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M | APPEAL | OPENING BRIEF (Makere v Allstate; §1981, 1985, EPA, FCRA, Title VII)

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24-11336-J
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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ELIAS MAKERE, FSA, MAAA
(Appellant/Plaintiff)

v.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
(Appellee/Defendant)

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On Appeal From The
United States District Court, Florida, Middle District
3:20-cv-00905-MMH-LLL
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APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

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Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA
Appellant (“Employee X”)
PO Box 324
Hobart, IN 46342
P: 904.294.0026
E: Justice.Actuarial@gmail.com
W: TextBookDiscrimination.com
   Get Booked Up on Justice!
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Monday, October 14, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Makere v Allstate, 24-11336

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Lower Tribunal:
Lambert, LauraMagistrate
Howard, MarciaDistrict Judge
Parties:
Allstate Insurance Company
(NYSE: ALL)
Appellee
Makere, Elias (FSA, MAAA)Appellant
Appellant is not a subsidiary/affiliate of a publicly owned corporation. Pursuant to Rule 26.1-2 11th Cir. R., Appellant does not know of any other entities that have interest in this case. Appellant hereby certifies that this CIP is complete.

⧗⧗⧗

after committing crimes, the authorities tried to manufacture an issue-on-timeliness.

then – after committing errors – the lower court claimed that time no longer mattered in its calculation of timeliness.

now – before this higher court – it's just a matter of time until the defendant repeats its lawlessness.

so, may this Court cure the manifest injustice [from below/there]; especially considering how defendant is destined to manifest those same injustices [above/here].

⧖⧖⧖

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rule 34(a) Fed. R. App. P., Appellant respectfully requests oral argument as this case presents crucial topics of law and public trust (also see Rule 28-1(c) 11th Cir. R.). In particular, he believes verbal presentation will benefit Issue I; a point about clear facts which have been muddied by an avalanche of state-nuanced improprieties (Issues II, III, VI-VIII). Also, Appellant asserts that none of the factors listed in Rule 34(a)(2) Fed. R. App. P. exist in this appeal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Interested PersonsC1
Prologuei
Statement Regarding Oral Argumentii
Table of Contentsiii
Table of Authoritiesiv
Introductionvii
Jurisdictional Statement1
Statement of Issues on Appeal1
Statement of the Case3
Overview3
Underlying Facts3
Immediate Procedural History11
Standard of Review17
Summary of Argument17
Issue I (Clear Error - Filing Date)19
Issue II (Due Process Error – Charge Exclusion)28
Issue III (Harmful Error – Relation-Back Provision)35
Issue IV (Legal Error – Evidentiary Standard)41
Issue V (Legal Error – Remand State Charges)45
Issue VI (Miscarriage of Justice – State of Florida)49
Issue VII (Unconstitutional State Statute - §760 FS)55
Issue VIII (Manifest Injustice – Law of the Case’)61
Conclusion69
Certificate of Compliance-
Certificate of Service-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Agro Dutch v. USA,589 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2009)65
Andrade v Hauck,452 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1971)58,59
Batson v Kentucky,476 US 79 (1986)53,54
Bounds v Smith,430 US 817 (1977)58
Calderon v Thompson,523 US 538 (1998)50
Castillo v Allegro,603 F. App’x. 913 (11th Cir. 2015)17
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp.,693 F. 3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012))17
Cooper v Leatherman,532 US 42 (2001)56
Cosby v Circle K22-002238; 9/26/22; DOAH (FL)26
DeMario v Franklin,648 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA)24
EEOC v Pemco,383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)29,32,33
Garrison v Colvin,759 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2014)44
GTech v. Florida,737 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)32
Haines v Heggs,658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995)52,53
Holton v City of Thomasville,425 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)20
Hybritech v. Monoclonal,802 F.2d 1367 (1986)27
Johnson v Nocco,8:20-cv-01370 (USFLMD)43
KPERS v Reimer,941 P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1997)47,66
Makere v Allstate,22-13588-AA (11th Cir. 2022)1
Makere v Early,4:21-cv-00096; USFLND--
Maledy v Enterprise,1:10-cv-0025410
Mann v Taser,588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)17
McDonnell-Douglas v Green,411 US 792 (1973)2,28,30,31,65,66
Melton v Abston,841 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2016)17
Miami Herald v Tornillo,418 US 241 (1974)59,60
NAACP v Hunt,821 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1987)29
Strange-Gaines v Jacksonville,3:20-cv-00056 (USFLMD 1/26/21)43
Southwest Florida v Save the Manatee,773 So.2d 594 (FL 1DCA 2000)36,42,46,62
Tannenbaum v USA,148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998)17
Taylor v Pekerol,760 Fed. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2019)43
Tipler v EI DuPont,443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971)47,48,51
United States v Quintana,300 F. 3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)64
United States v Rodriguez,363 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2004)20
Woodham v BCBSFL,829 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2002)24
CONSTITUTIONS
1st Amendment (US)52
7th Amendment (US)52
14 Amendment (US)52
REGULATIONS
60Y-5.003 FAC27,38
29 CFR §1601.1238
RULES
Rule 26.1-2 11th Cir. R.C1
Rule 28-1 11th Cir. R.ii
Rule 4 Fed. R. App. P.1
Rule 28 Fed. R. App. P.viii
Rule 34 Fed. R. App. P.ii
Rule 5.1 Fed. R. Civ. P.1
Rule 15 Fed. R. Civ. P.37
Rule 60 Fed. R. Civ. P.1
Rule 1.190 Fla. R. Civ. P.37
FEDERAL STATUTES
28 USC §12921
28 USC §12941
28 USC §13311
42 USC §19813,11,46
42 USC §1983--
Equal Pay Act3
Title VII3
STATE STATUTES (FL)
§20.22 FS26
§120.569 FS8
§760 FS3,8,11,18,23,24,26,37,46,54,55,56,57,60
MISCELLANEOUS
Barron’s Dictionary of Legal Terms,
Steven H. Gifis, 5th Edition, © 2016

INTRODUCTION

Appellant, Elias Makere, was the plaintiff in the lower tribunal; and will be referred to in this brief as “Employee X” (Rule 28(d) Fed. R. App. P.). Appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, was the defendant below; and will be referred to as “Company Y”.

The following references will be used in this brief:
[A_]Appendix on Appeal1/
The following abbreviations will also be used:
1DCAFirst District Court of Appeals (FL)
ALJAdministrative Law Judge
DCADistrict Court of Appeals (FL)
DOAHDivision of Administrative Hearings (FL)
EEOCEqual Employment Opportunity Commission
FACFlorida Administrative Code
FCHRFlorida Commission on Human Relations
FSFlorida Statute
LTLower Tribunal
USCA11US Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit
USALMDUS District Court, Alabama, Middle District
USFLMDUS District Court, Florida, Middle District
USFLNDUS District Court, Florida, Northern District
All statutory and rule references are made to their 2020 versions (unless otherwise indicated).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter – under several state/federal statutes (by virtue of 28 USC §1331 (federal question jurisdiction)).

On February 8, 2021, USFLMD dismissed three counts from Employee X’s complaint. Doing so on account of timeliness. Fourteen days later – on February 22, 2021 – Employee X filed written objections. Plus, on March 11, 2021 he filed a timely notice of appeal (tolled by Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)-(vi) Fed. R. App. P.).

On October 13, 2021, USFLMD ordered Employee X to amend his complaint. Employee X obliged; doing so on November 6, 2021.

On October 14, 2022, the LT overruled Employee X’s objections. Thus, Employee X submitted his case – pursuant to 28 USC §1291 - to this Court’s jurisdiction (also see 28 USC §1292(a)(1), and 28 USC §1294(1)). Shortly after receiving Employee X’s opening brief, however, this Court dismissed the [interlocutory] appeal (22-13588-AA). It did so because the-issues-contained-therein were “enmeshed” with the ongoing case [below].

Then, on March 26, 2024, USFLMD entered summary judgment [in favor of Company Y]. Subsequently – on April 26, 2024 - Employee X filed a Motion for Relief (under Rule 60 Fed. R. Civ. P.). A motion that – according to Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)-(vi) Fed. R. App. P. - tolled his notice of appeal (which he also filed on 4/26/24).

Finally – on August 9, 2024 – USFLMD entered an order of deferral. Thereby deferring two post-judgment motions; and, importantly, ripening this appeal. So, on September 3, 2024, this Court secured jurisdiction; setting forth a briefing schedule.

Put briefly, this Court has jurisdiction over this [appealed] final order. An order, importantly, that incorporated a [previously appealed/briefed] non-final order.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Overview

1. This is a discrimination case (42 USC §1981; §760 FS; EPA, Title VII) between an employee (Appellant-‘Employee X’) and a former employer (Appellee-‘Company Y’). Employee X charged Company Y with violating Employee X’s civil rights by (a) subjecting him to a hostile work environment; (b) subjecting him to unequal terms & conditions; (c) terminating him; and (d) retaliating against him.

2. Company Y, a publicly-traded private corporation, engaged with Employee X - at all times material hereto – in the state of Florida. At first, Company Y did so as Employee X’s active employer. Then, it did so as his former employer. A brief review of the underlying facts is in order.

Underlying Facts (Hostilities, Disparities, Terminations, etc.)

3. On November 18, 2013, Employee X began working for Company Y. [A0027]

4. Company Y admitted him into its Actuarial Career Program (“ACP”) alongside many of his newfound co-workers. The ACP’s goal was to develop its members into FSAs (Fellows of the Society of Actuaries). [A0027]

5. At the time of hiring, Employee X had passed six (6) actuarial exams, and had a little over one year of experience. This meant that he would have to pass four (4) more exams to attain the desired credential. [A0027]

6. Throughout Employee X’s 3-year tenure, Company Y subjected him to a hostile work environment. With harassment that included – but was not limited to:
a. Unwanted date requests from his direct manager [A0028]-[A0029];

b. Racist dolls [A0033], racist characterizations [A0033]-[A0034]; and

c. Cursing at Employee X for buying a condolence card [A0025];
7. Company Y also conditioned Employee X’s employment on racial inferiority. Highlights included – but were not limited to:
a. Paying Employee X a lower ASA salary than it paid other similarly-situated employees [A0033];

b. Proclaiming that Employee X’s newly acquired actuarial credentials (ASA) “devalue[d] the profession” [A0028].
8. Recognizing Company Y’s animus, Employee X begged management to let him work from home [A0035]; doing so on a routine basis. A request that Company Y always denied.
a. A work privilege, however, that Company Y granted to everyone else in its actuarial department. Everyone else, of course, was of a different demographic. [A0035]-[A0036]
9. Yet every time Employee X tried to avoid the hostilities, Company Y targeted him for more.
a. In Fall 2015, an IT manager phoned Employee X, told Employee X a series of lies, then explained how he would get Employee X fired. That same IT manager carried out the plan. [A0036]-[A0037]
i. That same IT manager, importantly, had been charged with employment discrimination before. [A0037],[A0084]
b. Also, in Fall 2015, Employee X’s direct manager relayed a message from a different IT manager. A different IT manager who wanted Employee X fired. Employee X’s direct manager also relayed that the ‘different IT manager’ never gave a reason for the adverse desires. [A0037]
10. Given these facts & circumstances, Employee X filed an internal discrimination complaint. The primary subject of the complaint (¶9a) acknowledged that it was based on “racism”.

11. Thereafter, Company Y worsened the work environment for Employee X. With acts that included – but were not limited to:
a. job replacement [A0038];

b. denied raises [A0038];

c. sabotaged work [A0038]; and

d. Company Y forcing Employee X to pay [$1,025] for an actuarial exam fee - while never forcing its other employees to do the same. [A0039]
12. Company Y met Employee X’s additional internal complaints with indignation. Telling Employee X to “figure out if this [was] the place for [him] to work”. [A0038]

13. Soon thereafter – on Friday, August 12, 2016 – Company Y told Employee X that it was terminating his employment; effective immediately. [A0039]
a. Notably, Employee X’s direct manager made the decision just hours after Employee X declined her last date request (doing so on 8/10/16).
14. Company Y’s reason for firing Employee X was that Employee X had failed an actuarial exam. It gave no other reason. [A0041]

15. Yet, Company Y had many other employees who also failed actuarial exams. Some who failed multiple exams; all who failed easier exams. Discriminatorily, though, Company Y never fired any of them. [A0041]

16. Plus, immediately after firing Employee X, Company Y replaced him with two employees who had never even passed one exam. The disparity in qualifications is/was drastic (0 exams passed vs 8 exams passed). [A0041]

17. Right after termination, Employee X passed the exam-in-question, and continued to avoid Company Y (and its employees). [A0042]
a. From 8/12/16 until now: Employee X has never done any work for Company Y; never tried; and never inquired. [A0042]
18. He did, however, attempt to seek justice & repair from the harassment/discrimination/retaliation that Company Y subjected him to. As well as punishment for the unlawful conduct Company Y has subjected [and will subject] others to (see ¶9ai).2/

External Discrimination Complaint #1 (Employee X v Company Y)

19. On June 30, 2017, Employee X filed an employment discrimination complaint with the FCHR (“First Charge”). Pursuant to §760.11(1) FS, he alleged that Company Y had violated his civil rights on the bases of race and sex. [A0094]

20. On September 8, 2017, Company Y denied both allegations. Stating that it fired Employee X for a legitimate reason. Specifically, because he had failed an actuarial exam (highlights added):
“[Employee X] was terminated solely because he failed his [FSA] exam.”
It bears repeating: Company Y explicitly acknowledged that Employee X’s First Charge contained “allegations of discrimination based upon race and sex discrimination”.[A0096]4/

21. On December 15, 2017, the FCHR concluded its investigation. Notably affirming that race and sex were the bases of Employee X’s complaint. [A0105]

22. On January 19, 2018, Employee X filed his Petition for Relief with the FCHR. Just as in his original charge, he listed only race and sex as the protected characteristics for his complaint. Thus, pursuant to §760.11(7) FS and §120.569 FS, the FCHR transmitted it to DOAH.

23. During the pendency of that administrative action, Company Y amplified its retaliation [against Employee X]. Thereby enlisting its employees (and others) to dissuade Employee X from continuing with his lawsuit. It did so in a variety of ways:
a. death threats [A0051];

b. smear campaigns [A0046]-[A0050]; and

c. lethal attacks [A0052].
24. The evidence (which pointed to Company Y’s guilt), however, was too strong. So, Employee X continued. Reason: Company Y’s unlawful conduct presented a textbook case of employment discrimination.

25. A textbook case which, unfortunately, ran counter to widespread anti-black-male propaganda (as foretold by the Ku Klux Klan – and its progenies). Faced with these probative facts, several state officials went on the attack.

26. After a series of procedural irregularities (authority breaches, deposition sit-ins, recusals, etc.), a man named Edward Gary Early became the administrative hearing officer over the case (circa November 13, 2018).3/ [A0054]

27. That man – in his quest to cover for Company Y – further violated Employee X’s constitutional rights. He did so by (a) hiding evidence; and (b) committing perjury. [A0196]-[A0225]

28. Due to these attacks, Employee X sought subsequent relief. First: against Company Y (¶30-32, infra); and second: against the state hearing officer (¶38-40 infra).

External Discrimination Complaint #2 (Employee X v Company Y)

29. With the attacks abounding (¶23 supra), Employee X sought to amend his First Charge. Thwarted by state officials, though, he had to file anew.

30. Thus - on April 10, 2019 - Employee X filed his second employment discrimination complaint [against Company Y] (“Second Charge”). Emailing it to the FCHR; who blessed it with a same-day timestamp (2:35PM on 4/10/19). [A0091]-[A0092]4/
a. Employee X, notably, never had an attorney during the [ongoing, 5+ year] litigation of the Second Charge.4/

b. Moreover, Employee X – at all times material hereto – has never had an attorney [during the ongoing, 7+ year litigation of the First Charge].4/
31. This Second Charge – which was dual-filed with the EEOC – included Company Y’s post-termination retaliation (¶23, supra).

32. Those state officials, though, used the color of law to unleash more state-sponsored treachery [on Employee X]. Treachery that included – but was not limited to:
a. ALJ Edward Gary Early committing perjury;3/
i. He did so by [falsely] claiming that Employee X’s First Charge did not include a sex discrimination basis. [A0196]-[A0225]
b. ALJ Edward Gary Early hiding evidence;
i. He did so by removing a crucial transcript page (which proved Company Y’s prima facie guilt – in clear & convincing fashion). [A0196]-[A0225]
c. FCHR Staff Attorney Stanley George Gorsica ratifying perjury;

d. FCHR-SA Gorsica filing a null & void determination;

e. FCHR-SA Gorsica mailing that null & void determination to an erroneous person; [A0112]-[A0130] and

f. FCHR-SA Gorsica refusing to relinquish jurisdiction.
i. Thereby forcing Employee X to seek a Writ of Prohibition (among other things).
33. October 7, 2019 marked the deadline for the FCHR’s determination, but the state agency failed to produce one (at least not on time). [A0112]-[A0130]
a. Instead, the FCHR issued a [null & void] phantom notice (on October 18, 2019). [A0112]-[A0130]

Federal Lawsuit (Employee X v Company Y)

34. Despite the inequities, Employee X filed this lawsuit in federal court. Doing so on August 12, 2020. Doing so, importantly, under both federal (42 USC §1981) and state law (§760 FS).5/
a. Unfortunately, Employee X’s initial complaint did not include his Title VII charges [A0019]. Later – and once the inequities began diminishing – he attached them (circa March 9, 2021). [A0112]-[A0130]

b. Importantly, the Title VII counts and the state counts were hydrated by Employee X’s Second Charge (¶29-33, supra).
35. On February 8, 2021, the LT entered its partial order of dismissal (“Improvident Order”) [A0131]. Therein, the lower court dismissed Employee X’s state counts (ie, §760 FS), because of administrative timeliness (highlights added):
“In sum, the record establishes that the FCHR rendered timely “No Cause” determinations on [Employee X’s state] charges... As such, [Employee X] is administratively barred under section 760.11(7) of the Florida Statutes from pursuing his [state] claims here. The Court will [dismiss] Counts I-III of the Complaint and dismiss the [state] claims in their entirety.”
36. The next day (ie, February 9, 2021), Employee X asked the LT to take judicial notice of Employee X’s [officially] time-stamped charge of discrimination (¶29 supra).

37. Plus, two weeks later, Employee X filed his objections [A0169] (and appealed). He also amended his complaint. An amendment that Company Y met with another motion to dismiss.
a. Company Y’s subsequent motion featured a crucial lie.

b. A crucial lie, importantly, that was the same one promulgated by Mr. Early (¶26, 32; infra).

c. A crucial lie that Employee X met with:
i. a motion for sanctions [A0184]; and

ii. a motion in limine [A0196].
38. Then, on October 13, 2021, the LT ordered Employee X to amend his complaint once more. Therein, the LT instructed Employee X to include all of his claims (highlights added):
“[Employee X] therefore should include all claims and factual allegations he wishes for the Court to consider in his Third Amended Complaint.”
Employee X obliged [A0020], and added a charge for Company Y’s fraud-on-the-court (¶37a supra).

39. On November 4, 2021, Employee X filed his fully amended complaint (“The Complaint”). It included – but was not limited to – counts under: (a) the FCRA; and (b) Title VII. Employee X, importantly, invoked both statutes to redress all of Company Y’s misconduct (ie, from 2013 onward). [A0020]

40. On October 13, 2022 the lower court overruled Employee X’s objections (¶32); thereby crystallizing the falsehood [on administrative timeliness] (¶35 supra, Cf. ¶42 infra).

41. Months later – on June 21, 2023 – the LT dismissed several counts from The Complaint (“Premeditated Order”). Thereby keeping Employee X’s Title VII counts – for the limited purpose of examining timeliness (highlights added):
“Nevertheless, in light of the foregoing and given the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds it appropriate to bifurcate the proceedings. The Court will allow the parties to proceed with limited discovery only as relevant to the statute of limitations, exhaustion, and collateral estoppel issues, and will set a deadline for the filing of a dispositive motion, if appropriate, on those issues. All other discovery in this action will remain stayed pending further order of the Court.”
42. Nine months later – on March 26, 2024 – the LT granted Employee X’s [2/9/21] motion for judicial notice [of the correct filing date] (¶36 supra) (highlights added):
“These filings all concern Makere’s ongoing contention that he filed the 2019 FCHR Charge on April 10, 2019, and not on April 26, 2019, as the Court stated in the [Improvident Order].
In support, Makere submits an email he sent to the FCHR on that date requesting an investigation into his “employment discrimination complaint against Allstate Insurance Company.” See Motion for Judicial Notice at 3, Ex. A. Makere contends that he included with that email an EEOC Charge Form and a “Complaint Attachment.” See id. at 3. He submits a copy of the “Complaint Attachment,” which bears an FCHR time stamp of April 10, 2019. Id., Ex. B, part 1 at 1.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant Makere’s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Clarification to the extent he asks the Court to consider his evidence of an April 10, 2019 filing date.”
43. However, within that same [3/26/24] order, the LT also incorporated the Improvident Order (in its entirety). The Improvident Order, confoundingly, was entirely based on the wrong filing date (highlights added):
“In the [Improvident Order], the [LT] set forth at length the factual allegations giving rise to this lawsuit as well as the convoluted procedural history of this case and the prior administrative proceedings. See [Improvident Order] at 5-14; 2023 Order at 3-14. The Court provides a brief overview below but will otherwise presume the reader’s familiarity with those Orders and adopt their defined terms.”
44. Plus, within that same [3/26/24] order, the LT also entered summary judgment in favor of Company Y (“Final Order”); doing so on the basis of administrative timeliness. A decision which claimed that the [correct] filing date no longer mattered (contrast with ¶35-36, ¶41-42 supra) (highlights added):
[Employee] filed the 2019 Charge on April 10, 2019. See TAC ¶ 7.a.; see also Response at 4, Exs. 101, 102.9 Thus, even if [Employee X]’s position is correct, he filed the 2019 Charge more than 2 and a half years after his employment with [Company Y] ended – well beyond the 300-day period for Title VII claims... the record establishes that [Employee X] failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies and the Title VII claims remaining in this case are not actionable.

8 [Employee X]’s 2019 Charge also included acts of post-termination retaliation. However, as noted above, the Court previously dismissed [Employee X]’s Title VII claims premised on those acts. See 2023 Order at 19-28, 31 n.15. Thus, the [LT] need not determine whether [Employee X]’s 2019 Charge was timely filed as to those discrete acts.

9 As discussed in the 2021 Order, [Employee X] previously filed a charge with the FCHR in 2017. See 2021 Order at 8. ... As such, the Court does not consider the 2017 FCHR Charge in this analysis.
45. On April 11, 2024, Company Y responded by filing a motion for attorney fees. A motion that was untimely. A motion, importantly, that was based on two false statements of material fact. In fact, one of Company Y’s lies had [already] been dissolved by the LT’s order of judicial notice (¶42 supra). As such – given Company Y’s history, behavior, and impunity – Company Y is destined to repeat its perjurous conduct in this appellate court (¶30 supra).

Procedural Summary

46. Put simply, the Lower Tribunal ruled that Employee X’s [state + federal] counts were untimely (¶35). Then, it ruled that the [materially] correct filing date no longer mattered (¶44).
a. It must be noted that the LT consumed 3+ years to [even] acknowledge the correct filing date (¶42).

b. It must also be noted that the LT systematically dislodged the discrete acts which constituted the continuing nature of Company Y’s unlawful conduct (¶41).

c. Moreover, it must be noted that this cause-of-action involves a textbook case of discrimination (¶24).
47. Many procedural hiccups and state-engineered hurdles arose along the way.
a. Yet, the core facts [of the case] have remained in Employee X’s favor (¶3-24, supra). And they have remained as untarnished (and clear to see) as ever.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

49. A district court’s order of dismissal is reviewed de novo (see Castillo v Allegro, 603 F. App’x. 913 (11th Cir. 2015)). Under that standard, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and make all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (ie, Employee X) (see Chaparro v Carnival Corp., 693 F. 3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012)). Plus, courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings (see Tannenbaum v United States, 148 F. 3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998)).

50. Similarly, a district court’s order of summary judgment is also reviewed de novo (see Melton v Abston, 841 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2016)). Under that standard, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (ie, Employee X) (see Mann v Taser, 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)).

51. Therefore, this Court can perform a de novo review on: (a) the Improvident Order (¶35); (b) the Premeditated Order (¶41); and (c) the Final Order (¶44).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

52. The Lower Tribunal used an invalid date to invalidate a valid case. Then - before using the valid date – it invalidated the stakes of the valid claim. Finally – with the stakes at bay – the LT stated that the valid date no longer held weight; in order to [ultimately] re-invalidated the valid case.

53. Summarized in more literal terms: the Lower Tribunal – inundated with Company Y’s lies (along with severe state-borne obstructions) – committed a clear error of law (I). It did so when it dismissed Employee X’s state charges for [presumably] being time-barred. A determination that was based on an incorrect filing date.

54. Then, the LT cherry-picked the underlying charges in order to reach its predestined acquittal [of Company Y] (II, III). Throughout its cherry-picking, the LT confused itself into misusing the plausibility standard (IV).

55. Moreover, the LT committed a reversible error when it failed to remand the state charges (V). The LT’s error, however, was mild compared to the state’s unconstitutional/obstructive conduct (VI). A miscarriage of justice that was spirited/spearheaded by the unconstitutionality of state law (ie, §760.11 FS) (VII).

56. From its own docket, however, the LT committed a manifest injustice – when it violated the ‘law-of-the-case’ (VIII).

57. Thus, this Court of Appeals is well-positioned to: (a) fix the clear errors from below; (b) vacate the orders from below; (c) remand the state charges; (d) declare that the state’s conduct/laws are unconstitutional; and/or (e) unwind/reverse the lower court’s manifest injustices. Of course, Appellant (ie, ‘Employee X’) asks this Court to perform those acts. Whereby the two parties can present their case to a jury of their peers.

ISSUE I

The District Court Committed a Clear Error by
Using the Wrong Date in its Timeliness Calculation



Timeline

OVERVIEW I

58. The Lower Tribunal erred when it based its ‘timeliness’ determination (ie, administrative bar) on a wrong date.

STANDARD OF REVIEW I

59. Fortunately, this Court has the power to reverse this decision, because it reviews factual determinations for clear error (highlights added):
“...this court reviews purely legal questions de novo, a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts for “due deference””
60. In Holton, this Court defined what a “clearly erroneous” factual finding is:
“[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

ARGUMENT I

61. In the instant case, the factual finding that was clearly erroneous was the filing date [on Employee X’s Second Charge] (¶30, ¶35-36, ¶42 supra).

62. The lower court assigned a wrong date of April 26, 2019. However, the correct date was April 10, 2019.4/

63. Public record shows that Employee X filed his Second Charge on April 10, 2019 (¶30 supra).4/
a. The email that he used to transmit it to the FCHR was sent at 8:00 AM EST on April 10, 2019.4/

b. The timestamp that the state agency emblazoned on the complaint was set to 2:35 PM EST on April 10, 2019.4/

c. In fact, the LT acknowledged that 4/10/19 was the correct filing date. Doing so, albeit, 3+ years after committing its original/persisting error (¶42).
64. The incorrect date, importantly, was central to the lower court’s ruling (highlights added):
“In sum, the record establishes that the FCHR rendered timely “No Cause” determinations on [Employee X’s state] charges... As such, [Employee X] is administratively barred under section 760.11(7) of the Florida Statutes from pursuing his [state] claims here. The Court will [dismiss] Counts I-III of the Complaint and dismiss the [state] claims in their entirety.
65. That ruling was based on that order’s prior determination that the state agency rendered a decision within the 180-day statutory window (highlights added):
“As set forth above, the FCHR issued a “No Cause” determination regarding the 2019 FCHR Charge on October 18, 2019, within the 180-day period.”
66. That 180-day calculation was based on a starting date of April 26, 2019 (highlights added):
“[Employee X] filed a second charge of discrimination with the [state agency], which was received on April 26, 2019.”
67. The problem, of course, is that the starting date (ie, 4/26/19) was wrong.
a. Employee X filed his Second Charge on April 10, 2019 (¶30).

Materiality of Error

56. The difference between the correct date (4/10) and the incorrect date (4/26) is/was vital. The incorrect date fell within the 180-day investigatory window, while the correct date did not (¶33 supra).
a. 10/18/19 minus 4/26/19 equals 175 (two invalid dates).

b. 10/18/19 minus 4/10/19 equals 191 (one invalid date).

c. By law, an FCHR determination falling inside that [180-day] window would have been valid. A valid determination would have required Employee X to successfully complete a state administrative proceeding.

d. Since the FCHR’s determination fell outside of that window, though, it was invalid (ie, “null & void”). Therefore, Employee X had [already] been released from the state’s administrative requirements.
69. According to statute, the FCHR has authority to enter determinations within the 180-day window (highlights added):
“(3)...Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the [FCHR] shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred...”
70. However, once that six-month period ends, the state agency loses such power:
“(4)... In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause ... the aggrieved person may either:
(a) Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or
(8) In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause.”
Moreover, the FCHR cannot contravene this statute [even with a late-filed notice of determination] (please accord DeMario v Franklin, 648 So.2d 210, 213-214, (Fla. 4th DCA)).

71. Florida’s Supreme Court went on to say that the 180-day cut off renders any late-filed FCHR determination null & void:
“Reading the relevant provisions of the statute together clearly establishes that whenever the FCHR fails to make its determination within 180 days, even if the untimely determination is made before the filing of a lawsuit, the claimant may proceed to file a lawsuit under subsection (4).
72. Thus, once the 180-day window closes (regardless of any untimely FCHR determination), plaintiffs are no longer bound by state administrative proceedings. Instead, they are given one year to file suit (§760.11(4) FS) (which is what Employee X did).

73. In fact, the LT acknowledged that the closure of this 180-day window releases litigants from the bindings of a state administrative proceeding (highlights assed):
“As stated above, unless the FCHR fails to issue a determination in 180 days, a claimant must successfully complete the administrative review process before he can pursue a claim in court.”
In the instant case, the FCHR did [indeed] fail to issue its determination within the 180-day window (¶33 supra).

74. So, these statutes and Supreme Court holdings fit the facts of this appeal perfectly. And they showcase the materiality of the LT’s error.

75. By using the incorrect date, the LT ruled that the FCHR’s untimely notice of determination (ie, “Phantom Notice”) was valid [and timely] (¶33 supra). That false validity led the LT to conclude that Employee X’s state charges were time-barred.

76. Instead, had the LT used the correct date then it would have found that the FCHR’s 180-day window had closed.
a. A finding that would have mooted the state agency’s late notice of determination (ie, “Phantom Notice” - ¶33), and relinquished all administrative bindings from Employee X.
77. With administrative bindings detached, the LT would have ruled that Employee X’s state charges were not time-barred. The key was the starting date.
a. The correct starting date (ie, 4/10/19) would have led to this correct conclusion.

b. Now, it is key to see that the correct starting date is the only date to be used.

The Correct Starting Date is the Only Starting Date

78. According to Florida law, the starting date for a state discrimination complaint is determined by the timestamp that the FCHR affixes to it [on the same day it was received].

79. Florida’s legislature established this (highlights added):
On the same day the complaint is filed with the commission, the commission shall clearly stamp on the face of the complaint the date the complaint was filed with the commission... If the date the complaint is filed is clearly stamped on the face of the complaint, that date is the date of filing.
80. DOAH concurred (highlights added):
“However, she filed her Complaint on December 27, 2021 – which, according to section 760.11(1), is the date of filing because of the clear file stamp from FCHR.
81. DOAH - as an executive branch agency (§20.22(2)(f) FS) - is an arm of the state. Florida’s legislature, of course, is part of the state’s legislative branch.

82. Thus, the State of Florida – via its executive and legislative branches – holds that the FCHR’s timestamp establishes the filing date of a discrimination complaint.

83. In the instant case, the record shows that the FCHR ‘actually received’ Employee X’s Second Charge on April 10, 2019 (¶30, supra) (see 60Y-5.001(3) FAC).
a. That was the date he emailed it to the agency; and

b. That was the date that the agency stamped on his complaint.
84. Therefore, in addition to April 10, 2019 being the correct date, it is also the only date to be used for Employee X’s filing date.
a. This conclusion is backed by the State of Florida (ie, the government whose rules the LT’s decision was based on).

CONCLUSION I

85. The LT used the wrong date. This was clear (4/10 vs 4/26).

86. The error was material to its ruling (¶68-77 supra).

87. And, the correct date is the only applicable date (¶78-84).

88. WHEREFORE, this Appellate Court is well-positioned to reverse the decision from below. Because based on the ‘entire evidence’, this Court is imbued with ‘the definite and firm conviction’ that the Lower Tribunal made a mistake (Hybritech v. Monoclonal, 802 F.2d 1367 (1986)).

89. At the very least – and notwithstanding the LT’s other flaws (infra) – reversal will cure the cancerous basis of the decision below.

ISSUE II

Whether Accrediting Adjudication of an Excluded Charge – in contravention of The Seminal Case (McDonnell-Douglas v Green, 411 US 792 (1973)) - Constitutes Reversible Error

OVERVIEW II

90. Mr. Edward Gary Early (ALJ) infringed on Employee X’s constitutional right [to due process] when he:
a. hid evidence (¶27, ¶32 supra).
i. He did so by removing a crucial transcript page from the batch that he scanned; and
b. perjured himself (¶27, ¶32 supra).
i. He did so by lying in order to remove Employee X’s sex discrimination basis [from Employee X’s First Charge].
91. Company Y – as the benefactor of Mr. Early’s transgressions – is thereby unentitled to res judicata (or collateral estoppel).

92. Therefore, the LT erred by suggesting that Employee X’s due process rights were not violated [when it entertained those two doctrines].

STANDARD OF REVIEW II

93. The doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel are reviewable de novo (EEOC v Pemco, 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir 2004)):
“A district court’s conclusions as to res judicata are conclusions of law, and are thus reviewable de novo by this Court.”

ARGUMENT II

94. The Law of the Land states that removal of a discrimination basis from a lawsuit constitutes a violation of due process.
a. This holding even withstands events in which evidence still gets taken on the removed basis.
Any suggestion to the contrary is ‘erroneous’.

95. In the Improvident Order, the LT violated this principle. It suggested that Employee X’s due process rights were not violated [by the aforementioned hearing officer’s removal of Employee X’s sex discrimination basis]. The reason that the LT gave was that testimony was still taken on that removed basis:
“Notably, the record shows that contrary to [Employee X]’s argument, the [state hearing officer] made substantive findings on numerous allegations that were otherwise untimely or not raised in the underlying Charge.”
96. The US Supreme Court was faced with an identical assertion in McDonnell-Douglas v Green, 411 US 792 (1973) (“The Seminal Case”).

97. It stated that making findings of fact after excluding a discrimination charge still constitutes reversible error (highlights added):
  “[Employer] argues, as it did below, that [employee] sustained no prejudice from the trial court’s erroneous ruling, because, in fact, the [removed] issue of racial discrimination in the refusal to reemploy “was tried thoroughly” in a trial lasting four days, with “at least 80%” of the questions relating to the issue of “race.”

“...”

We cannot agree that the dismissal of [employee’s race] claim was harmless error

“...”

“[Employee] should have been accorded the right to prepare his case and plan the strategy of trial with the knowledge that the [excluded race] cause of action was properly before the [Lower Tribunal]. Accordingly, we remand the case for trial of [employee]’s claim of racial discrimination consistent with the views set forth below.”
98. A “remand” that must afford plaintiffs full & fair opportunities to present their discrimination cases (highlights added):
“In short, on the retrial, [employee] must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence [of Employer X’s discrimination]”
99. Full & Fair opportunities which – according to Florida’s 1DCA – equate to due process protection (highlights added):
Procedural due process includes the right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard [citations omitted] In the present case, the [lower tribunal] afforded GTECH a full and fair opportunity to contest the proposed agency action on any relevant ground, including the potential bias of the evaluation committee members.”

“...”

“Here, the parties were afforded due process of law
100. These rulings fit this issue perfectly, because:
a. the record shows that Florida removed Employee X’s sex discrimination basis (¶27 supra);

b. Florida still credited testimony to Employee X’s removed sex discrimination basis (¶32 supra); and

c. the LT suggested that the unlawful removal was cured by testimony allocation (¶95 supra).
101. Thus, the LT’s suggestion is the same suggestion that the US Supreme Court struck down in The Seminal Case. A suggestion which violates the constitution’s due process guarantees. A legal pillar, importantly, that precludes res judicata and collateral estoppel.

102. In EEOC v Pemco, 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004), this Court held that res judicata cannot apply if a decision was not made on the merits (highlights added):
“We have held that res judicata can be applied only if all of four factors are shown: "...(2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; ... and (4) both cases must involve the same causes of action."”
103. The EEOC decision took a similar holding regarding collateral estoppel (highlights added):
“Likewise, in this Circuit, collateral estoppel can apply only "when the parties are the same (or in privity) [and] if the party against whom the issue was decided had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding."”
104. In the instant case, Employee X was robbed of a ‘full & fair opportunity’ (ie, due process protection) to litigate his first administrative complaint [against Company Y].
a. The Seminal Case produces this conclusion.
105. Plus, the fact that Employee X’s sex discrimination basis was [intentionally/wrongfully] removed from his first administrative case (Recommended Order, Final Order) makes it clear that “a final judgment on the merits” was never reached.

CONCLUSION II

106. WHEREFORE, this Court is well-positioned to extinguish any lingering suggestions of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel. The Seminal Case renders them inoperable. Plus, the record below renders any contentions of Res-Judicata/Collateral-Estoppel to be ‘clearly erroneous’.

107. Most pertinently, this Court is well-positioned to declare that the proceeding below violated Employee X’s due process rights. A declaration that will support reversal. And, of course, a declaration that Employee X hereby asks this Court to issue; especially considering the LT’s subsequent abandonment of statutory law (Issue III, infra).

ISSUE III

Whether a District Court can Abandon Title VII’s Relation-Back Provision

OVERVIEW III

108. The LT erred (in a material way) when it failed to apply the relation-back provision to this case (¶44).

STANDARD OF REVIEW III

109. According to the courts of appeal, questions of law (such as this immediate one) are examined under the de novo standard of review:
“Consequently, we are not required to defer to the administrative law judge. Because the case involves a pure issue of law, we review the order by the de novo standard of review.”

ARGUMENT III

110. The LT acknowledged that Employee X’s lawsuit included an allegation of post-termination retaliation (¶44). An allegation that extended the continuing nature of Company Y’s unlawful discrimination. A fact-based allegation, importantly, that triggered the relation-back principle (highlights added):
“the principle that an act done at a later time is deemed by law to have occurred at a prior time, often for purposes of the statute of limitations or rules of procedure permitting amendment of pleadings.”
111. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure account for this principle:
“Relation Back of Amendments. When the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original pleading.”
The Federal Rules do the same (highlights added):
“(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;”
112. Valuably – and according to the FCHR - §760 FS allows for the relation-back provision:
“(4) Relation Back of Certain Complaints. A complaint which would not otherwise be timely may be filed if it:
(a) States that another complaint naming the same respondent is properly before the Commission and identifies that other complaint, and

(b) Alleges the same or additional facts which describe an unlawful employment practice related to or growing out of the subject matter of the other, identified complaint, and

(c) Would have been timely if filed at the time of, or other time subsequent to, the filing of the other, identified complaint. A complaint under this subsection may be filed by a new complainant and shall relate back to the date the other, identified complaint was first received.”
The same can be said about Title VII - according to the EEOC (highlights added):
“A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.
113. In fact, this Court acknowledges that the relation-back provision applies to discrimination suits (highlights added):
“Plaintiff Melissa Maledy, a former city revenue clerk, brings this lawsuit... under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54, and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)... Because she filed her amended complaint over three years after her termination, her FMLA claims are barred unless they "relates back" to her original complaint filed on March 22, 2010."'Relation back' causes an otherwise untimely claim to be considered timely by treating it as if it had been filed when the timely claims were filed." Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B), an "amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading."”
114. In the instant case, the relation-back provision applies because:
a. the Second Charge sets out acts of post-termination retaliation (which arose out of the [unlawful] conduct that was pinpointed in the First Charge);

b. the Second Charge included the same two parties (ie, Company Y vs Employee X); and

c. the defendant (ie, Company Y) was fully aware of the Second Charge’s imminence (via Employee X’s explicit opposition-of/abstinence-to Company Y’s continued lawlessness).

CONCLUSION III

115. WHEREFORE, this Court is well-positioned to reverse the decision below (on account of the LT’s failure to apply the relation-back provision). Especially considering how material the doctrine was to the LT’s ruling [on timeliness].

116. Another legal standard that the LT erred on was its misuse of the plausibility/evidentiary standard (Issue IV, infra).

ISSUE IV

Whether a District Court’s Misuse of the ‘Plausibility Standard’ Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion

OVERVIEW IV

117. The LT erred when it used the evidentiary standard (instead of the plausibility standard) when it dismissed Employee X’s post-termination retaliation counts.

STANDARD OF REVIEW IV

118. As highlighted before (Issue III, supra), questions of law (such as this one) are reviewed de novo:
“Consequently, we are not required to defer to the administrative law judge. Because the case involves a pure issue of law, we review the order by the de novo standard of review.”

ARGUMENT IV

119. In its Premeditated Order (¶41), the LT examined the likelihood that Company Y was behind the attacks that Employee X endured. Weighing – at various points – Company Y’s connection to the people who carried out [some of] the acts. The LT even ignored the explicit encouragement that Company Y gave to [some of] the retaliatory actors.

120. Ultimately, the LT concluded that the retaliation that Employee X survived stemmed from “independent actions of third parties”.

121. Of course, the LT’s weighing of evidence/allegations breached the pleading standard that the LT was required to stick to. In fact, the LT [itself] has stated that it is wrong to use the evidentiary standard on [prospective] orders of dismissal:
“The pleading standard should not be confused with the evidentiary standard; detailing all evidence in a pleading or attaching evidence to a pleading could run afoul of the “short and plain statement” requirement. Presenting arguments and all evidence in a complaint generally is improper.”
122. Plus, the LT had [previously] reiterated the requirement that [prospective] orders of dismissal must not re-weigh evidence:
“[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the complaint’s legal sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions or addressing the merits of the case.”
123. Thus, the LT’s use of the wrong legal standard amounted to an abuse of discretion.
“A district court abuses its direction if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
124. Of course, abuses of discretion are reversible on appeal (highlights added):
“We conclude that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Wang and Anderson's opinions, erred in her characterization of General's opinion, and failed to offer specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting part of Garrison's testimony. We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion

“...”

We reverse the judgment of the district court

CONCLUSION IV

125. WHEREFORE, this Court is well-positioned to reverse the LT’s Premeditated Order, because it was based on an abuse of discretion. This abuse was particularly important, because it infected the remainder of the proceeding (Issues V, VIII infra).

ISSUE V

Whether a District Court can Abandon the Onus to Remand State Charges

OVERVIEW V

126. The LT erred by abandoning its responsibility to remand (or to [at least] address the remanding-of) the state charges [back to the state court].

STANDARD OF REVIEW V

127. Decisions to remand are questions of law. And – as documented earlier (Issues III, IV supra) – questions of law receive a de novo standard of review:
“Consequently, we are not required to defer to the administrative law judge. Because the case involves a pure issue of law, we review the order by the de novo standard of review.”

ARGUMENT V

128. This cause of action has always involved state charges (from FL). In fact, the case below originated in state court (¶34).

129. Of course, the state charges (ie, the §760 FS charges) differ from the federal charges (ie, §1981, the EPA, Title VII, etc). This is important in the instant case, because the LT’s [erroneous timeliness] rulings are not binding on the state:
“Federal court decisions on issues of state law are not binding on and have limited precedential effect in state courts. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).”
130. Thus, all of the orders-on-appeal (ie, the Improvident Order; the Premeditated Order; and the Final Order) should have remanded the state charges back to state court (or [at least] addressed the topic) (highlights added):
“Absent a special consideration, a determination arising solely under one statute should not automatically be binding when a similar question arises under another statute... This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary. This case provides an excellent example of the differences in two statutes. Racial discrimination in employment is an unfair labor practice that violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act if the discrimination is unjustified and interferes with the affected employees' right to act concertedly for their own aid or protection... In contrast, racial discrimination in employment is prohibited by Title VII without reference to the effect on the employees' right to unite. Hence, certain discriminatory practices that are valid under the National Labor Relations Act may be invalid under Title VII...

Similarly, the United States Senate rejected a proposed amendment which would have made Title VII the exclusive means of relief for most discriminatory employment practices. 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-52 (1964). This action is some evidence at least that Congress, realizing the differences between Title VII and other statutes directly or indirectly proscribing racial discrimination in employment, did not intend for a decision under one such provision to bar automatically a suit under another statutory scheme.”

CONCLUSION V

131. WHEREFORE – if this Court divests the LT of pendent jurisdiction then - this Court will be well-positioned to direct the LT to remand Employee X’s state charges back to the state court [from which they came]. Speaking of the state, this Court is also primed to examine the unconstitutionality of Florida’s conduct/laws (Issues VI, VII infra).

ISSUE VI

Whether a State’s Unconstitutional/Obstructive Conduct Constitutes a Miscarriage of Justice

OVERVIEW VI

132. Throughout its handling of the matter below, the State of Florida performed a miscarriage of justice [in its attempt to cover for Company Y].

STANDARD OF REVIEW VI

133. According to the US Supreme Court, miscarriages of justice are reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard (highlights added):
“Abuse-of-discretion review of the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice is analogous to the abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 11 sanctions... In the present circumstances, where the subject of our review for an abuse of discretion is an appellate court's conclusion that a threatened miscarriage of justice is sufficient to justify recalling the mandate, I believe that we similarly must give some deference to the Court of Appeals's preliminary analysis that there may have been a misapplication of a legal standard, even though we would not defer to it if we were addressing the ultimate question on the merits, whether a trial court had committed legal error.”
134. Of course, this Court established that an abuse-of-discretion occurs when improper procedures lead to a determination (highlights added):
“A district court abuses its direction if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”

ARGUMENT VI

135. The case below suffered from a lot of procedural improprieties (¶32). Improprieties which included – but were not limited to:
a. the State of Florida (via DOAH) destroying evidence;

b. the State of Florida (via DOAH) committing perjury;

c. the State of Florida (via DOAH) ratifying perjury;

d. the State of Florida (via the FCHR) drafting a null & void determination;

e. the State of Florida (via the FCHR) mailing that null & void determination to the wrong person;4/

f. the State of Florida (via the FCHR) inducing the mailing of Employee X’s Right-to-Sue letter to the wrong person;4/

g. the State of Florida (via the FCHR) refusing to relinquish jurisdiction; and

h. much more
136. These acts – individually and in total – were aimed at defeating Employee X’s constitutional rights. Constitutional rights that included – but were not limited to:
a. being robbed of his opportunity to litigate the sex discrimination basis of his lawsuit;

b. suffering a 3-year delay in his access to the court;

c. enduring an additional 1.5-year obstruction on his Title VII counts;

d. sustaining a 7.5-year impairment of his access to a jury; and

e. much more.
138. As such, precedent holds that the State of Florida performed a miscarriage of justice [at Employee X’s expense] (highlights added):
““...in determining whether there was a ‘departure from the essential requirements of law’ reviewing courts have inquired:
(1) whether the lower court proceeded ‘according to justice’ or deprived the petitioner of fundamental rights, resulting in serious and material injury or gross injustice;

(2) whether the judgment is authorized by law or is invalid, illegal, essentially irregular, or prejudicial;

(3) whether the court rendering judgment lacked jurisdiction;

(4) whether the circuit court’s appellate judgment violates established principles of law;

(5) whether the judgment results in a substantial injury to the legal rights of the petitioner;

(6) whether the judgment constitutes a palpable miscarriage of justice;

or (7) whether the lower court applied the wrong rule of law to the evidence””
139. According to the US Supreme Court, these miscarriages should be reversed:
“Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protection where the procedures implementing a neutral statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds... decisions of this Court have been concerned largely with discrimination. Since the Fourteenth Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 (1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other stages in the selection process,

...

In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner's conviction be reversed.”

CONCLUSION VI

140. WHEREFORE, this Appellate Court is well-positioned to reverse the decision below. And Employee X hereby asks that it does.

141. Furthermore, Employee X hereby asks this Court to issue specific instructions which include – but are not limited to:
a. the LT must vacate/disregard the FCHR’s Final Order;

b. the LT must vacate/disregard DOAH’s Recommended Order;

c. the LT must vacate/disregard the FCHR’s phantom notice; and

d. the LT must place the parties on track to acquire their [constitutionally-guaranteed] trial-by-jury.
142. This reversal – alongside these instructions – will be enhanced by the declaration that §760 FS is unconstitutional (Issue VII infra).

ISSUE VII7/

Whether the FCHR’s Determinations (found under §760 FS) are Constitutional

OVERVIEW VII7/

143. The errors/obstructions from below were [largely] borne out of the unconstitutionality of a state statute (ie, §760.11(7) FS).

STANDARD OF REVIEW VII7/

144. Of course, a statute’s constitutionality is a pure question of law, and therefore receives de novo review (highlights added0:
“Cooper’s petition for a writ of certiorari asked us to decide whether the Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the punitive damages award under the correct standard and also whether the award violated the criteria we articulated in Gore. We granted the petition to resolve confusion among the Courts of Appeals on the first question. [4] 531 US 923 (2000). We now conclude that the constitutional issue merits de novo review.”

ARGUMENT VII7/

145. §760.11(7) allows the state to infringe on a person’s [constitutionally-guaranteed] right to access the court (highlights added):
“If the commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing...

If the administrative law judge finds that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, he or she shall issue an appropriate recommended order to the commission prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including back pay. Within 90 days of the date the recommended order is rendered, the commission shall issue a final order...

In the event the final order issued by the commission determines that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the aggrieved person may bring, within 1 year of the date of the final order, a civil action under subsection (5) as if there has been a reasonable cause determination or accept the affirmative relief offered by the commission”
146. Of course - by that same token – the state statute infringes on people’s [constitutional] rights to trials-by-jury.

147. Put plainly, the State of Florida – via the FCHR – will obstruct a litigant’s access-to-the-courts (as well as his/her right to a trial-by-jury) whenever it issues a “no cause” determination.

148. This statute is particularly egregious because the FCHR issues “no cause” determinations 86% of the time.6/

149. Plus – in the instant case - this statute is specifically egregious because the FCHR used it to block the First Charge from entering the trial courts.

150. Then - two years later - the FCHR used this statute to try to block Employee X’s Second Charge from entering the judiciary. Although Employee X caught the FCHR red-handed, the damage was still done (as Employee X was delayed [for 1.5 years] from attaching his Title VII charges - ¶34 supra).

151. According to the US Supreme Court, infringements on a person’s access-to-the-courts is unconstitutional:
“This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered, for example, in choosing the methods used to provide meaningful access. But the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”

“...”

“The District Court initially held only that petitioners had violated the "fundamental constitutional guarantee," ibid., of access to the courts. It did not thereupon thrust itself into prison administration. Rather, it ordered petitioners themselves to devise a remedy for the violation, strongly suggesting that it would prefer a plan providing trained legal advisors. Petitioners chose to establish law libraries, however, and their plan was approved with only minimal changes over the strong objections of respondents. Prison administrators thus exercised wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements in this case. The judgment is Affirmed.”
152. This Court – via its 5th Circuit origins - has said the same (highlights added):
“Access to the courts is a fundamental precept of our system of government. No citizen, regardless of his transgressions, is ever to be legally consigned to the total and unreviewed power of any single branch of government. To make the system work, to maintain the proper checks and the proper balance, no person subject to the power of government can be denied communication with or access to each of the three spheres of governmental authority.”
153. As such, these fundamental impingements (which §760.11(7) FS carries out) meet the textbook definition of unconstitutional (highlights added):
“conflicting with some provision of the Constitution. A statute found to be unconstitutional is considered void or as if it had never been, and consequently all rights, contracts or duties that depend on it are void. Similarly, no one can be punished for having refused obedience to the law once it is found to be unconstitutional.”
154. The textbook solution – as laid out by the US Supreme Court – is to render the statute void (highlights added):
“The Circuit Court held the [state] statute unconstitutional as infringing on the freedom of the press, and dismissed the action. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees, and that civil remedies, including damages, were available, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.”

“...”

“Appellant contends the statute is void on its face because it purports to regulate the content of a newspaper in violation of the First Amendment.”

“...”

“It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the [statute is unconstitutional]. It is so ordered.”

CONCLUSION VII7/

155. WHEREFORE, this Court is also well-positioned to deem §760.11(7) FS to be unconstitutional. Plus, this Court can issue a mandate – and Employee X hereby asks that it does - declaring that §760 FS defeated/delayed/hampered Americans’ rights to trials-by-jury.

156. Speaking of delays/impingements/unconstitutionalities, the LT – imbued with the state’s lawlessness – manifested a grave injustice on Employee X (Issue VIII, infra).

ISSUE VIII

Whether a District Court Commits Manifest Injustice when it Dishonors/Violates its own Law-of-the-Case

OVERVIEW VIII

157. The Lower Tribunal manifested an injustice by dishonoring/violating its own Law-of-the-Case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW VIII

158. Manifest injustice – as well as the ‘Law of the Case’ doctrine – is a pure question of law. As such, it receives a de novo review (highlights added):
“Consequently, we are not required to defer to the administrative law judge. Because the case involves a pure issue of law, we review the order by the de novo standard of review.”

ARGUMENT VIII

159. The LT manifested the destiny that it sought for Company Y; while doing so at the expense of the judiciary’s integrity.

160. First, the LT ruled – via the Improvident Order - that Employee X filed an untimely lawsuit.
a. The problem, of course, was that the LT used an invalid date for its timeliness calculation (Issue I, supra).

b. The truth, of course, was that Employee X did [indeed] file his lawsuit on time; albeit, hampered by the state’s obstructions (Issue VI, supra).

c. The LT’s desire, however, was to ‘acquit’ Company Y.
161. Then – upon recognizing its error – the LT manifested a scenario that would satisfy its desire. In its Premeditated Order, the LT detached the continuing nature of Company Y’s underlying illegalities.
a. The problem, of course, was that – in order to do so - the LT usurped the jury’s authority (Issue IV, supra).

b. The truth, of course, was that Company Y’s continued illegalities related-back to the First Charge (III, supra).

c. The LT’s desire, however, was a relentless pursuit of ‘acquittal’ [for Company Y].
162. Finally – after 3+ years of obstruction/delay – the LT effectuated its destiny with summary judgment [in favor of Company Y]. Therein, the LT claimed that time no longer mattered in the calculation of timeliness; thereby ruling that Employee X did not file suit in time.
a. The problem of course, was that the LT manufactured a fiction [in order] to disregard time (Issue III-IV, supra).

b. The truth, of course, was that Employee X did [indeed] file his lawsuit on time (Issue I, supra).

c. The LT’s desire, of course, was to ‘acquit’ Company Y. A desire, of course, which the LT fulfilled.
163. As such, the LT’s manifest destiny manifested an injustice onto Employee X. The textbook definition of manifest injustice is as follows (highlights added):
“a plain error that impacts substantial rights and impairs the fundamental fairness of a proceeding.”
164. The Eleventh Circuit (ie, this Court) outlined how to legally attach manifest injustice to a proceeding (highlights added):
“Our case law equates manifest injustice with the plain error standard of review. United States v. McClendon, 195 F.3d 598, 603 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). To demonstrate manifest injustice, a petitioner must demonstrate
(1) that there was error;

(2) that was plain;

(3) that affected his substantial rights; and

(4) that affected the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.”
165. In short, this Court created the following 4-part test for establishing manifest injustice:
a. there must be an error;

b. the error must be plain;

c. the error must have affected one’s substantial rights; and

d. the error must have affected the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
166. The calamities [found] in the instant case meet all four criteria.

167. For starters, the LT committed an error regarding Employee X’s filing date (Issue I supra). {Element 1 satisfied (✓)}

168. Secondly, the LT’s error was plain (ie, 4/10/19 vs 4/26/19 – Issue I supra). {Element 2 satisfied (✓)}

169. Thirdly, the LT’s error has affected Employee X’s substantial rights. Namely, Employee X’s: (i) access-to-the-courts (Issue VI supra); (ii) access to a trial-by-jury (Issue VI supra); and (iii) finances. In fact, in Agro Dutch v USA, the Federal Circuit held that financial injuries are substantial injuries (highlights added):
“The court added that not granting relief would result in "manifest injustice" to the non-party importer of record, which was likely to be rendered insolvent unless the entries were reliquidated at the proper, lower duty rate.”
{Element 3 satisfied (✓)}

170. Fourthly/Lastly, the LT’s error has affected the fundamental fairness of this proceeding. It has done so, notably, by: (i) spurring the 3-year-long discovery stay; and (ii) limiting discovery (see Premeditated Order). Thereby preventing Employee X from having a full & fair opportunity to litigate his case (highlights added):
“In short, on the retrial, [employee] must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence [of Employer X’s discrimination]”

“...”

“[Employee] should have been accorded the right to prepare his case and plan the strategy of trial with the knowledge that the [excluded race] cause of action was properly before the [Lower Tribunal]. Accordingly, we remand the case for trial of [employee]’s claim of racial discrimination consistent with the views set forth below.”
{Element 4 satisfied (✓)}

171. Altogether, multiple authorities (ie, textbooks, appellate courts, supreme courts) have converged to declare that a manifest injustice has occurred. This declaration is further supported by the particulars of the LT’s professed time-bar; which gets defeated by the KPERs decision (highlights added):
“The most recent Eighth Circuit opinion dealt primarily with the defendants' assertions that KPERS's claims were time barred by K.S.A. 60-512 and K.S.A. 60-513(a) and suggested that KPERS's contention that its claims are not subject to any statute of limitations may not be relitigated under the law of the case doctrine. (Slip opinion at 16). Nevertheless, the opinion stated the law of the case doctrine does not apply when it results in manifest injustice

CONCLUSION VIII

172. WHEREFORE, this Court is well-positioned to cure the manifest injustice that exists/persists in this case. And Employee X hereby asks that it does - with this Court’s explicit instructions to vacate: (i) the Improvident Order; (ii) the Premeditated Order; and (iii) the Final Order.

⧗⧗⧗

With a Valid Date in place (among other things)/

May this Court validate this case (among other things)?/

With an order of reversal, remand, and/or vacate//

⧖⧖⧖

CONCLUSION

But for the Lower Tribunal’s predestined venture into covering for Company Y, this appeal would not exist. The LT manifested many falsehoods - and departed from several core tenets of law - in order to arrive at the injustices below.

WHEREFORE, Appellant (ie, ‘Employee X’) asks this Court to (a) vacate the lower tribunal’s order; (b) reverse it; and/or (c) remand this case for further proceedings (consistent with a repair of the LT’s manifest injustices).

Dated this 14th day of October 2024.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Elias Makere
Elias Makere, FSA, MAAA
Appellant
PO Box 324
Hobart, IN 46342
P: 904.294.0026
E: Justice.Actuarial@gmail.com
W: TextBookDiscrimination.com
   Get Booked Up on Justice!

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. Type-Volume

This document complies with the word limit of Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(i) Fed. R. App. P., because - excluding the parts of the document exempted by Rule 32(f) - this document contains 11,243 words.

or

This brief complies with the line limit prescribed by Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(i) Fed. R. App. P., because – excluding the parts of the document exempted by Rule 32(f) – this document contains [NNNN] lines of monospaced text.

2. Typeface and Type-Style

This document uses Courier New (12-Pt) Font; thereby complying with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5)(B) Fed. R. App. P.. This document also satisfies the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6).
/s/ Elias Makere
DateElias Makere, FSA, MAAA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of October 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Courts by using PACER; which will send a notice of electronic filing to the attached service list.
/s/ Elias Makere

Endnotes:

1/ [A0210] means page 210 from the appendix.

2/ at USFLMD alone, Allstate has been sued by more than 15 employees [for discrimination] since 1990:
Augello v Allstate, (2:01-cv-00115)
Bologna v Allstate, (2:01-cv-00645)
Braedyn v Allstate, (6:06-cv-00739)
Brennan v Allstate, (5:02-cv-00168)
Cola v Allstate, (6:02-cv-01001)
Davis v Allstate, (8:20-cv-00852)
Dorsey v Allstate, (3:02-cv-00434)
Howard v Allstate, (8:01-cv-00513)
Huber v Allstate, (6:96-cv-01254)
Kahn v AHL, (3:06-cv-00731)
Lyons v Allstate, (8:96-cv-00690)
Makere v Allstate, (3:20-cv-00905)
Martin v Allstate, (3:96-cv-01247)
Martin v Allstate, (8:98-cv-02598)
McCranie v Allstate, (3:92-cv-00664)
Mendivil v Allstate, (8:01-cv-02415)
Ortiz v Allstate, (2:10-cv-00280)
Reis v Allstate, (8:12-cv-02452)
Rice v Allstate, (8:98-cv-00601)
Thompson v Allstate, (8:97-cv-02055)
Wright v Allstate, (6:20-cv-00305)
Wynn v AHL, (3:01-cv-00341)
3/ Mr. Early – due to his unlawful actions – became the defendant in a §1983 action (4:21-cv-00096; USFLND). At USFLND, Appellant tried to transfer/consolidate the Early case with the instant case. However, transfer was denied; and the Early case has matriculated to this court (22-13613-H; USCA11).

4/ this is one of the material facts that Appellee (ie, ‘Company Y’) is destined to lie about [in this Court] (as Appellee has done throughout the proceeding below).

5/ Employee X first filed suit in state court (on 6/30/2020). That state case subsequently consolidated with this federal case.
  • State case = Duval County, FL (16-2020-CA-3770)
  • Consolidated as 3:20-cv-00921.
6/ see any of the FCHR’s annual reports
TextBookDiscrimination.com/Reports/FL/FCHR/Annual/
7/ Pursuant to Rule 5.1 Fed. R. Civ. P., Employee X filed a Notice of a Constitutional Challenge. He did so on May 30, 2024 {#127}. [A0016]

Link to Underlying Complaint (HTML, PDF, Video)

HTMLTextBookDiscrimination.com/Allstate/Complaint-Full.html
PDFTextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/USFLMD/20000905_AAC_20211104_230439.pdf
VIDEOhttps://youtu.be/e3mgBPHesXg

Electronic Copy (text-searchable, hyperlinked):

TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/CA11/24011336_IB_20241014_220206.pdf
TextBookDiscrimination.com/Files/CA11/24011336_ADD_20241014_122305.pdf
TextBookDiscrimination.com/Allstate/OpeningBrief02.html
Congratulations! You're now Booked Up on the Opening Brief that a Floridian filed in the discrimination case against Allstate Insurance Company.

Please get the justice you deserve.

Sincerely,



www.TextBookDiscrimination.com
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Makere v Allstate (3:20-cv-00905) (USFLMD)
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Reading List: Clear Error Reading List: Timeliness
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Cases: Allstate Discrimination
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