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Icon-UpArrow Summary Judgment #1 (Makere v Allstate)





Case No (LT): 3:20-cv-00905-MMH-LLL

Division: (3) Jacksonville


Plaintiff, ELIAS MAKERE, on this 14th day of November 2023, respectfully asks this Honorable Court to deny “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment...Incorporated Memorandum of Law” (hereinafter “That Motion”) {#99}.

Key Points:
• Grounds: Defendant failed to meet its initial burden
• Facts: 4/10/19 vs 4/26/19; 2019-19238 vs 2017-01432
Table of Contents:
Context3rd Page
Material Facts4th Page
Response6th Page
Certificates20th Page
Exhibits22nd Page
Affidavits120th Page
How-To Guide: How to Respond to a Motion for Summary Judgment
some judge on fantasy. some judge on fact. the former employer has judged on the former; and has now entreated this court to perform summary judgment on that.

yet the material facts are where the material fantasies (which defendant ballooned up) will come down and fall flat.

so, may this court reject defendant's fantasies, because its requests for summary judgment are debunked by fact.

Background:Defendant moved for a procedural-based summary judgment
Problem:Defendant’s motion was based on fatal falsehoods
Request:This Court rejects Defendant’s motion
Rule 56(C) | Fed. R. Civ. P. | Summary Judgment (highlights added)
“(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record...; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish [the absence] of a genuine dispute...”
Local Rule 3.01(c) | USFLMD | Time to Respond
“A party may respond to a motion...for summary judgment... within twenty-one days after service of the motion.”
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (highlights added)
“Accordingly, the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment that asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.
• 2:22-cv-00730-SPC-KCD- USFLMD (7/24/23)
• 3:20-cv-00514-BJD-LLL- USFLMD (1/20/23)
• 5:22-cv-00324-PRL- USFLMD (8/2/23)
• 6:22-cv-00906-PGB-EJK- USFLMD (10/10/23)
• 8:22-cv-01054-KKM-TGW- USFLMD (8/15/23)

This Court recently denied defendant motions for summary judgment
{#XX}Docket Entry XX
[C###]Page ### from The Complaint1/
[X###]Exhibit ### from this response (attached)
1DCAFirst District Court of Appeals (Florida)
4DCAFourth District Court of Appeals (Florida)
EEOCEqual Employment Opportunity Commission
FCHRFlorida Commission on Human Relations
FEPAFair Employment Practices Agency
FSFlorida Statute
USFLMDUS District Court, Florida, Middle District


1. Government records prove that That Motion is wrong about material facts.

2. The most significant of which is the filing date on Plaintiff’s administrative charge of employment discrimination; as highlighted in the following table:
April 10, 2019April 26, 2019
a. That Motion used the wrong filing date (ie, 4/26/19); an inaccuracy that will prove fatal to its request.

b. Moreover, the correct filing date (which That Motion never mentioned) is the only valid filing date. As it was supported by:
(1) electronic record [X101]; and

(2) a statutorily required timestamp [X102].
c. This fact is fundamental to That Motion. As it renders all other parts of That Motion moot; leaving Defendant nothing to stand on.
3. Notwithstanding, That Motion is still wrong about another material fact: Plaintiff has never had an attorney for this action. This is proven by the case numbers:
a. That Motion used the wrong case number (ie, 2017-01432); an inaccuracy that nullifies its argument [X111].
i. Defendant used this wrong case number to claim that Plaintiff had an attorney for this action. Thereby launching its argument on a false basis.
1. Of course, Plaintiff has never had an attorney for this action.

2. In fact, the FCHR – for whom Defendant relies – admitted that Plaintiff never had an attorney for this action. [X306]
b. Importantly, the correct case numbers (ie, 2019-19238; 15D-2019-00685) are the case numbers that brought this lawsuit to bear.
i. The FCHR (a statewide FEPA) set 2019-19238 as the case number in the prerequisite charge [X301].

ii. 15D-2019-00685 was the corresponding case number for Plaintiff’s dual-filed EEOC charge [X301].
c. None of That Motion’s seventeen (17) exhibits showed anyone filing a Notice of Appearance for [either of] the correct case numbers.

d. Of course, Plaintiff’s [lack of] legal representation was material to That Motion.
i. Defendant claimed that Plaintiff had an attorney.
1. Then, Defendant claimed that Plaintiff received timely notifications via that attorney.
a. Of course, Defendant was wrong about each claim.

4. Although these two material facts are sufficient to end this discussion (Catrett v. Johns-Manville, 756 F.2d 181 (DC Cir. 1985)), a full response will show how the State of Florida has helped Defendant depart from reality (which is a key element to the underlying complaint – [C038]-[C042]). Thereby serving as the [metaphorical] flight data recorder for the hot-air balloon which Defendant floated That Motion on.


5. Despite not attacking the merits of Plaintiff’s case, That Motion did begin by tiptoeing onto the undisputed facts. Facts, importantly, which its footnote deemed to be true [M003]. A mild dive into the undisputed facts (and procedural history) will accomplish three things. It will reveal that:
a. That Motion is debunked by the record;

b. Defendant is guilty of the underlying action (ie, discrimination); and

c. The FCHR has obstructed Plaintiff’s case in order to cover for Defendant.
000 | Statement of Undisputed Facts

6. On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff began working for Defendant. [C003]

7. Defendant admitted him into its Actuarial Career Program (“ACP”) alongside many of his newfound co-workers. The ACP’s goal was to develop its members into FSAs (Fellows of the Society of Actuaries). [C003]

8. At the time of hiring, Plaintiff had passed six (6) actuarial exams, and had a little over one year of experience. This meant that he would have to pass four (4) more exams to attain the desired credential. [C003]

9. Throughout Plaintiff’s 3-year tenure, Defendant subjected him to a hostile work environment. With harassment that included – but was not limited to:
a. Unwanted date requests from his direct manager [C003];

b. Racist dolls [C006], racist characterizations [C005]-[C006]; and

c. Cursing at Plaintiff for buying a condolence card [C006].
10. Defendant also conditioned Plaintiff’s employment on racial inferiority. Highlights included – but were not limited to:
a. Paying Plaintiff a lower ASA salary than it paid other similarly-situated employees [C005];

b. Proclaiming that Plaintiff’s newly acquired actuarial credentials (ASA) “devalue[d] the profession[C005].
11. Recognizing the employer’s unprovoked animus, Plaintiff begged management to let him work from home [C007]; doing so on a routine basis. A request that Defendant always denied.
a. A work accommodation, however, that Defendant granted to everyone else in its actuarial department. [C007]
12. Yet every time Plaintiff tried to avoid the hostilities, Defendant target him for more.
a. In Fall 2015, an IT manager phoned Plaintiff, told him a series of lies, then explained how he would get Plaintiff fired. That same manager carried out the plan [C008]-[C010].
i. That IT manager, importantly, had been charged with employment discrimination before [C008],[C018]
b. Also, in Fall 2015, Plaintiff’s direct manager relayed a message from a different IT manager. A different IT manager who wanted Plaintiff fired (for no stated/legitimate reason). [C008]
13. Given these facts & circumstances, Plaintiff filed an internal discrimination complaint. The primary subject of the complaint (¶12a) acknowledged that it was based on “racism”.

14. Thereafter, Defendant worsened the work environment for Plaintiff. With acts which included – but were not limited to:
a. Job replacement [C009];

b. Denied raises [C009];

c. Sabotaged work [C009]; and

d. Defendant forcing Plaintiff to pay for an actuarial exam fee while never doing the same to its other employees. [C009]
15. Defendant met Plaintiff’s additional internal complaints with indignation. Telling Plaintiff to “figure out if this [was] the place for [him] to work”. [C009]

16. Soon thereafter – on Friday, August 12, 2016 – Defendant told Plaintiff that it was terminating his employment; effective immediately. [C010]
a. Notably, Plaintiff’s direct manager made the decision just hours after Plaintiff declined her last date request (doing so on 8/10/16).
17. Defendant’s reason for firing Plaintiff was that Plaintiff had failed an actuarial exam. It gave no other reason. [C010]

18. Yet, Defendant had many other employees who also failed actuarial exams. Some who failed multiple exams; all who failed easier exams. Discriminatorily, though, Defendant never fired any of them. [C011]

19. Plus, immediately after firing Plaintiff, Defendant replaced him with two employees who had never even passed one exam. The disparity in qualifications is/was drastic (0 exams passed vs 8 exams passed). [C011]

20. Right after termination, Plaintiff passed the exam-in-question, and continued to avoid Defendant (and its employees). [C011]

21. He did, however, attempt to seek justice & repair from the harassment/discrimination/retaliation that Defendant subjected him to. As well as punishment for the unlawful conduct Defendant has subjected [and will subject] others to (see ¶12ai)

001 | External Discrimination Charge #1 (Plaintiff v Defendant)

22. On June 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination charge with the FCHR. Pursuant to §760.11(1) FS, he alleged that Defendant had violated his civil rights on the bases of race and sex ([C012][C046]). [X201]

23. On September 8, 2017, Allstate denied both allegations [C046][C099]. [X202] Stating that it fired Plaintiff for failing actuarial exam number nine [C102] [X203] (highlights added):
“[Plaintiff] was terminated solely because he failed his [FSA] exam.”
24. On December 15, 2017, the FCHR concluded its investigation. Notably affirming that race and sex were the bases of Plaintiff’s complaint. [X204]

25. On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Petition for Relief with the FCHR. Just as in his original charge, he listed only race and sex as the protected characteristics for his complaint. Thus, pursuant to §760.11(7) FS and §120.569 FS, the FCHR transmitted it to DOAH. [C047][C059]

26. During the pendency of that administrative action, Defendant enlisted its employees to dissuade Plaintiff from continuing with his suit. Doing so in a variety of ways:
a. Death threats [C012][C054]-[C055];

b. smear campaigns [C012][C047]-[C053]; and

c. Lethal attacks [C012][C054]-[C058].
27. On July 19, 2018, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s culmination of attacks by requesting leave to amend his original charge of discrimination. [X205]
a. DOAH refused to relinquish jurisdiction, though. So, Plaintiff knew that he would have to file anew; which he did (see ¶30 infra)
28. Additionally, after a series of procedural irregularities (authority breaches, deposition sit-ins, recusals, etc.), a man named Edward Gary Early became the administrative hearing officer over the case (circa 11/13/2018). [C094]

29. That man – in his quest to cover for Defendant – further violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. He did so by: (a) destroying evidence; and (b) committing perjury. [X206]

002 | External Discrimination Charge #2 (Plaintiff v Defendant)

30. Thus, on April 10, 2019,2/ Plaintiff filed his second discrimination charge against Defendant [C007]. Emailing it to the FCHR [X101]; who blessed it with a same-day timestamp (2:35PM on 4/10/19) [X102].

31. This second complaint – which was dual-filed with the EEOC – included Defendant’s post-termination retaliation (¶26, supra).

32. On May 1, 2019, the FCHR told Plaintiff that it would notify him if the state agency failed to meet its 180-day statutory window [X301].

33. On July 25, 2019, the FCHR asked Plaintiff for a rebuttal [of Defendant’s position statement]. [X302].
a. The document, importantly, was addressed/directed/emailed to Plaintiff (ie, not to any uninvolved attorney). [X303]
34. October 7, 2019 marked the deadline for the FCHR’s determination, but the state agency failed to produce one (at least not validly/on-time).

010 | Judicial Pursuits

35. Around this same time, Plaintiff appealed the perjury-ratifying two-commissioner Final Order [from his first discrimination charge] (ie, ¶28-29, supra) [X207]. Doing so on July 24, 2019 [X304].
a. Importantly, Plaintiff litigated his entire appeal pro se. Plus, the FO’s unlawful ratification excluded his sex discrimination charge.
36. On May 26, 2020 – as this appeal was winding down – Plaintiff asked the FCHR for his Election of Rights form (ie, the document that the state agency promised to deliver – ¶32 supra) [X305]
a. The FCHR, however, relented. Instead of producing Plaintiff’s afore-promised Election of Rights form, the FCHR revealed that it had already issued a Notice of Determination (“Phantom Notice”); doing so, apparently, [back] on October 18, 2019.

b. The agency further revealed that it did not send that Phantom Notice to Plaintiff. Rather, the FCHR sent it to someone else: ‘the uninvolved attorney from Orlando, FL’.

c. Then, upon admitting that Plaintiff never had an attorney, the FCHR issued an Amended Notice of Determination. [X306]
i. Therein the state agency confessed that it had mailed Plaintiff’s Phantom Notice to “[Plaintiff]’s legal representative in a former matter”.
d. Above all, though, both the amended notice and the Phantom Notice were null & void. They were invalid because the FCHR created them after the 180-day window had elapsed. A point that Plaintiff explained to the FCHR multiple times. [X307]
37. On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff sued Defendant in state court.3/ [X308]

38. The FCHR, however, had yet to release Plaintiff from its administrative tentacles. So – out of an abundance of caution – Plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief (on Friday, July 3, 2020). Only to rapidly ask DOAH (ie, the receiving state agency) to relinquish jurisdiction back to the FCHR.
a. Within days, DOAH obliged. Whereby Plaintiff began taking judicial action to detach the FCHR’s improper bindings.
39. Despite the inequities (¶36, ¶38 supra), Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in federal court. Doing so on August 12, 2020. Doing so, importantly, under both federal (42 USC §1981) and state law (§760 FS).3/
a. Plus, throughout this period, Plaintiff was still working to add his [dual-filed] Title VII charges (¶31 supra). According to the law – and the FCHR’s own words – he would need to cut ties with the FCHR. An agency with a track record that has included – but has not been limited to:
i. illegitimate final orders (¶35 supra)

ii. lost federal funding [X309];

iii. delays [X309] (¶27, ¶35-36 supra);

iv. phantom notices (¶36c supra); and

v. reluctances to relinquish jurisdiction (¶36-¶38)
40. So, on September 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition. Thereby asking 1DCA to prevent the FCHR from breaching its authority (which would let Plaintiff cut ties with the FCHR). [X310]

41. On November 25, 2020 – while that extraordinary writ was still pending – the FCHR issued an administrative dismissal for Charge #2 (ie, 2019-19238). This constituted the “final agency action” that Plaintiff was seeking (see 60Y-5.006(5) FAC). [X311]

42. From there, Plaintiff took the required steps to attach his Title VII charges.
a. On December 7, 2020,4/ Plaintiff mailed the EEOC his Request for a Substantial Weight Review (“SWR”) (under 29 CFR §1601.76).

b. On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff received his charge file. Whereby he contacted his designated representative to ask for his Right-to-Sue Letter (“RTS Letter”). It arrived on March 9, 2021.5/
43. Roughly one month earlier, though, (on February 8, 2021), this Court entered a partial order of dismissal in this action. Thereby dismissing Plaintiff’s state charges (ie, §760 FS), [mistakenly] due to administrative timeliness (highlights added):
In sum, the record establishes that the FCHR rendered timely “No Cause” determinations on [Plaintiff’s state] charges... As such, [Plaintiff] is administratively barred under section 760.11(7) of the Florida Statutes from pursuing his [state] claims here. The Court will [dismiss] Counts I-III of the Complaint and dismiss the [state] claims in their entirety.”
44. The following day – on February 9, 2021 – Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judicial Notice (hereinafter “Reality”). Thereby asking this Court to officially recognize that Plaintiff filed his dual-filed charge (ie, #30 supra) on April 10, 2019. [X312] [X313]

45. On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Title VII lawsuit [against Defendant] in this Court.6/ Several months later – and after Court order – he was finally able to attach those Title VII charges to this case.
a. Of course, March 9, 2021 marked the date that the EEOC sent Plaintiff his RTS Letter (¶42b).
46. On October 31, 2023, Defendant filed That Motion.7/

II. Analysis

47. Plaintiff has been timely with every administrative charge of employment discrimination (see ¶22-29, ¶30-34, supra).

48. Plaintiff has been timely with every civil complaint (¶37, ¶39, ¶45).

49. Defendant is guilty of discriminating against Plaintiff (¶6-26).
a. Defendant tried to cover up its unlawful acts by claiming it terminated Plaintiff because he failed actuarial exam number nine (9).

b. Yet, Defendant never fired any of its other employees for failing exams.
i. All of whom, importantly, were of a different demographic. [X209]

ii. Meanwhile, Plaintiff passed all ten (10) of the exams; passing the first five faster than 98% of the population.[X208]
c. Even worse, Defendant has told many lies – and has tried to capitalize on state-borne lies/perjury – in order to dodge accountability (¶28-41).
50. One such falsehood is Defendant’s contradictory claim that Plaintiff’s first charge did not include sex discrimination. [M004]
a. A claim debunked by the fact Defendant had already acknowledged that it was charged with sex discrimination. [X202]
51. Another such falsehood is Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff had a “counsel of record” for Charge #2. [M008]
a. A claim debunked by the FCHR’s own confession [X306].
52. Another material falsehood is Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff filed his discrimination charge on April 26, 2019.
a. A claim debunked by the fact that Plaintiff filed it on April 10, 2019. (§760.11(1)FS; Cosby v Circle K, DOAH 22-2238 (9/26/22)). [X101][X102]
53. Crucially, Defendant – despite having direct knowledge of the 4/10/2019 filing date – failed to mention it in That Motion.

54. Thus, That Motion is just wrong, and its arguments are mooted by Reality.

III. Legal Standard | Summary Judgment

55. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed under Rule 56 Fed. R. Civ. P. [M001]. History shows that this Court has a well-established method for resolving Rule 56 motions for summary judgment.

56. To start out, the Court’s review is bound by the entire record; which includes – but is not limited to:
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents...”
57. Next, the Court looks to see if the movant has proven that the nonmovant cannot produce any triable facts (highlights added):
the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is upon the moving party.”
58. If-and-only-If the movant satisfies this burden, the Court then seeks the nonmovant’s rebuttal (highlights added):
“the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of responding only after the moving party has met its burden...”
Wherein, the Court requires the nonmovant’s production of evidence (highlights added):
“Accordingly, the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment that asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.
59. In the event the Court receives two competing sets of material fact, it cannot play jury [by weighing the evidence] (highlights added):
“At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence
Instead, the Court has to allocate all presumptions in favor of the nonmovant; and rule accordingly (highlights added):
“at the summary judgment stage of the action, the court must construe all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
IV. Application

60. Altogether, a methodical review of a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment encompasses:
a. Checking if the movant has satisfied its initial burden (of proving the non-existence of any competing evidence);

b. Checking if the nonmovant has satisfied its conditional burden (of supplying evidence to rebut the movant’s motion); and

c. Construing all evidence/inferences in favor of the nonmovant
61. If either party fails to meet its burden then the Court must rule in favor of that party’s opponent.

A | Movant’s Burden

62. Defendant – as the movant – failed to satisfy its initial burden. Simply put, That Motion failed to prove that Reality does not exist. In fact, it did not even address Reality.

63. Instead, That Motion claimed that Plaintiff filed his prerequisite charge on April 26, 2019. [M007]. It used that falsehood to further claim that Plaintiff failed to: (a) Exhaust Administrative Remedies [M012]; and (b) File a Timely Lawsuit [M014].

64. Reality, however, proves that Plaintiff filed his charge on April 10, 2019 (¶52). [X101] An established fact (electronically; statutorily) that proves that:
a. Plaintiff did exhaust administrative remedies (¶22-45); and

b. Plaintiff did file his Title VII lawsuit on time (¶22-45).
65. According to the US Supreme Court, Defendant’s material shortcoming means that this Court must deny That Motion (highlights added):
“If the moving party has not fully discharged this initial burden of production, its motion for summary judgment must be denied
66. Nevertheless, Plaintiff will still satisfy his Rule 56 burden.

B | Nonmovant’s Burden

67. The record shows that Reality exists. Plaintiff – herein and elsewhere – has called this Court’s attention to Reality.

68. According to the US Supreme Court, Plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions mean that this Court should deny That Motion (see Adickes v SH Cress, 398 US 144 (1970)).

C | Construing All Evidence/Inference in Nonmovant’s Favor

69. Lastly, the evidence that Plaintiff has supplied is concrete and binary (ie, 4/10/19 vs 4/26/19; no attorney vs attorney; 0 days vs 91+ days)

70. The bottom line is that Defendant is wrong: That Motion is debunked by concrete fact.


Plaintiff requests that the parties be afforded a prompt, full and fair hearing on That Motion. Whereby: (i) Defendant can explain why That Motion should get to escape Reality (Celotex at 332); and (ii) Plaintiff can reassert Reality (in accordance with Rule 201(e) Fed. R. Evid.). Pursuant to our constitutions (see 5th Amendment - US, 14th Amendment – US, Art. I §9 FL Constitution), depriving the parties of a summary judgment hearing is tantamount to depriving them of their due process rights (also see Kozich v. Hartford, 609 So.2d 147 (4DCA 1992)).


WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Honorable Court to deny “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment... Memorandum of Law”, because Plaintiff has submitted a well-pled set of factual elements pointing to Defendant’s unlawful employment conduct; worthy of a jury’s deliberations on: facts versus discrimination-based fantasy.

Dated this 14th day of November 2023.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Elias Makere
Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA
PO Box 324
Hobart, IN 46342
P: 904.294.0026
E: Justice.Actuarial@gmail.com
W: TextBookDiscrimination.com
   Get Booked Up on Justice!


I certify that the size and style of type used in this document is Century Schoolbook 14-point font (contents); thus complying with the font requirements of Local Rule 1.08 (USFLMD).


I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of November 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Courts by using its online filing page.
/s/ Elias Makere


1/Plaintiff’s Verified Civil Complaint” (11/5/21) {#73}

2/ Valuably, this was before the DOAH ALJ entered his recommended order (ie, not after – like Defendant claimed).

3/ State case = Duval County, FL (16-2020-CA-3770) Consolidated as 3:20-cv-00921.

4/ On-or-around October 7, 2020, Plaintiff launched a free, self-help website for civil rights litigants (ie, TextBookDiscrimination.com). On December 13, 2020, Plaintiff added a how-to guide for effectuating Requests for Substantial Weight Reviews. Notably, December 13th fell 6 days after Plaintiff filed his own SWR request (¶42). Thus, the chronology of these three dates debunks Defendant’s remarks/claims about Plaintiff’s knowledge of the FCHR’s obstructions [M018].

5/ due to the FCHR’s deliberate/invalid mis-mailing (¶36 supra), the EEOC had previously mailed an invalid letter to someone else (ie, that ‘uninvolved attorney from Orlando, FL’). Plus, the EEOC was hampered by the COVID19 global pandemic.

6/ out of respect for this Court’s order (2/8/21 {#40}; see ¶43 supra), Plaintiff filed that complaint anew. Immediately notifying this Court that he intended to attach it to this case.

7/ doing so after this Court lifted its 2.5-year discovery stay.

Electronic Copy (text-searchable, hyperlinked):



    How-To Guide: How to Respond to a Motion for Summary Judgment

Link to Underlying Complaint (HTML, PDF, Video)



Kimberly J. Doud, Esquire (0523771)
Heather A. Johnson, Esquire (pro hac vice)
Lauren C. Robertson, Esquire (1024845)

E: kdoud@littler.com
E: hajohnson@littler.com
E: lcrobertson@littler.com
P: 407.393.2900
F: 407.393.2929

Littler Mendleson, PC
111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750
Orlando, FL 32801-2366

(defendant’s trial lawyers)
101Email | Proving Filing Date (of Charge #2)
102Timestamp | Proving Filing Date (of Charge #2)
111Notice of Appearance | Proving Case Number Difference
201Plaintiff Charge #1 | Proving Race and Sex bases
202Defendant Response #1 | Proving Race and Sex bases
203Defendant Response #1 | Proving Defendant’s Guilt
204Notice #1 | Proving Race and Sex bases
205Plaintiff’s Filing #1 | Proving Amendment Attempts
206Complaint against E. Gary Early | ‘Ku Klux Klan Act’
207Final Order #1 | Proving Unlawful Cover-Up for Allstate
208Photo #1 | Proving Defendant’s Guilt
209Snapshots #1 | Proving Defendant’s Guilt
210Email | Proving Filing Date (of Title VII Charges)
211Final Order X | Evidencing State-Borne Bribery
301Notice of Receipt #2 | Proving Estoppel
302Request for Rebuttal #2 | Proving Knowledge of No Attorney
303Email | Proving Knowledge of No Attorney
304Notice of Appeal #1 | Proving Status of No Attorney
305Email | Proving FCHR Invalidity
306Amended Notice #2 | Proving Knowledge of No Attorney
307Emails | Proving FCHR Invalidity
308Complaint Cover Sheet | Proving FCHR Invalidity
309Investigative Memo | Proving FCHR’s Loss of Federal Funding
310Emails | Proving FCHR Invalidity
311Notice #2 | Proving FCHR Final Agency Action
312*Plaintiff Filing | Proving Filing Date (of Charge #2) | *‘Reality’
313*Email | Proving Filing Date (of Charge #2) | *‘Reality’
314Email | Proving Filing Date (of SWR Request)






Case No (LT): 3:20-cv-00905-MMH-LLL

Division: (3) Jacksonville


The affiant, Elias Makere, swears or affirms as follows:


1. I am over the age of eighteen (18).

2. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned case.

3. This affidavit is made in good faith.


4. I have read the Local Rules of Court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Middle District’s Discovery Handbook.

5. The information in this affidavit is based on my own personal knowledge.


6. Allstate is operating on fantasy.

7. What’s worse is that the company has asked this court to join in on those fantasies – to my detriment.

8. The bottom line is that I filed my administrative charge on April 10, 2019.
a. I emailed it to the FCHR at 8:00 AM EST that morning. [X101]

b. The agency received it immediately; and placed an official timestamp on it – the same day. [X102]

c. I hereby certify that the documents (which I’ve attached) that prove this essential point are true & correct copies of the originals.
(i) In fact, I’ve shared these documents with this court many times before (eg, {#41}.
9. Importantly, Allstate’s motion for summary judgment failed to mention this crucial fact (despite knowing of its existence for several years).
a. And – in its effort to get this Court to ignore reality – Allstate based its entire motion on a significantly different filing date.
10. As I’ve detailed before: Allstate has a sickness.

11. It’s spread its sickness to many others.

12. Notably, it’s been coinfecting the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the state agency that’s been covering for Allstate).

13. In covering for the company, the FCHR has also aimed to dodge the purview of the federal government (namely, the EEOC).
a. The EEOC, of course, grants/disapproves the FCHR’s federal funding.

b. The FCHR tried to dodge the EEOC’s disapproval by:
(i) mis-mailing an invalid notice of determination to someone other than me (ie, to an attorney whom it knew I didn’t have).

(ii) Then it coaxed the EEOC into doing the same.
14. Now, Allstate’s coughing up those viral corruptions into this court.

15. The clear facts are the elixir. Pertinently, it is a fact that:
a. I filed my charge of discrimination on April 10, 2019. [X101]

b. The FCHR’s 180-day investigative window closed on October 7, 2019.

c. The FCHR never entered a determination within that 180-day period.

d. The FCHR knew I never had an attorney for the prerequisite Title VII charges (ie, FCHR Case 2019-19238). [X302] [X303] [X306]

e. The FCHR took “final agency action” on November 25, 2020. [X311]

f. I requested an EEOC Substantial Weight Review on December 7, 2020. [X314]

g. The EEOC first sent me my Right-to-Sue Letter on March 9, 2021. [X210]

h. I filed my Title VII charges on March 9, 2021 (ie, the same day I was finally given the statutory right to do so).

i. Allstate replaced me with two employees – neither of whom have ever passed an actuarial exam – after firing me for my exam prowess (even though I’ve passed all 10 actuarial exams). [X209]
(i) Exhibit 209 shows screenshots of websites that post actuarial memberships (as well as actuarial exam passers).
1. I took the screenshots two days ago (on 11/12/2023).

2. Neither of the two employees (“Mr. Mirisola”, “Ms. Bowland”) have ever passed an actuarial exam.

3. Of course, Allstate has many other elements of guilt; but – for the sake of brevity – these snapshots are enough to prove the company’s liability.

4. I hereby certify that the images that I’ve attached are true & correct copies of those webpages (Actuarial-Lookup.com, SOA.org, CASAct.org).
a. I further certify that those images show the actuarial search results for the two aforementioned Allstate employees.

16. May you please let the facts be the elixir to Allstate’s virally corrupt fantasy?

17. May you please let a jury of my peers be the judge of Allstate’s discrimination?

18. Thus, may you please reject Allstate’s latest motion {#99}; thereby halting the fantastical spread of its state-borne virus?

Thank you.

Verification Under Oath Pursuant to 28 USC §1746

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 14th day of November 2023.

Elias Makere, Plaintiff/Affiant

Congratulations! You're now Booked Up on the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that a Floridian filed in the discrimination case against Allstate Insurance Company.

Please get the justice you deserve.


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Explanation: Judicial Immunity
Makere v Allstate (3:20-cv-00905) (USFLMD)
Makere v Early (4:21-cv-00096) (USFLND) Makere v Fitzpatrick (4:22-cv-00315) (USFLND) Makere v Gorsica (3:22-cv-01203) (USFLMD)
McDonnell-Douglas v Green, 411 US 792 (1973)
Reading List: Clear Error Reading List: Timeliness
Analysis: FCHR Determinations
Defined: 'EEOC' Defined: 'FCHR'
Cases: Allstate Discrimination
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