted line (ie, “for the first identifiable time”) several more times throughout his authored RO.
30. The statement, of course, was false.
31. Plaintiff did charge Allstate with sex discrimination.
a. He did so in his original charge (6/30/17, see ¶11);
b. Allstate acknowledged the sex basis (9/8/17, ¶12); and
c. The FCHR explicitly ruled on the basis of sex (12/15/17, ¶13)

32. Nevertheless, the force and effect of Judge Early’s statement made the FCHR change its tune.
33. On June 27, 2019, the FCHR issued its Final Order (“FO”). In which it listed race as the only protected characteristic in Plaintiff’s complaint (see Exhibit H); and adopted Judge Early’s ruling.
34. Judge Early’s lie had its intended effect.
35. Now, it is important to recognize that Judge Early knew he was lying.
Judge Early’s Knowledge of the Truth
36. Prior to authoring his RO, Judge Early deliberately acknowledged that the sex discrimination charge was in Plaintiff’s originating complaint.
37. On February 6, 2019, Allstate moved Judge Early to take official recognition of the FCHR’s Determination (under §90.201 FS).^1/
38. That state-issued Determination letter read, in pertinent part, as follows (highlights added):
“Complainant worked for Respondent as an Actuary. Complainant alleged that Respondent discriminated against him based on his race and sex.”
- The FCHR | 12/15/17 | Florida

39. On February 18, 2019, Judge Early granted the motion. Thereby cementing – unequivocally – that he knew that Plaintiff charged Allstate with sex discrimination. He said the following (highlights added).
“[Allstate’s] Motion for Official Recognition requests that official recognition be taken of the Notice of Determination: No Reasonable Cause, and of the Determination: No Reasonable Cause, both of which were issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations on December 15, 2017. Those documents provided the point of entry to [Plaintiff] for this proceeding.”
- The Honorable E. Gary Early, ALJ | February 18, 2019 | Florida

40. Thus, Judge Early’s repeated “statements” to the contrary were a known lie (a massive lie – in fact).
41. A big lie that impacted the outcome of Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Allstate. A case which sought monetary damages (among other things).

Judge Early’s Corruption + Conspiratorial Nexus to Defendants
42. Judge Early enlisted others to help effectuate his illegalities. He did this in two ways (bribing state officials; bribing federal officials).
43. First, Judge Early took advantage of state infirmities by bequeathing the FCHR in exchange for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
44. §760.06(4) FS empowers the FCHR to accept gifts and bequests to “help finance its activities”. In September 2019, Plaintiff asked the FCHR whether it could accept a respondent’s gifts/bequests during an active case. The agency answered with an “emphatic yes” (highlights added) (Exhibit I):
“the [FCHR] has the power to accept gifts, bequests, grants, or other payments, public or private, to help finance its activities... There are no limitations in the text of the statute... There is no applicable case law suggesting that the Commission cannot accept bequests during the investigation of a claim ... Given that the answer to Petitioner's question of law on whether the Commission can accept gifts during the investigation phase of a claim is such an emphatic yes, there is no doubt to resolve”
- FCHR | Order 19-065 | 12/10/19

45. Plus, in past Annual Reports (§760.06(11) FS), the FCHR has labeled these public/private sources of bribery as “stakeholders”.
a. Upon information & belief, Judge Early is one such stakeholder.
b. More directly – based upon information & belief – Judge Early gave the FCHR (a Tallahassee-based agency) something of value in exchange for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

46. Secondly, Judge Early furthered his assault on Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by bribing federal officials.
a. Defendant has exhibited a devotion to the unconstitutional rituals of the Ku Klux Klan. Namely, the Klan's practice of subverting the constitutional rights of black people (and black men in particular). In the instant case, Defendant accomplished that by: (a) destroying evidence (¶21-24); (b) committing perjury (¶25-41); and (c) bribing state officers (¶42-45).

47. Given Judge Early’s harmful departure from (a) facts, (b) logic, (c) statutory law, and (d) the US Constitution, Plaintiff filed suit. He did so on-or-around January 31, 2021 (hereinafter “That Case”). A case which continues to this day; albeit hampered by the public officials (state, federal) who Judge Early has enlisted to help effectuate his illegalities.
Defendant Schreiber’s Anti-Black Pact and Obstruction
48. One such state official is Defendant Schreiber, an attorney for Florida’s Attorney General’s office.
49. On March 11, 2022, Defendant Schreiber appeared in That Case; purporting to be Defendant Early’s representative. He did so via motion (“That Motion”).
50. On Page 7 of That Motion, he acknowledged the truth: that Plaintiff has been suing Judge Early in Judge Early’s individual capacity only:
“Plaintiff sues [Judge] Early only in an individual capacity. [ECF 26 at 22, 23]”
- Charles J.F. Schreiber, Jr. | 3/11/22

51. On Page 25 of That Motion, though, Defendant Schreiber stated the opposite:
“Plaintiff sues [Judge Early] in his official capacity, and in essence, the claims against [Judge Early] are claims against the State of Florida...”
- Charles J.F. Schreiber, Jr. | 3/11/22

52. Schreiber, importantly, was lying (a lâ Judge Early in April 2019; ¶25-32 supra). Following Defendant Schreiber’s 3/11/22 submission, Plaintiff pointed out (1) the facts; and (2) Defendant Schreiber’s own contradictions. Defendant Schreiber responded by failing to state any fact, rule, statute, case law, or common law practice to overcome his materially false statement. Instead, Defendant Schreiber said these facts were ‘subjective/speculative’, and that he was going to change nothing.
53. Defendant Schreiber, importantly, used this lie as the basis for his appearance/interference. As an Assistant Attorney General (FL), Defendant Schreiber is prohibited from representing (a) private citizens; and/or (b) public officials sued in their individual capacities. The Florida Attorney General’s website says this:
“The Lawyer Referral Service at the Florida Bar can assist you in contacting an attorney in Florida with expertise relevant to your situation. By law, the Office of the Attorney General may not represent private citizens in legal disputes.”
- http://MyFloridaLegal.com/Questions | 6/24/21

54. The bottom line is that Defendant Schreiber is prohibited from appearing in That Case on behalf of Judge Early. He lied to evade that prohibition, though. And his lies have been borne out of the same invidious discrimination that compelled Judge Early to commit perjury. Defendant Schreiber’s aims – as well as those of his companions – have been to abridge Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Defendant Fitzpatrick’s Invidious Kicks of Discrimination
55. Together with the aforementioned people/companies is Defendant Fitzpatrick. He, too, subscribed to the anti-black pact. An agreement which involved rehearsing one-another’s contributions towards injuring black people (especially those who petition the government).
56. To be specific – upon information & belief – Defendant Fitzpatrick also vowed to thwart Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (to a fair trial, to a trial by jury, and to the equal protections of the law). Defendant Fitzpatrick agreed to these terms before accepting That Case, during That case, and has vowed to renew his allegiance after That Case.
57. Upon information & belief, Fitzpatrick bolstered his invidious aims by accepting bribes. He took these bribes before accepting That Case, while handling That Case, and has plans to take more after That Case.
58. With full certainty, Defendant Fitzpatrick upheld his end of the discriminatory bargain by (a) entering unauthorized decisions; (b) lying; (c) refusing to disqualify himself (in contravention of 28 USC §455); (d) manipulating the trial docket; (e) drafting unconstitutional rules; and (f) enforcing unconstitutional rules.
a. The record is clear on Defendant Fitzpatrick’s misdeeds.
b. USFLND has a rule that prohibits pro se litigants from utilizing electronic filing (Rules 5.1(E), 5.4(A)).
i. Throughout That Case, Plaintiff has been pro se. Judge Early, on the other hand, has not.
ii. Despite multiple pleas for relief, Defendant Fitzpatrick has forced Plaintiff to suffer unequal hardships due to the rule.
iii. Meaning that Plaintiff will have to spend nearly $600 on printing & shipping fees, and 695 hours on printing & shipping work. Plus, he will lose 1,563 potential days of litigation. Judge Early, in contrast, will experience none of this.
1. For instance, it took 12 days for USFLND to enter Plaintiff’s 3/17/22 motion. By contrast, it took 0 days for USFLND to do the same for Judge Early’s 3/18/22 motion.
2. Another example: it took 6 days for Plaintiff to receive Defendant Fitzpatrick’s 3/31/22 paper (Doc #40 – That Case). It took 0 days, though, for Judge Early to get it.

iv. The unequal expenditure further shows that justice is for sale with Defendant Fitzpatrick; while constitutional subversions are a bonus.

c. Also, Defendant Fitzpatrick – despite being identified as a defendant – refused to disqualify himself from That Case (please see ¶62c, infra).
i. He relented months later, though. After inflicting more damage.

d. Moreover, in April 2022, Defendant Fitzpatrick approved trial docket manipulation.
i. That month, Plaintiff sent USFLND several legal documents.
ii. He sent them via postal mail (see ¶58b supra). He organized them, and he fastened them with paper clips.
iii. Despite that, though, Defendant Fitzpatrick’s assistant transposed Plaintiff’s documents, and entered them into the docket.
iv. Days later, Defendant Fitzpatrick acknowledged the transposition. Thereby approving his assistants’ manipulation of Plaintiff’s filings.
v. A manipulation that Defendant Fitzpatrick later used to deny Plaintiff relief.



Defendant Walker’s Applause & Unconstitutional Walk
59. Joined with Judge Early in that anti-black pact was Defendant Walker. Like Fitzpatrick, Defendant Walker’s agreement involved rehearsing how he would contribute to injuring black people (especially those who petition the government).
60. To be specific – upon information & belief – Defendant Walker also vowed to thwart Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (to a fair trial, to a trial by jury, and to the equal protections of the law). Defendant Walker agreed to these terms before accepting That Case, during That case, and has vowed to renew his allegiance after That Case.
61. Upon information & belief, Defendant Walker bolstered his invidious aims by accepting bribes. He took these bribes before accepting That Case, while handling That Case, and has plans to take more after That Case.
62. With full certainty, Defendant Walker upheld his end of the discriminatory bargain by (a) ratifying Defendant Fitzpatrick’s lies; (b) entering unauthorized decisions; (c) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule.
a. The record is clear on Defendant Walker’s misdeeds.
b. USFLND has a rule that prohibits pro se litigants from utilizing electronic filing (¶58b supra).
c. Moreover, on-or-around December 31, 2021, Plaintiff amended his original complaint in That Case. Therein, he listed Defendant Walker and Defendant Fitzpatrick as Judge Early’s conspired “companions-of-the-cloth” (see ¶108 infra).
i. Plaintiff also disclosed that he would further amend the complaint to formally name Defendant Walker and Defendant Fitzpatrick.
d. At the very least, Defendants Walker/Fitzpatrick knew that they were likely to be material witnesses in That Case.
e. 28 USC §455(b) prohibits federal judges from staying on cases in which they have been identified as potential material witnesses.
f. 28 USC §455(b) also prohibits federal judges from staying on cases in which they have been identified as defendants.
g. Despite their personal involvement in That Case, though, neither Defendant Fitzpatrick nor Defendant Walker disqualified themselves prior to this lawsuit. Doing so only after inflicting more damage upon Plaintiff.

USFLND’s Unconstitutional Stance
63. As specified before (¶58), USFLND discriminates against different classes of litigants. Local Rule 5.4(A)(3) states that pro se parties must send hard copies of their court papers. That same rule, though, alleviates represented parties from this hardship.
64. Not only does the disparity affect time & money, it also affects the efficacy of litigation.
a. Pro se litigants lose multiple days due to the transit times (mailing documents to & from USFLND). Days which they could use for research, evidence collection, writing, and self-representation.
b. Plus, scanned hard copies are at a disadvantage (text recognition, hyperlinks, search-&-find, etc.).


65. Moreover, there is no legitimate reason for the disparity. Neither USFLND’s rules nor USFLND’s website state a compelling government interest in the discrimination.
66. Plus – upon information & belief – USFLND has never allowed the public to weigh in on the rule. Instead, the Court has dictated to the people how the people will be governed.
67. Importantly, the pro se distinction is just a cover for targeting black people (especially black men who litigate civil rights cases).
a. Records show that pro se litigants are disproportionately black. Records also show that civil rights litigants are disproportionately black.
i. To be precise, statistics show that 84% of Florida’s pro se civil rights litigants are black. This value is dramatically high, because government census shows that only 17% of Floridians are black.
b. USFLND has always known that its rule would have (and has had) a disparate impact on black people.
i. On June 10, 2022, Plaintiff asked Defendants (via email) whether they disputed these statistics. Defendants laid silent.
ii. The following month - on July 13, 2022 – asked again. Defendants – again – did not dispute the facts/statistics related to its discriminatory rule.
c. The fact of the matter is that discrimination was USFLND’s aim all along.
d. Additionally, USFLND’s pro se vs attorney distinction is flawed on its face. There are many pro se litigants who are attorneys.
e. Lastly, one of the most influential federal cases (Bivens v Six Narcotics Agents) was initiated by a pro se litigant. Further showing that USFLND’s pro se distinction lacks legitimacy.

68. USFLND has a pattern & practice of manipulating federal dockets in order to produce fake statistics. Fake statistics that it uses to justify discriminating against black litigants.
a. A practice that Defendant Fitzpatrick exercised against Plaintiff (¶58d supra).

69. As such, USFLND uses Local Rule 5.4 to effectuate its self-fulfilling prophesy of abridging the constitutional rights of black people.
a. The rule is repugnant on its face, and diabolical upon closer inspection.
b. Upon information & belief, USFLND’s judges use the anti-black stratification to deter others (eg, prospective attorneys) from helping black litigants. i. Judge Early has used this tactic as well.


70. Nevertheless – without doubt – USFLND’s discrimination has adversely affected Plaintiff in That Case (¶58b), and it will injure him further. Plus, it will do the same to other pro se litigants.
Defendant Frank’s Strides and Strident Unconstitutionality
71. Ambling to carry the anti-black torch is Defendant Frank. Upon being fully indoctrinated, the official agreed to perform his part in injuring black people (particularly those who petition the government).
72. To be specific – upon information & belief – Defendant Frank also vowed to thwart Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (to a fair trial, to a trial by jury, and to the equal protections of the law). Defendant Frank agreed to these terms before accepting That Case, during That case, and has vowed to renew his allegiance after That Case.
73. Upon information & belief, Defendant Frank bolstered his invidious aims by accepting bribes. He took these bribes before accepting That Case, while handling That Case, and has plans to take more after That Case.
74. With full certainty, Defendant Frank upheld his end of the discriminatory bargain by (a) drafting an unconstitutional local rule; and (b) enforcing an unconstitutional rule.
a. The record is also clear on Defendant Frank’s unconstitutional conduct.
b. He – like the clothed companions he is in lockstep with – enforced USFLND’s rule. A rule prohibiting equal protections under the law. A rule targeting black litigants. Defendant Frank did so in June 2022.

Defendant Winsor’s Unconstitutional Gatekeeping Gait
75. Also in lockstep with these anti-black co-conspirators is Defendant Winsor. Who agreed to lock Plaintiff out of the well-amended pastures of the US Constitution. Memorialized by the unequal guarantees in Local Rule 5.4.
76. To be specific – upon information & belief – Defendant Winsor also vowed to thwart Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (to a fair trial, to a trial by jury, and to the equal protections of the law). Defendant Winsor agreed to these terms before accepting That Case, during That case, and has vowed to renew his allegiance after That Case.
77. Upon information & belief, Defendant Winsor bolstered his invidious aims by accepting bribes. He took these bribes before accepting That Case, while handling That Case, and has plans to take more after That Case.
78. With full certainty, Defendant Winsor upheld his end of the discriminatory bargain by (a) drafting an unconstitutional local rule; and (b) directing Defendant Frank to enforce that unconstitutional local rule.
a. The record is also clear on Defendant Winsor’s unconstitutional conduct.
b. He – alongside his companions of the cloth – enforced USFLND’s rule. A rule prohibiting equal protections under the law. A rule targeting black litigants.
c. Defendant Winsor did so in June 2022.
d. Plus, upon information & belief, Defendant Winsor (and others) wrote that unconstitutional rule (Local Rule 5.4).

Defendant Cannon’s Unconstitutional Barrage
79. Last but not least is Defendant Cannon; who burst onto the scene with anti-black adherence on all seams. Defendant Cannon’s seamless transition into the practice of targeting black people exhibited her commitment to the pre-suit pact.
80. To be specific – upon information & belief – Defendant Cannon also vowed to thwart Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (to a fair trial, to a trial by jury, and to the equal protections of the law). Defendant Cannon agreed to these terms before accepting That Case, during That case, and has vowed to renew his allegiance after That Case.
81. Upon information & belief, Defendant Cannon bolstered her invidious aims by accepting bribes. She took these bribes before accepting That Case, while handling That Case, and has plans to take more after That Case.
82. With full certainty, Defendant Cannon upheld her end of the discriminatory bargain by (a) lying, (b) drafting an unconstitutional local rule; and (c) enforce that unconstitutional local rule.
a. The record is also clear on Defendant Cannon’s unconstitutional conduct.
b. She – like the clothed companions who sway her crooked shots – enforced USFLND’s rule. A rule prohibiting equal protections under the law. A rule targeting black litigants.
c. Defendant Cannon did so in July 2022.

Full-Circle Voyage Between Defendants Cannon and Schreiber
83. Of particular value is the destruction that Defendant Cannon propelled onto the litigious lie that Defendant Schreiber constructed (highlights added):
“Plaintiff sues Judge Early in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Seventh Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”
- Hope T. Cannon | 7/13/22
The record is clear, Judge Early was sued in his individual capacity only. Defendant Schreiber’s lie has been contradicted by fact, by law, by his own words, and [now] by his co-defendant’s declaration.
84. Defendant Schreiber is not the only defendant who has been lying, though. None of these defendants have been beholden to (a) the truth; (b) the facts; (c) logic; (d) the law; or – quite importantly – (e) the US Constitution. Ultimately, they have committed themselves to do/say/write whatever they want in their quest to perform their Klan-like attack-on-black.



VIII.  ULTIMATE FACTS

Defendant Martin Fitzpatrick
85. Defendant Fitzpatrick entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Fitzpatrick’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination (on the bases of race & sex).
86. Defendant Fitzpatrick performed his role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶57);
b. lying (¶58);
c. altering the federal docket (¶58d);
d. entering orders without authority (¶58);
e. shunning his duty to disqualify himself (¶58);
f. drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶58); and
g. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶58).
87. Defendant Fitzpatrick will continue his misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶22-26);
b. destroying evidence (¶22-26);
c. manipulating the federal docket (¶58);
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶58);
e. overruling jury verdicts;
f. shunning appellate mandates; and
g. committing perjury (¶58)

Defendant Charles JF Schreiber, Jr.
88. Defendant Schreiber also entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Schreiber’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination on the bases of race & sex. Plus, he was motivated by Judge Early’s bribes/contributions (financial, professional, etc.)
89. Defendant Schreiber performed his role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶47);
b. lying (¶50-54);
c. altering electronic records;
d. appearing in That Case without authority (¶53); and
e. interfering with That Case (¶48-54).

90. Defendant Schreiber will continue his misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating public records (¶58d); and
d. committing perjury (¶25-35).

Defendant Mark Walker
91. Defendant Walker entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Walker’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination (on the bases of race & sex). Plus, he was motivated by Judge Early’s bribes/contributions (financial, etc.).
92. Defendant Walker performed his role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶61);
b. ratifying Defendant Fitzpatrick’s lies (¶62);
c. rendering judgments without authority (¶62);
d. shunning his duty to disqualify himself (¶62);
e. drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶62); and
f. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶62).

93. Defendant Walker will continue his misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating the federal docket (¶58d);
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶62);
e. overruling jury verdicts;
f. shunning appellate mandates; and
g. committing perjury (¶25-35).

Defendant USFLND
94. USFLND created an unconstitutional local rule (¶63-70). One which was driven by invidious discrimination on the bases of race and sex.
95. USFLND has been enforcing that unconstitutional rule ever since.
96. If not stopped, USFLND will continue its misconduct by violating Plaintiff (and others).
Defendant Michael Frank
97. Defendant Frank entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Frank’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination (on the bases of race & sex).
98. Defendant Frank performed his role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶73);
b. drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶74); and
c. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶74).

99. Defendant Frank will continue his misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating the federal docket (¶58d);
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶58);
e. overruling jury verdicts;
f. shunning appellate mandates; and
g. committing perjury (¶25-35)

Defendant Allen Winsor
100. Defendant Winsor entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Fitzpatrick’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination (on the bases of race & sex).
101. Defendant Winsor performed his role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶77);
b. directing Defendant Michael Frank’s misconduct (¶78);
c. shunning his duty to disqualify himself (¶78);
d. drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶78); and
e. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶78).

102. Defendant Winsor will continue his misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating the federal docket (¶58d);
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶78);
e. overruling jury verdicts;
f. shunning appellate mandates; and
g. committing perjury (¶25-35).

Defendant Hope Cannon
103. Defendant Cannon entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendant Cannon’s agreement was driven by invidious discrimination (on the bases of race & sex).
104. Defendant Cannon performed her role in the conspiracy by:
a. accepting bribes (¶81);
b. lying (¶82);
c. drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶82); and
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶82).

105. Defendant Cannon will continue her misconduct by:
a. fabricating evidence (¶21-24);
b. destroying evidence (¶21-24);
c. manipulating the federal docket (¶58d);
d. enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶82);
e. overruling jury verdicts;
f. shunning appellate mandates; and
g. committing perjury (¶25-35)




IX. LEGAL APPLICATION

COUNT I: FITZPATRICK | BIVENS

106. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 59 through 70, and 85 through 87.
107. Defendant Fitzpatrick entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And its scheme involved impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
108. Under the guise of federal authority, Defendant Fitzpatrick has been accomplishing his objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶86); (c) entering unauthorized orders (¶86); (d) thwarting 28 USC §455(b)(5) (¶86) – via refusal to recuse despite being identified as a defendant; (e) drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶86); and (f) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶86).
109. Defendant Fitzpatrick’s actions have (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); due process (14th Amendment); and (b) been pockmarked by invidious discrimination.


COUNT II: SCHREIBER | 42 USC §1983

110. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 54, 83 through 84, and 88 through 90.
111. Defendant Schreiber entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And it was set to be effectuated by impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
112. Under the color of state law, Defendant Schreiber has been accomplishing his objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶89); (b) lying in order to represent Judge Early (¶89); (c) misusing public funds; (d) altering electronic records (¶89); (e) appearing in That case without requisite authority (¶89); and (f) interfering with That Case (¶89).
113. Defendant Schreiber’s Actions have impeded Plaintiff’s access to (a) the courts (1st Amendment); (b) a trial-by-jury (7th Amendment); (c) the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); and (d) due process (14th Amendment).


COUNT III: SCHREIBER | 42 USC §1985

114. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 110 through 113.
115. Defendant Schreiber violated §1985 by conspiring with others (eg, Judge Early, etc.).


COUNT IV: WALKER | BIVENS

116. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 70, and 91 through 93.
117. Defendant Walker entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And its scheme involved impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
118. Under the guise of federal authority, Defendant Walker has been accomplishing his objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶92); (b) entering unauthorized orders (¶92); (c) thwarting 28 USC §455(b)(5) (¶92) – via a refusal to recuse despite being identified as a defendant; (d) drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶92); and (e) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶92).
119. Defendant Walker’s actions have (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); and (b) been pockmarked by invidious discrimination.


COUNT V: USFLND | BIVENS

120. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 96.
121. Local Rule 5.4(A)(3) is repugnant to the US Constitution. USFLND uses it to enact its invidious discrimination against black people. When utilized, USFLND impedes, hinders, obstructs, and defeats black people’s pursuits of justice. The pro se vs attorney distinction is a pretext for USFLND’s racial animus. A distinction unworthy of credence – even on its face (ie, attorneys can be pro se litigants)
122. Put simply: USFLND – under the guise of federal authority – has been enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶63).
123. USFLND has (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); and (b) been infused with invidious discrimination.


COUNT VI: FRANK | BIVENS

124. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 74, and 97 through 99.
125. Defendant Frank entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And its scheme involved impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
126. Under the guise of federal authority, Defendant Frank has been accomplishing his objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶98); (b) drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶98); and (c) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶98).
127. Defendant Frank’s actions have (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); and (b) been pockmarked by invidious discrimination.


COUNT VII: WINSOR | BIVENS

128. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 96, and 100 through 102.
129. Defendant Winsor entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And its scheme involved impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
130. Under the guise of federal authority, Defendant Winsor has been accomplishing his objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶101); (b) directing others to obstruct justice at Plaintiff’s expense; (c) drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶101); and (d) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶101).
131. Defendant Winsor’s actions have (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); and (b) been pockmarked by invidious discrimination.


COUNT VIII: BIVENS | BIVENS

132. Plaintiff hereby restates and realleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 9 through 96, and 103 through 105.
133. Defendant Cannon entered into a pre-suit pact to deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The covenant was marked by an anti-black devotion. And its scheme involved impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating black people’s pursuits of justice.
134. Under the guise of federal authority, Defendant Cannon has been accomplishing her objectives by (a) accepting bribes (¶104); (b) drafting an unconstitutional local rule (¶104); and (c) enforcing an unconstitutional local rule (¶104).
135. Defendant Cannon’s actions have (a) deprived Plaintiff of the equal protections of the law (14th Amendment); (b deprived Plaintiff of due process (14th Amendment); and (c) been pockmarked by invidious discrimination.


JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

136. The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity does not attach to this case for two several fundamental reasons.
137. First, none of the complained-of conduct were judicial acts. The document manipulation that Defendant Fitzpatrick engaged in was an administrative task; one which USFLND’s clerical employees normally do. The unconstitutional rulemaking that Defendants engaged in was akin to a legislative act.
138. Secondly, Plaintiff never dealt with these judicial defendants in their judicial capacities. Plaintiff never sought them out to create unconstitutional rules. Plaintiff never sought them out to enforce unconstitutional rules. Plaintiff never asked them to discriminate against black people. Plaintiff – instead – saw their true colors blazing under the color of law; the same laws & constitutions that they were stepping all over.
139. Third, Defendant Schreiber was/is not a judicial officer at all. His commitment, though (to lying, to the anti-black pact, and to the cover-up) has placed him within the embrace of his lawless companions-of-the-cloth. Yet, his acts were not judicial either.


DAMAGES

140. As a direct and proximate result of said acts, Plaintiff has suffered – and continues to suffer – financial loss and loss of earning capacity. Plus, he has suffered (and continues to suffer) mental anguish, distress, pain, great expense, inconvenience, professional damage and other pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses.
141. As a further result of Defendant’s constitutional breaches, Plaintiff has incurred legal fees and will continue to incur legal fees.


RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

142. Defendants’ unlawful acts and discriminatory patterns demonstrate a disdain for Plaintiff’s rights; thereby justifying an award of punitive damages at trial. Upon an evidentiary showing and hearing, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend his pleadings to assert a claim for punitive damages against Defendants (as well as to add other defendants).
143. Plaintiff may retain attorneys to represent him in prosecuting this action and if so will be obligated to pay them a reasonable fee for their services.
a. Pursuant to 42 USC §1988, Plaintiff is entitled to request that the Court allow him to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in successfully prosecuting this cause, should he retain an attorney.



REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL

144. Pursuant to 7^th Amendment of the United States Constitution (and Rule 38(b) Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 81(c) Fed. R. Civ. P.), Plaintiff respectfully requests that this honorable Court grant him a trial by jury on all issues so triable.


REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Relief from Martin Fitzpatrick
145. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Fitzpatrick (Count I), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
b. Declaring that Defendant Fitzpatrick violated 28 USC §455;
c. Declaring that Defendant Fitzpatrick violated 28 USC §1343;
d. Declaring that Defendant Fitzpatrick violated Bivens;
e. Enjoining Defendant Fitzpatrick from committing further violations of 28 USC §455;
f. Enjoining Defendant Fitzpatrick from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
g. Enjoining Defendant Fitzpatrick from committing further violations of Bivens;
h. Enjoining Defendant Fitzpatrick from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from Charles JF Schreiber, Jr.
146. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Schreiber (Counts II-III), and enter an Order providing following relief:
a. Declaring that Defendant Schreiber violated §1983;
b. Declaring that Defendant Schreiber violated §1985;
c. Enjoining Defendant Schreiber from committing further violations of §1983;
d. Enjoining Defendant Schreiber from committing further violations of §1985;
e. Enjoining Schreiber from ever participating in a case in which his client is being sued solely in an individual capacity.

Relief from Mark Walker
147. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Walker (Count IV), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
a. Declaring that Defendant Walker violated 28 USC §455;
b. Declaring that Defendant Walker violated 28 USC §1343;
c. Declaring that Defendant Walker violated Bivens;
d. Enjoining Defendant Walker from committing further violations of 28 USC §455;
e. Enjoining Defendant Walker from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
f. Enjoining Defendant Walker from committing further violations of Bivens;
g. Enjoining Defendant Walker from ever participating (judge, juror, etc.) in a case involving Plaintiff.
h. Enjoining Defendant Walker from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from USFLND
148. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against USFLND (Count V), and enter an order providing the following relief.
a. Declaring that USFLND violated 28 USC §1343;
b. Declaring that USFLND violated Bivens;
c. Enjoining USFLND from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
d. Enjoining USFLND from committing further violations of Bivens;
e. Enjoining USFLND from ever participating in a case involving Plaintiff.
f. Enjoining USFLND from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from Michael Frank
149. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Frank (Count VI), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
a. Declaring that Defendant Frank violated 28 USC §1343;
b. Declaring that Defendant Frank violated Bivens;
c. Enjoining Defendant Frank from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
d. Enjoining Defendant Frank from committing further violations of Bivens;
e. Enjoining Defendant Frank from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from Allen Winsor
150. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Winsor (Count VII), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
a. Declaring that Defendant Winsor violated 28 USC §455;
f. Declaring that Defendant Winsor violated 28 USC §1343;
g. Declaring that Defendant Winsor violated Bivens;
h. Enjoining Defendant Winsor from committing further violations of 28 USC §455;
i. Enjoining Defendant Winsor from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
j. Enjoining Defendant Winsor from committing further violations of Bivens;
k. Enjoining Defendant Winsor from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from Hope Cannon
151. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Cannon (Count VIII), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
l. Declaring that Defendant Cannon violated 28 USC §1343;
m. Declaring that Defendant Cannon violated Bivens;
n. Enjoining Defendant Cannon from committing further violations of 28 USC §1343;
o. Enjoining Defendant Cannon from committing further violations of Bivens;
p. Enjoining Defendant Cannon from ever enforcing a rule that – within the same case – (a) permits one litigant to file electronically; and (b) prohibits another litigant from doing the same.

Relief from All Defendants
152. WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants (Counts I-VIII), and enter an Order providing the following relief:
a. Awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages (back pay, front pay, including interest, lost fringe benefits, etc.) which each defendant’s unlawful act(s) precluded him from obtaining.
b. Awarding Plaintiff the cost of this action, together with reasonable attorney’s fees (if any).
c. Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment interest;
d. Awarding Plaintiff punitive damages;
e. Awarding Plaintiff nominal damages; and
f. Awarding such other and further relief as is just, equitable, and proper.

Dated this 29th day of July 2022.
Respectfully submitted,

	/s/ Elias Makere
	ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA, Plaintiff 3709 San Pablo Rd. S # 701 Jacksonville, FL 32224 P: (904) 294-0026 E: justice.actuarial@gmail.com W: TextBookDiscrimination.com    Get Booked Up on Justice!

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of January 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Courts by using its online filing page.

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

I HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to Rule 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. the foregoing (1) has been submitted in good faith; (2) is supported by existing law; (3) is supported by indisputable evidence (and will likely be compounded with further evidence); and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.

/s/ Elias Makere

Verification Under Oath Pursuant to 28 USC §1746

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Moreover, the ultimate, material facts laid out above come from publicly available sources. Thus, they are not subject to dispute because “they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned”. Some of the other facts are based on information and belief. These two elements come from my own personal observation, knowledge, and experience – coupled with circumstantial evidence of the matter.
Executed on this 29th day of July 2022.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	7/29/2022
	Elias Makere, Plaintiff/Affiant

Endnotes

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A
Charge of Discrimination

From: Plaintiff
To: State Agency (FCHR)
6/30/2017



[marked]

(first page only)

EXHIBIT B
Position Statement

From: Allstate
To: State Agency (FCHR)
9/8/2017


(note: Allstate = Plaintiff’s former employer)


[marked]


(first page only)

EXHIBIT C
Allstate’s Termination Rationale
(ie, Allstate fired Plaintiff “solely” for failing an exam)
From: Allstate
To: State Agency (FCHR)
9/8/2017





[marked]

EXHIBIT D
Notice of Determination

From: State Agency (FCHR)
To: Plaintiff/Allstate/Defendant’s Agency
12/15/2017





[marked]

EXHIBIT E
Petition for Relief

From: Plaintiff
To: State Agencies (FCHR/DOAH)
1/19/2018





[marked]


(first page only)

EXHIBIT F
Recommended Order


From: Defendant
To: State Agency (FCHR)
4/19/2019





[marked]


(Pages 1 and 2 only)


{Defendant’s removal of sex discrimination charge}

EXHIBIT G
Recommended Order


From: Defendant
To: State Agency (FCHR)
4/19/2019





[marked]


(2nd page only)


{defendant’s perjury}

EXHIBIT H
FCHR Final Order
Exclusion of Sex Discrimination Complaint

From: State Agency (FCHR)
To: Defendant/Plaintiff/Allstate
6/27/2019





[marked]


(first page only)


{end result of Defendant’s ‘big lie’}

EXHIBIT I
FCHR Final Order
19-065

In Re: Makere
12/10/2019
Florida

Corrupt Allowance of Bequests During Active Investigations



[marked]


(pages 1 through 3 only)

Electronic Copies:
     HTML: TextBookDiscrimination.com/Info/Misc/FCHRBribery/FirstDecision
     PDF:  TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/FCHR/FO_19065.pdf