R | APPEAL | PETITION FOR REHEARING (Makere v Allstate; §1981, 1985, EPA, FCRA, Title VII)

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24-11336-J
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA
(Appellant/Plaintiff)

v.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
(Appellee/Defendant)

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On Appeal From The
United States District Court, Florida, Middle District
3:20-cv-00905-MMH-LLL

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APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

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Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA
Appellant/Plaintiff (“Employee X”)
PO Box 324
Hobart, IN 46342
P: 904.294.0026
E: Justice.Actuarial@gmail.com
W: TextBookDiscrimination.com
Get Booked Up on Justice!

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Thursday, November 13, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Makere v Allstate, 24-11336

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Lower Tribunal:
Lambert, Laura	Magistrate
Howard, Marcia	District Judge

Parties:
Allstate Insurance Company (NYSE: ALL)	Appellee
Makere, Elias (FSA, MAAA)	Appellant

Appellant is not a subsidiary/affiliate of a publicly owned corporation. Pursuant to Rule 26.1-2 11th Cir. R., Appellant does not know of any other entities that have interest in this case. Appellant hereby certifies that this CIP is complete.

⧗⧗⧗

under siege from Defendant’s repeated lies, this Court overlooked material facts.

so, may this panel hereby incorporate the sound truths; whereby this higher Court can hear all that lies below.

⧖⧖⧖

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

According to Rule 40(a)(2) Fed. R. App. P., oral argument is not permitted on petitions for rehearing. Notwithstanding the fact that this Court never afforded Appellant Oral Argument on the briefs (despite Appellant’s requests).

Certificate of Interested Persons		C1
Prologue		i
Statement Regarding Oral Argument		ii
Table of Contents		iii
Table of Citations		iv
Introduction		v

Petition
I	Pertinent History	2
II	Analysis	9
III	Court's Error	9
IV	Argument in Support of Rehearing	11

Conclusion		43
Certificate of Compliance		-
Certificate of Service		-

Attachment/Addendum		-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Folsom v Spokane,111 Wn.2d 256 (1988)		11
Greene v Rothschild,68 Wn.2d 1 (1965)		11
IRS v Sunnen,333 US 591 (1948)		11
Kansas v Reimer,941 P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1997)		11
Latin v Italian,596 So.2d 1174 (4DCA 1992)		10
Minneapolis v Moquin,283 US 520 (1931)		11
Rozier v Ford,573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)		11
State v. Green,105 So.2d 817 (1DCA 1958)		12
State v McBride,848 So.2d 287 (Fla. 2003)		11
Sunchase v Sunbelt,596 So.2d 119 (1DCA 1992)		10
Thompson v Schweiker,665 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1982)		11
Tipler v EI DuPont,443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971)		11
USA v McClendon,195 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1999)		11
USA v Quintana,300 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2002))		11
Whipple v. State,431 So.2d 2011 (2DCA 1983)		12

RULES
Local Rule 40-3 11th Cir. R.		vi
Rule 28 Fed. R. App. P.		vi
Rule 40 Fed. R. App. P.		ii, vi

STATUTES
§760.11 FS		3
§837 FS		3
§843 FS		3
§918 FS		3

REFERENCES

[A_]	Appendix for Opening Brief^1/
[AB_]	Answer Brief^1/
[OB_]	Opening Brief^1/
[P_]	Appendix for Petition for Rehearing^1/
[R_]	Appendix for Reply Brief^1/
{#_}	Docket Entry^1/

ABBREVIATIONS

1DCA	First District Court of Appeals (FL)
2DCA	Second District Court of Appeals (FL)
4DCA	Fourth District Court of Appeals (FL)
LT	Lower Tribunal
USFLMD	US District Court, Florida, Middle District
USFLND	US District Court, Florida, Northern District

INTRODUCTION

Appellant (ie, Elias Makere) was the plaintiff in the lower tribunal; and will be referred to in this brief as “Employee X” (Rule 28(d) Fed. R. App. P.). Appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, was the defendant below; and will be referred to as “Company Y”.

Incorporating Opening Brief

Employee X files this Petition in response to this Court’s recent opinion (“That Opinion”); hereby incorporating:

(i) Employee X’s Opening Brief (in its entirety); and

(ii) Employee X’s Reply Brief (in its entirety).

Timeliness

This Petition is timely.

On October 29, 2025, this Court issued That Opinion.

According to Rule 40(a)(1) Fed. R. App. P., the deadline for this petition is Thursday, November 13, 2025.^2/

A due date which falls ‘14 days after entry of judgment’ (Rule 40(a)(1) Fed. R. App. P.). Thus, by filing it today (ie, on the November 13^th due date), Employee X has met this Court’s time constraint.^2/

PETITION

I. PERTINENT HISTORY

A. Background: Employment Discrimination (Textbook Case)

1. On November 18, 2013, Employee X began working for Company Y. Company Y, in turn, subjected Employee X to multiple years of disparate/discriminatory/hostile/lethal treatment that included – but was not limited to:

a. unwanted date requests [A0028]-[A0039];

b. racist dolls [A0033];

c. racist characterizations [A0033]-[A0034];

d. hostile work environments [A0028]-[A0035];

e. sabotaged work [A0038];

f. pay disparity [A0033] (ie, Company Y paying Employee X a lower ASA salary than it paid its other similarly-situated employees);

g. denied-work-from-home privileges [A0035];

h. registration-fee disparity [A0039] (ie, Company Y forcing Employee X to pay for a $1,025 actuarial exam fee – while never doing the same to its other employees);

i. an illegitimate termination [A0039][A0067];

j. post-termination retaliation [A0044]-[A0062]; and

k. much more[A0028]-[A0039].

2. As such, Employee X sought justice/repair from the harassment/discrimination/retaliation that Company Y subjected him to. As well as punishment for the unlawful conduct that Company Y has subjected [and will subject] others to.

B. Background: Preceding State Action (Makere v Allstate)

3. So – on June 30, 2017 – Employee X filed an employment discrimination complaint (in accordance with §760.11(1) FS). Thereby charging Company Y with violating his civil rights on the bases of race and sex. As required, Employee X filed his charges with the FCHR (an agency of the State of Florida). [A0094]

a. The State of Florida’s administrative process, however, was/is rife with abuses. Abuses, of course, that have hampered this lawsuit. [A0062]-[A0066] [A0196]-[A0225]

4. In Winter 2018/2019, the State of Florida (via its perjurous Administrative Law Judge E. Gary Early) began its unconstitutional/unlawful attacks. Doing so by hiding crucial evidence [A0196]-[A0225].

a. In fact, the State’s attack violated the State’s [own] laws on evidence spoliation (ie, §843 FS; §918 FS).

b. Plus, the State’s subsequent attack (¶5 infra) violated the State’s [own] laws on perjury (ie, §837.06 FS).

5. On April 18, 2019, the State executed that ‘subsequent attack’ – by committing perjury. Thereby using its [publicly-enveloped] lie in order to remove the sex discrimination basis from Employee X’s complaint (¶3 supra).

6. With the attacks abounding (from: (i) the State of Florida [¶3-5 supra]; and (ii) Company Y [¶1-2 supra]), Employee X sought further justice/repair.

C. Background: Immediate Action (Makere v Allstate)

7. Thus, on August 12, 2020, Employee X sued Company Y for employment discrimination (3:20-cv-00905; USFLMD). The action was/is on the bases of race/sex/color/retaliation; and brought under many state & federal statutes.

8. On May 21, 2021, Company Y continued its lawlessness. Thereby committing perjury; and doing so, notably, in the LT. Company Y repeated its perjurous lie several more times; even adding new lies to its lie-filled campaign.

9. On April 11, 2024, Company Y attempted to [once again] defraud the LT with additional lies. As such, Employee X met Company Y’s lies with motions for sanctions. While one of those motions was [still] pending [below], this appeal ripened.^3/

D. The Appeal (Makere v Allstate)

10. On April 26, 2024, Employee X initiated this appeal.

11. On December 17, 2024, Company Y continued with its demonstrable lies of material fact. Thereby repeating [once again] the State of Florida’s original perjury (¶5 supra). A pervasive lie that Company Y complemented with other [repeated] lies [of material fact]. Lies which formed the basis of the LT’s summary judgment (and this subsequent appeal).

a. As such, Employee X supplemented his [pending] motion for sanctions [against Company Y]. Supplementing it, of course, with Company Y’s fraud upon the Court.

That Opinion’s Falsehood #1: Remand

12. Speaking of supplements, this Court claimed (within That Opinion) that Employee X did not raise the issue of the LT’s need to remand [the case] (ie, supplemental jurisdiction):

“For the first time on appeal, [Employee X] argues that, after dismissing his federal claims, the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his FCRA claims... Because [Employee X] failed to raise the supplemental jurisdiction issue in the district court, he forfeited it.”

13. This claim, of course, is false.

14. Employee X did [indeed] raise the issue of remand. He did so, quite notably, in his Motion for Relief [R0003]-[R0008].

That Opinion’s Falsehood #2: Null & Void FCHR Determination

15. Unfortunately, That Opinion operated on another material falsehood. This second material falsehood was based on the fact that the FCHR’s 2019 determination was null & void.

16. The reason that the FCHR’s determination was/is null & void is because it fell outside of the [mandatory] 180-investigatory window. In fact, That Opinion recognized this time requirement:

“If the FCHR fails to decide whether there is reasonable cause within 180 days, the claimant may proceed to file a civil action in court.”

17. Importantly, That Opinion also recognized that Employee X filed his Second Charge on April 10, 2019 (highlights added):

“On April 10, 2019, [Employee X] filed a second administrative complaint.”

18. The [undisputed] record shows, of course, that the FCHR did not enter its [null & void] determination until October 18, 2019:

“On October 18, 2019 the FCHR issued a “No Reasonable Cause” determination”

[P0005]

19. The difference between those two dates is 191 days (ie, 10/18/19 minus 4/10/19 equals 191).

20. 191 days, of course, is greater than 180 days. As such, the FCHR’s [phantom] Determination (which That Opinion relied on) was null & void (see ¶16 supra).^4/

21. Altogether, That Opinion was wrong, because it based its decision on a [phantom] null & void determination [from the State of Florida].

That Opinion’s Various Other Falsehoods

22. That Opinion also authored numerous other falsehoods/misrepresentations/distortions.

a. For instance, That Opinion [repeatedly] claimed that a Company Y employee filed a false police report on Employee X (eg, “reported false information about [Employee X] to police”).

i. That never happened.

ii. Most importantly, no one ever claimed that such a thing happened.

iii. Instead, Employee X’s complaint/appeal supplied evidence of Company Y’s retaliatory smear campaign. A smear campaign that involved Company Y’s [admittedly] irrelevant law enforcement inquiries. Irrelevant inquiries, of course, that yielded nothing accurate (as conceded by Company Y’s [own] henchman). [A0046]-[A0050]

b. Another falsehood was about collateral estoppel. That Opinion claimed that the LT applied it [to the case below].

i. This claim, however, is false.

ii. The LT never attached collateral estoppel (nor res judicata) to the case below.

iii. Instead, the LT’s rulings were solely grounded on administrative timeliness; while merely mentioning collateral estoppel. As such – in his Opening Brief – Employee X merely asked this Court to extinguish any “lingering” dreams of the doctrine’s application.

23. Moreover, That Opinion failed to address several of Employee X’s issues-on-appeal.

a. Most notably, That Opinion failed to deliberate on the unconstitutionality of FCHR Determinations (Issue VII). An issue that Employee X raised in prominent fashion.

i. Thereby doing so via numerous [formal] Notices of a Constitutional Challenge (both in the LT and in this Court). [R0009]-[R0011] {#39}

ii. In fact, That Opinion does not even have the term “constitutionality” (nor the term “unconstitutional”). These were terms, importantly, that both of Employee X’s appellate briefs were [explicitly] founded upon (categorically and otherwise).

b. Moreover, That Opinion failed to deliberate on the manifest injustice from below (Issue VIII).

i. In fact, That Opinion does not even have the term “manifest” (nor the term “injustice”). These were terms, importantly, that both of Employee X’s appellate briefs were [explicitly] founded upon (categorically and otherwise).

24. These failures evidence the reality that That Opinion overlooked critical points of law/fact.

II. ANALYSIS: ULTIMATE GUILT

25. Above all else, though, That Opinion overlooked the ultimate facts surrounding Company Y’s guilt [in this textbook case of employment discrimination].

26. Inescapably put, Company Y fired Employee X “solely” because Employee X failed an actuarial exam. Yet, Company Y never fired any of its other employees (who also failed actuarial exams). All of Company Y’s other [similarly-situated] employees, importantly, were of a different demographic (compared to Employee X).

a. Ultimately speaking, none of Company Y’s lies/obstructions/illegalities/lethal-attacks will ever overcome this reality.

b. Ultimately speaking, none of [the State of] Florida’s lies/obstructions/illegalities/corruptions will ever overcome this reality.

27. As such, Allstate Insurance Company (ie, Company Y) is guilty of discriminating against Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA (ie, Employee X).

28. This Court, unfortunately, overlooked this crucial fact.

III. ERROR IN THIS COURT’S ISSUED OPINION

29. Of course, summary judgment cannot acquit a defendant who is actually guilty. Instead, a trial on the merits must commence (“have their controversies decided on the merits” – Latin v Italian, 596 So.2d 1174 (4DCA 1992)).

30. Therefore, this Court is well-positioned to rehear this case; since it previously overlooked Company Y’s guilt (¶1; ¶25-28).

31. Plus, appellate courts have long-held that courts cannot enter summary judgment when fraud is involved (highlights added):

“We recognize that, as a general matter, claims in which fraud is an issue should not be resolved by summary judgment.”

32. Therefore, this Court is also well-positioned to rehear this case; since Company Y repeatedly defrauded the court (¶8-9, ¶11).

33. Moreover – and as previously detailed – this Court based That Opinion on numerous falsehoods.

a. That Opinion claimed that Employee X did not raise the issue of remand. That claim, of course, was false (¶12-14 supra).

b. That Opinion also based itself on a state determination. A [phantom] determination, of course, that was null & void (¶15-21 supra).

c. Plus, That Opinion was riddled with a variety of other falsehoods (¶22-24 supra).

34. Therefore, this Court is further well-positioned to rehear this case; since appellate courts cannot base their decisions on falsehoods (Folsom v Spokane, 111 Wn.2d 256 (1988); Greene v Rothschild, 68 Wn.2d 1 (1965); IRS v Sunnen, 333 US 591 (1948); Kansas v Reimer, 941 P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1997); Minneapolis v Moquin, 283 US 520 (1931); Rozier v Ford, 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978); State v McBride, 848 So.2d 287 (Fla. 2003); Thompson v Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1982); Tipler v EI DuPont, 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); USA v McClendon, 195 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1999); USA v Quintana, 300 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)).

IV. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING<

35. According to appellate courts, a petition for rehearing merely needs to point out the factual/legal error that a tribunal misapprehended/overlooked (highlights added):

“The sole and only purpose of a petition for rehearing is to call to the attention of the court some fact, precedent or rule of law which the court has overlooked in rendering its decision. Judges are human and subject to the frailties of humans. It follows that there will be occasions when a fact, a controlling decision or a principle of law even though discussed in the brief or pointed out in oral argument will be inadvertently overlooked in rendering the judgment of the court... It is to meet these situations that the rules provide for petitions for rehearing as an orderly means of directing the court's attention to its inadvertence.”

36. The appellate courts further explain that litigants must avoid re-arguing their points-on-appeal (highlights added):

“[We] urge counsel to file a [petition for rehearing] only where careful analysis indicates a point of law or a fact which the court has overlooked or misapprehended, or where clarification of a written opinion is essential. Counsel should not use such [petition] as a vehicle to reargue the merits of the court's decision or to express displeasure with its judgment.

37. Put together, a petition for rehearing must:

a. point out the Court’s error;

b. avoid re-arguing the points-on-appeal; and

c. refrain from expressing any displeasure with the court’s judgment.

38. In the instant case, Employee X has satisfied all three elements.

a. For starters, he has pointed out this Court’s harmful error.

i. Those errors, of course, included – but were not limited to:

1. this Court’s operative claim that Employee X did [not] raise the issue of the LT’s need to remand (¶12); and

2. this Court’s [erroneous] use of a null & void state determination (¶15).

b. Secondly, Employee X has not re-argued any of his eight points-on-appeal.

c. Thirdly, Employee X has not expressed any displeasure with the Court’s judgment. Instead, he has merely pointed out:

i. the facts (especially the indisputable material facts – ¶1; ¶25-28); and

ii. this Court’s errors (¶38a supra).

39. Thus, this Court is in prime position to rehear this case. And Employee X hereby asks that it does. In fact, Employee X avers that this Court should, because doing so will restore the judiciary’s impartiality/legitimacy. Impartiality & legitimacy, importantly, which That Opinion stole from this tribunal.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Appellant (ie, Employee X) asks this Court to rehear this appeal; because - in addition to suffering from falsehoods & errors – this Court’s issued opinion is refuted by the record.

Dated this 13^th day of November 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Elias Makere
Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA
Appellant
PO Box 324
Hobart, IN 46342
P: 904.294.0026
E: Justice.Actuarial@gmail.com
W: TextBookDiscrimination.com
Get Booked Up on Justice!

Endnotes:

^1/ [A0210] means page 210 from the appendix [to Appellant’s Opening Brief]
[OBII] means page ii from the Opening Brief
[AB012] means page 12 from the Answer Brief
[P0210] means page 210 from the appendix [to Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing]
[R0210] means page 210 from the appendix [to Appellant’s Reply Brief]
{#44} means docket entry 44 from the lower tribunal

^2/ Please refer to Rule 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. in order to calculate the time window. Moreover, Rule 40-2 11th Cir. R. provides a 21-day window. A window, of course, that this petition [still] falls within.

^3/ the motion still pends to this day (ie, 11/13/25)

^4/ as repeated numerous times (in this Court and elsewhere), the FCHR’s [null & void] determination was also a phantom notice. This is because the FCHR mailed it to the wrong person. In other words, the FCHR did not mail its [null & void] notice to Appellant/’Employee-X’.

Link to Underlying Complaint (HTML, PDF, Video) | Makere v Allstate

HTML	TextBookDiscrimination.com/Allstate/Complaint-Full
PDF	TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/USFLMD/20000905_AAC_20211104_230439.pdf
VIDEO	https://youtu.be/e3mgBPHesXg

Electronic Copy (text-searchable):

TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/CA11/24011336_GMOT_20251113_103742.pdf
TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/CA11/24011336_ADD_20251113_144459.pdf
TextBookDiscrimination.com/Allstate/Rehearing
How-To: Write a Motion for Rehearing
Opening Brief (Makere v Allstate) | Textbook Case of Discrimination
Reply Brief (Makere v Allstate) | Textbook Case of Discrimination

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. Type-Volume

☒	This document complies with the word limit of Rule 40(b)(1) Fed. R. App. P., because - excluding the parts of the document exempted by Rule 32(f) (also see Rule 40-1 11th Cir. R.) - this document contains 2,182 words.

or

☐	This brief complies with the page limit prescribed by Rule 40(b)(2) Fed. R. App. P., because – excluding the parts of the document exempted by Rule 32(f) (also see Rule 40-1 11th Cir. R.) – this document contains [NNNN] pages.

2. Typeface and Type-Style

☒	This document uses Courier New (12-Pt) Font; thereby complying with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5)(B) Fed. R. App. P.. This document also satisfies the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6).

11/13/2025	/s/ Elias Makere
Date	Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13^th day of November 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Courts by using PACER; which will send a notice of electronic filing to the attached service list.

/s/ Elias Makere

SERVICE LIST

Kimberly J. Doud, Esquire (0523771)
Lauren C. Robertson, Esquire (1024845)

E: kdoud@littler.com
E: lcrobertson@littler.com
P: 407.393.2900
F: 407.393.2929

Littler Mendleson, PC
111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750
Orlando, FL 32801-2366

(appellee’s trial lawyers)

Congratulations! You're now Booked Up on the Petition for Rehearing that a Floridian filed in this textbook case of employment discrimination (against Allstate Insurance Company).

Reading it might help you recover from the damages that lawbreaking organizations/judges/lawyers/agencies have inflicted upon you [and/or the public] (see this example of a Florida judge who outright committed perjury).

Also, please beware that the FCHR (ie, the state agency incriminated in this lawsuit) has corrupted itself. Thereby doing so in the following ways (among others):

FCHR Bribery

FCHR Corruption

FCHR Obstruction

FCHR Self-Discrimination

Nevertheless – and as always – please get the justice you deserve.

Sincerely,

www.TextBookDiscrimination.com

	Petition
	Appendix
	Video
	Template
	How-To Guide
	A Judge's Perjury
	A Judge's Perjury
	Audio: Drop the Steal
	Breakdown: Drop the Steal
	Survey
	Info: FCHR Bribery
	Info: FCHR Corruption
	Info: FCHR Discrimination
	Info: FCHR Obstructions
	Info: FCHR Process